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INTRODUCTION
Two perhaps overworked illustrations originating in Chi-
nese folklore aptly describe the current juncture of civil litiga-
tion. The first, "May you live in interesting times," a Chinese
blessing that repeatedly pokes its way into prime-time televi-
sion, has been more than fulfilled for those who follow Ameri-
can litigation practice and policy. The past quarter-century has
seen virtually non-stop efforts to alter disputing practice,
spawning a growth industry of both alternative dispute resolu-
tion ("ADR") and seemingly perpetual amendment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules"), spiced further
by frequent congressional forays into the field. The "interesting
times" blessing seems decidedly a mixed one, at least for law-
yers who place a high value on stability.
Another popularized Chinese legacy is the similarity of the
characters representing the western words "crisis" and "oppor-
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tunity." Only a slight alteration of the writer's stroke changes
the meaning of the symbol. Lawyers undoubtedly have a simi-
lar appreciation of the fine line between reform and chaos.
Trained to view "reform" as a good word and an even better
activity,' lawyers are also acquainted with the law of unintend-
ed consequences and the general theory of the second-best. Any
reform effort is viewed as holding the potential for making
things worse rather than better.
This Article assesses the landscape of litigation reform
activity and the current political tension between continuing
commitment to open access to the courts and a desire for fast-
er, less expensive dispute resolution. It will also examine the
state of the reform process but refrain from evaluating specific
proposals.2 Part I describes major recent and current activities
affecting American litigation. Part II then analyzes current
debates about litigation by identifying the leading schools of
thought on both litigation practice and litigation reform. It
attempts to situate current litigation issues in a broader inqui-
ry: whether the perceived post-1938 consensus attending adju-
dicatory procedure and civil litigation reform has merely come
unglued (in whole or in part) or, rather, whether it has been
supplanted by a new consensus, a "new paradigm," reflecting
an altered vision of the litigation process. Finally, Part III
proposes a more integrated and deliberate method to govern
civil litigation reform as a means of thwarting troublesome
recent tendencies.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE AND
LITIGATION REFORM: INSTITUTIONS, IDEOLOGY AND
ACTIVITY
To some extent, summarizing social history is reductionist.
The very activity of condensing events in a sufficiently coher-
ent form necessitates some oversimplification, even in lengthy
descriptions. Any narrative of litigation change tends to leave
1 See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at
War With the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993).
2 I admit, however, to having opinions about the merits of particular recent
reforms. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the Adversary System,
27 VAL. U. L. REV. 313 (1993) (criticizing proposed disclosure rules and presump-
tive limits on interrogatories and depositions).
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out, gloss over or minimize discordant data or inconclusive
phenomena. But without such simplification, communicating
the "gist" of an area is virtually impossible in anything less
than a semester-long course or, even, an academic career.
Some detail and precision are lost in the interest of imposing
some order upon and explanation of the material. Yet, there
remains the constant danger of producing an overly simplistic
or misleading explanation.3 Notwithstanding this difficulty, a
review of the litigation landscape permits some general obser-
vations.
A. The Increasing Politicization of Litigation Issues
One aspect of a possible new era is the increasing ad hoc
activity of various interest groups, including the bench and the
organized bar, primarily pursued through official organizations
such as the Judicial Conference, the Federal Judicial Center,
the American Bar Association ("ABA"), and the American Law
Institute. Traditionally, of course, judges and lawyers have
lobbied Congress and state legislatures for litigation change, as
demonstrated by the saga of the Rules Enabling Act ("Enabling
Act" or "Act").4 But, the legal profession's more recent "politi-
cal" activity regarding litigation reform differs from the tradi-
tional model in several ways.
First, the participation of both groups, particularly the
judiciary, has been more institutionalized. During the Nine-
teenth Century and the time of debate over the Enabling Act,
the federal judiciary lacked today's infrastructure of an orga-
nized Judicial Conference, an Administrative Office and staff
SLike any summary, my synopsis of changes in civil litigation practice and
thinking can be attacked as insufficiently sensitive to the subtleties of the topic.
For example, I posit that we recently have seen a trend toward greater legislative
involvement in matters of litigation procedure. However, in sketching this picture
of developments, I do not mean to suggest that Congress was inert about litigation
matters prior to 1970. Obviously, the changes of which I write are matters of
degree. Nonetheless, acknowledging this "nonabsolutism" of historical phenomena, I
conclude that adjudicatory procedure and litigation policymaking have changed
significantly during the past 15-20 years and continue in flux, prompting me to
question whether we have crossed the metaphorical Rubicon and seen a paradigm
shift in these two areas.
" See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982) (describing the 60-year process of reform efforts, including 30
years of debate and lobbying culminating in the Act).
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and a "policy think-tank" arm such as the Federal Judicial
Center.5 The modern, more institutionalized judiciary displays
both greater capacity to generate litigation proposals and in-
creased ability to react to the initiatives of others, although
neither trait ensures that the judicial establishment will suc-
ceed in persuading other policymakers about its policy views.6
I use the term "judicial establishment" to denote some-
thing of a power structure in the administration of these orga-
nizations that represent the bench. Although there are now
approximately 800 federal judges,7 their individual influence
on policymaking varies widely. Many, or perhaps most, judges
have no direct impact because of inexperience, preoccupation
with demanding daily activities, indifference, political
marginalization or other reasons.' A relatively small number of
"insider" judges, however, seem to exert great influence,
through their appointment to important positions in the judi-
cial establishment, but also because of prestigious reputations
or sustained activity in litigation reform.
Often, the traits of influence are cumulative: a judge of
high reputation is active in litigation reform and is appointed
to an official policymaking position. For example, William
Schwarzer, a well-regarded district judge (Northern District of
The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") was created in 1967 as the "research,
development and training arm of the federal judicial system." See THOMAS E.
WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988) (description of FJC on book
cover). The Chief Justice chairs the FJC Board of eight persons, including the
Director of the Administrative Office and six judges elected by the Judicial Confer-
ence. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
' See infra note 93 and accompanying text (regarding the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990).
7 See ADMINISTRATiVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, Appendix
(1992) (at close of 1991, 167 authorized appellate judgeships and 649 authorized
district judgeships).
' Individually and collectively, however, "average" judges affect litigation policy
indirectly because the policymaking establishment responds to their application of
rules and statutes, and their administration of caseload. In my view, though, this
impact is as attenuated as it is undeniable. A rank-and-file judge rendering opin-
ions and presiding over cases is simply not a true "player" in litigation policy even
if some of her decisions are sufficiently provocative to affect reform debates. Re-
cently, a well-known district judge expressed this view in stronger terms. "There is
little that is democratic within the Third Branch. The Chief Justice, the Judicial
Conference, and even committees thereof, regularly inform Congress as to the
'views of the judiciary' often without seeking the yeas and nays." G. Thomas
Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Refor-
mation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. REV. 1935, 1945 (1993).
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California) appointed in 1977, has written frequently about hot
litigation topics such as complex antitrust cases, Rule 11, sum-
mary judgment and discovery,9 and in 1990 was appointed
Director of the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC" or "Center"). In
addition to administering the FJC, Judge Schwarzer has used
the Center as something of a bully pulpit from which to contin-
ue advancing his proposals, including most recently a proposed
amendment to Rule 68 which would permit partial shifting of
liability for counsel fees. ° Although he is not a member of the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the
Committee directed the Reporter to embody Judge Schwarzer's
Rule 68 proposal in draft rule language that was widely circu-
lated for informal comment during early 1993." Similarly,
other respected Judges such as former Harvard Law School
professor Robert Keeton (District of Massachusetts, Chair of
the Standing Committee on Rules) and former Yale Law
School professor, Judge Ralph Winter (Second Circuit, former
member of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and current
Chair of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee) are, to use
Orwell's memorable phrase but without suggesting Orwellian
implications, much "more equal than others" 2 with regard to
the judicial role in litigation reform.
Because membership in either an Advisory Committee or
the Standing Committee result from appointment by the Chief
Justice, the Chief plays a major but often overlooked role in
the formation of litigation policy. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
although at times scathingly critical of perceived Orwellian
political power and social control, 3 would presumably acknowl-
9 See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay:
Would Disclosure Be More Effective Than Discovery? JUDICATURE, Dec.-Jan. 1990,
at 178; William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Dis-
covery Reform, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 703 (1989); William W Schwarzer, Sanctions
Under Amended Rule 11: A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); William W
Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues
of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
10 See William W Schwarzer, Fee Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to
Reducing Cost of Litigation, JUDICATURE, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at 147.
"1 At its May 1993 meeting, the Advisory Committee placed the Rule 68 draft
on an informal hold pending further research regarding settlement practices in
litigation. A significant expected source of such information is the Federal Judicial
Center directed by Judge Schwarzer.
12 See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (1946).
13 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-20 (1979)
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edge that his appointment power is quite a political one and
carries with it substantial power to shape the litigation reform
agenda through controlling membership on important commit-
tees. Similarly, his power to appoint the FJC director enhances
his ability to shape the landscape of litigation. The Chief Jus-
tice, however is not all-powerful even in this domain. The Judi-
cial Conference membership is comprised of the Chief Justice,
the Chief Judge of each Circuit Court and one other judge
selected from each Circuit; membership is not subject to the
Chief Justice's control.14 Because the chief judge positions re-
sult in part from seniority, the Judicial Conference may differ
in view from the Chief Justice to the extent that age and se-
niority differences reflect the influence of different presidents
and appointment criteria. Although recently there have ap-
peared to be no great divergences between the Chief and the
Judicial Conference, there is at least some possibility of such
tension as Carter appointees become Circuit Court Chief Judg-
es while Nixon/Reagan appointee Rehnquist is Chief Justice.
But the possibility of ideological clash may also have been
reduced in the most recent Court transmittal of proposed
amendments to Rules 11 and 26 through 37 (discussed in
greater detail below) as the Court appears to have adopted a
deferential standard of review in judging Judicial Conference
referrals.15
The second difference from the traditional political model
is that the profession's participation includes a greater percent-
age of both bench and bar despite the paradoxical prominence
of a small group of influential insider judges. And although
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from majority opinion holding race-conscious affirmative
action plan to violate Title VII and comparing majority result to the oppressive
happenings in George Orwell's 1984).
"' See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The Judicial Conference also includes the Chief
Judge of the Court of International Trade.
1" But, of course, the Judicial Conference proposals are unlikely to clash with
the Chief Justice's preferences so long as the Conference does not substantially
alter the proposals of the Advisory Committees, whose members are hand-picked
by the Chief Justice. In practice, the relationship between the Conference and the
Committees has been a mix of deference and conflict. For example, the Judicial
Conference recently declined to approve an Advisory Committee proposal to amend
summary judgment (or "judgment as a matter of law") Rule 56 and revised a pro-
posed amended Rule 11 to make sanctions discretionary ("may") rather than man-
datory ("shall"), but otherwise did not disturb substantial Committee proposals to
change Rule 11 and the discovery process.
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insiders may have great influence in the modern judicial estab-
lishment, many more outsiders can participate easily as com-
pared to earlier eras. In 1988, the Rules Enabling Act was
amended to increase the openness of the process by mandating
formal periods of public comment prior to the formal referral of
Federal Rules amendments to the Supreme Court. 16 The typi-
cal path of an amendment to the Federal Rules begins with a
proposal, either from within or without the Advisory Commit-
tee, and is followed by consideration, solicitation of informal
comments, further review, referral to the Standing Committee,
publication of the Rule for formal comment, at least one hear-
ing on the proposed rule, reconsideration by the Advisory Com-
mittee and Standing Committee and then referral to the Su-
preme Court if the Rule is provisionally approved. The Court
considers the rule change and, if it agrees, adopts the amended
rule and transmits it to Congress no later than May 1.17 If
Congress does nothing, the Rule becomes effective on Decem-
ber 1.18 Congress can act to alter the proposed amendment or
disapprove it entirely. 9
Rules Advisory Committee hearings are open to the public
unless the Committee specifically enters an executive ses-
sion.2" Upon request, the Judicial Conference routinely pro-
vides the names, addresses and phone numbers of Committee
members, who can be contacted directly by persons wishing to
make a case for or against change.21 Although participation by
le 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1988).
17 Id. § 2074(a).
'8 Id.
W Id. ("Such rule shall take effect . . . unless otherwise provided by law.").
'o Id. § 2073(c)(1). At least one legal scholar made a point of sitting in on and
following the Advisory Committee meetings crucial to reformulation of Rule 11 and
analyzed the Committee's resulting product in a legal periodical well before the
proposed change was referred to the Supreme Court. See Carl Tobias, Reconsid-
ering Rule 11, 466 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992).
21 To be sure, the Committee members are under no obligation to take calls or
read letters outside the "official" record of comments on a proposal. My point re-
mains, however: Committee membership is not secretive and there is no per se
ban on ex parte contact with individual Committee members. In fact, it appears
from informal statements made by Committee members that they gather a good
deal of information and make determinations based in part on their conversations
with academics, lawyers or litigants. Although this process is not necessarily neu-
tral (the Committee members, like everybody else, tend to talk to their friends,
who tend to share similar experiences and views), neither is it restrictive. Part III,
infra, suggests changes to make the Committee's database more evenhanded.
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the profession's nearly 800,000 lawyers is not widespread,
neither is it restricted. By comparison, the original drafting of
the Federal Rules during the 1930s was a much more closed
affair. A handful of prominent white male lawyers drawn
largely from the Northeastern states was selected and deliber-
ated in relative anonymity before producing a fully developed
code of civil procedure." Although this group may have pro-
duced a set of rules favoring openness in adjudication,23 there
is no avoiding the essential elitism of the process.24
Furthermore, the individuals and organizations providing
input into the law reform process have become more diverse.
Federal judgeships are no longer the exclusive domain of men
of Northern European lineage, extracted solely from the
prosecutor's office or the downtown law firms. The increased
politicization of the post-Warren Court era has also brought
greater ideological and political diversity to the bench, which
varies according to the nominating President and home state
Senators of the Judge. Consequently, the federal bench is less
cohesive today regarding litigation issues. The composition of
today's practicing bar and legal academy reflect similar chang-
es. In particular, the activists and leadership of organizations
like the ABA as well as state and local bar associations are a
less homogeneous bunch. Socially and professionally, they are
less linked to the bench and more likely to differ in opinion.
"Special interest" lawyer's groups such as the American Trial
Lawyers Association ("ATLA"), comprised of plaintiffs lawyers,
and Lawyers for Civil Justice, a defense bar organization, have
formed or expanded as well, bringing their respective substan-
tive agendas to the field of procedure.25
2 See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494, 498 n.20 (1986) (listing Committee members); see also, Stephen
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
See Resnik, supra note 22, at 498-502.
24 As Stephen Subrin notes in his article and emphasized at his presentation
during this Symposium, see Stephen Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You
Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993), the process that produced
the 1938 Federal Rules-where a group of elite white male lawyers met quietly,
revised litigation substantially and enjoyed immediate acquiescence-could hardly
be repeated today, whatever the merits of the product. Today's law and politics
demand more openness and deliberation among a larger segment of the profession
and polity.
2 I realize that many, particularly nonlawyers, regard any bar association as a
19931
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Third, the profession has become more chronically active
and more "political" in its activity. In part this results from the
larger bar infrastructure and the "special interest" bar groups
just discussed. The more developed general and special interest
bar groups provide their members with tools that encourage
and enhance their political activity: publications, newsletters,
lobbyists, researchers, hot lines, form letters, fundraisers,
PACS and other trappings of the institutionalized political
participant.26 Even without these more consistent and greater
resources for participation, however, the bar's attempts to
influence litigation policy would likely have grown over the
course of the Twentieth Century. During this time, Legal Real-
ism revolutionized the profession's thinking about law, making
it virtually impossible for thoughtful lawyers to regard litiga-
tion procedure and policy as completely divorced from the poli-
tics of substantive outcomes. Increasingly, courts were regard-
ed as another arena for resolving social disputes and questions
of public policy. Consequently, lawyers were forced to pay
greater attention to litigation reforms and their potential polit-
ical impact and to become more involved before the Rules Com-
mittees and Congress."
In addition, clients as well as lawyers have increased and
special interest group and, perhaps, even see the legal profession as a cartel. Al-
though there is at least a grain of truth in that position, one can meaningfully
distinguish between a general organization of lawyers and particularized organiza-
tions with express or obvious goals designed to benefit their more narrow member-
ship or clients, often at a cost to other lawyers and their clients. These latter
groups are by any definition more partisan than the ABA or similar state and
local organizations.
2" The bar's organized activity, however, was quite formidable even before the
1930s' inauguration of what I call the "open courts" paradigm. See Burbank, supra
note 4, at 1050-90; Subrin, supra note 22, at 948-55 (describing ABA efforts to
achieve Enabling Act). However, the bar association infrastructure was no match
for the force of an energetic insider like Yale Law School Dean Charles E. Clark.
See Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disci-
plined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115
(Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) (describing Clark's successful efforts to persuade Su-
preme Court to merge law and equity procedure despite significant bar opposition).
27 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedural Reform in a Local Context: The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Federal Rule Model, in THE HISTORY OF
THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COuRT 1692-1992, 393 (Rus-
sell K. Osgood ed., 1993) (describing growing strength and activity of bar associa-
tions in Massachusetts' eventual adoption of Federal Rules model of state civil
procedure).
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institutionalized their participation in the litigation policy pro-
cess. In particular, the past twenty years have seen increased
efforts of the business community and other substantive law
interest groups to shape legal change, both substantive and
procedural, for their benefit. Across the spectrum of interests
ranging from the American Tort Reform Association (a manu-
facturers group seeking more favorable product liability laws)
to the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (a liberal group
seeking to protect or expand civil rights laws), America's politi-
cal actors have increasingly become involved in matters of
litigation procedure.2"
B. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement
Accompanying the increased politicization of litigation
issues has been frustration with litigation and the rise of the
ADR movement. ADR is not new per se. For example, arbitra-
tion, the leading form of ADR, has been practiced for centuries
and enforcement of arbitration agreements became national
policy with passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1926.29
But prior to the 1970s, ADR clearly took a back seat to litiga-
tion in several significant ways. First, ADR was primarily
arbitration. Mediation, summary jury trials and rent-a-judge
forms of ADR were relatively unknown." Second, arbitration
" See generally Karen O'Connor & Bryant S. McFall, Conservative Interest
Group Litigation in the Reagan Era and Beyond, in MARK P. PEFRACCA, THE POLI-
TICS OF INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED (1992); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE,
JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1993)
(describing activities by politically conservative groups); Bess Bezirgan, Assessing
the Damage: 12 Years of Reagan-Bush Anti-Consumerism, PUB. CITIZEN, Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 10. Standard news reports reflect the degree to which law reform has
ceased to be a drawing-room pastime of the intelligentsia and has become part of
the milieu of down-and-dirty politics. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Divorced Dad
Groups Unite to Target Judges, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 5 1993, at Al; Jay
Romano, New Effort To Restrict Civil Suits Is Started, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993,
at Al.
" See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 269-77 (1990).
"' Although arbitration has long been the most prominent type of ADR, media-
tion has grown rapidly in the past decade, sufficiently so that the venerable Amer-
ican Arbitration Association ("AAA") has been forced to add and nurture a medi-
ation division in order to accommodate demand and retain business vis-a-vis its
competing ADR organizations. See Ellen J. Pollock, Arbitrators Hear the Arguments
for Mediation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1993, at Bi; see also Ellen J. Pollock, Food
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was restricted largely to commercial actors making contract
claims involving sales of goods, commodities or securities.
Many thought arbitration clauses did not apply to statutory
claims.31 Third, arbitration was viewed by many as second-
class justice,32 a kangaroo court stacked in favor of the party
that had insisted on the clause33 or a ploy for gaining tactical
advantage.34
Although arbitration remained controversial and
disfavored by a substantial number of courts and attorneys
until the 1960s, the tide began to turn over the next two de-
cades. In 1960, the Supreme Court strongly endorsed labor
arbitration in the well-known Steelworker's Trilogy.35 Then, in
Concerns Opt to Mediate, Not Litigate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at B1. For
descriptions of arbitration, mediation and hybrids, see JOHN J. COUND ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 15 (5th ed. 1989); STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION chs. 2-5 (1985); Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk,
The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980); see also Richard A.
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986) (criticizing
summary jury trial ADR device); Stempel, supra note 29, at 263-69 (discussing
differences between arbitration and litigation).
31 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to enforce arbitration
agreement in the face of investor's claim under the Securities Act of 1933), over-
ruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (finding arbitration agreement inapplicable to statutory antitrust claims);
Miller v. AAACon Auto Transp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (finding
arbitration clause in conflict with Interstate Commerce Commission policy), affd
mem., 614 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 918 (1980); Zip Mfg. Co. v.
Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 1930) (refusing to compel arbitration in
patent claims). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to
Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1392-1414 (1991); Stewart Sterk, Enforceability
of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981); see also Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon
Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1113 (1993); Norman S. Poser, When ADR
Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 1095 (1993).
"2 See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 663-64 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting); Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963);
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (comparing arbitration and litigation and finding arbitra-
tion inferior).
See, e.g., Moseley, 374 U.S. at 167; Gulf Interstate Eng. Co. v. Pecos Pipeline
& Producing Co., 680 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
14 See, e.g., AAACon Auto Transp., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 537
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1967).
"5 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
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1967, it looked favorably upon arbitration clauses in sales
contracts by requiring defenses to the contract's formation to
first be presented to the arbitrators.36 Beginning in the 1970s,
the Court refused to apply domestic exceptions to arbitrability
in international disputes.3 Finally, in the 1980s, the Court
declared the Arbitration Act to be substantive federal law
rather than mere federal procedure, thereby requiring state
courts to apply federal law and give deference to arbitration
clauses in disputes connected to interstate commerce.38 The
Court also reversed field by permitting arbitration of some
previously nonarbitrable statutory claims. 9
Although during this same period the Court sent mixed
messages of a sort by holding some claims inapt for arbitra-
tion,4" the clear overall thrust of federal court holdings during
the past three decades was an increased respect for and defer-
ence to arbitration and, implicitly, other forms of ADR as well.
Although one well-known case held that a court may not com-
pel litigants to participate in a summary jury trial,41 the bulk
of cases have given trial judges substantial discretion and
power to require that lawyers and litigants participate in set-
tlement efforts of all types, including mini-trials.42 In addition,
574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974); The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
" See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983).
" See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding,
upon tortured contract interpretation grounds, that employee's Age Discrimination
Act claims were subject to arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (reversing exceptions to arbitrability in cases arising under
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts). See generally Katsoris, supra note 31; Poser, supra
note 31.
40 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (hold-
ing arbitration proceeding inadequate for § 1983 action); Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding Fair Labor Standards Act
overtime wages claim exempt from arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding Title VII claims exempt from arbitration clause).
4, See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
42 See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas and Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900,
903 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (finding that federal
district courts have the power to compel a party to participate in a summary jury
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1980s changes in Rule 16 during the last decade have general-
ly codified increased discretion and settlement activity by judg-
es.4" Close to one-third of the federal district courts now have
some type of court-annexed arbitration program in which rela-
tively small cases seeking only monetary relief are arbitrated,
with dissatisfied litigants permitted to seek trial de novo be-
fore the court." Many state courts either use similar court-
annexed arbitration programs for smaller claims for money
damages or have similar mediation programs, particularly for
family court matters.45 Indeed, the ABA has published an ADR
Handbook for Judges.46
If nothing else, the growth of ADR activity and infrastruc-
ture in the private sector is convincing testament to the overall
growth of ADR and its increasing role in dispute resolution in
conjunction with litigation. The largest arbitration organiza-
tion, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), has seen
its case load steadily increase since 1970 to the point where it
administers 60,000 cases per year; a number of competing
organizations have started and grown. Although the AAA is
known primarily for its commercial and construction arbitra-
tion services, it also arbitrates a significant number of secu-
rities claims by customers, as do the New York Stock Ex-
change and other securities organizations that operate their
own arbitration departments in order to process an increasing
trial); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis.
1985), affd, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that district court had authority
to require presence of parties with full authority to settle case at settlement con-
ference).
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing recent amendments
to the Federal Rules).
41 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651, 658 (1988); Raymond J. Broderick, Compulsory Arbi-
tration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983); Paul Nejelsky & Andrew Zeldin,
Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD.
L. REv. 787 (1983). For criticisms of these programs, see Eisele, supra note 8.
4 See GOLBERG ET AL., supra note 30, chs. 6-9.
46 See STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AMERICAN BAR Assoc.,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (1991). In another
example of the ascendence of ADR, the Standing Committee recently was given
full status as an ABA Section. See Robert D. Raven, Your ABA Alternative Dispute
Resolution Effort Underway to Form Section to Address ADR Issues, 78 A.B-.A J.
112 (1992).
"' Examples include Endispute, Equilaw and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. DOYLE & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, WITHOUT THE
PUNCHES: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION (1991).
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number of claims each year.4" Moreover, the AAA established
a program for processing "large, complex" cases.49
Mediation has grown in favor as well, making the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. mediation program a
major force in dispute resolution and forcing the AAA to pay
greater attention to mediation activities." In addition, other
"private judging" services, which offer clients private trial or
mini-trial adjudication in lieu of litigation, have emerged. In
fact, private for-hire firms have begun to market themselves as
providing a full array of ADR services.5
Another popular form of ADR is Early Neutral Evaluation
("ENE"), in which a lawyer not involved with the case gives
the parties a frank assessment of the matter, hoping that the
detached assessment will prompt the litigants toward settle-
ment. ENE is part of the local practice of several districts and
has been extensively used in the Northern District of Califor-
nia. 2 Finally, the advent of "managerial judging" can be char-
acterized as a form of ADR in which judges attempt to preside
over the negotiation and settlement of a case through efforts at
moral suasion backed by the possible use of adjudicatory pow-
er. 3 Although the precise boundaries between negotiation,
mediation, arbitration and mini-trials are hard to fix, all are
clearly alternatives to litigation that were far less important to
the national dispute resolution picture twenty years ago.
In addition to ADR, whole categories of cases have been
shifted from standard litigation to what might be termed alter-
" See Mark Weibel, Federal Securities Arbitration: Does It Provide Adequate
Relief?, ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 54, 57.
"' Mark A. Buckstein, AAA's Large, Complex Case Dispute Resolution Program,
ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 12.
" See Ellen J. Pollock, Arbitrators Hear the Arguments For Mediation, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 28, 1993, at B1.
" For example, Symposium panelist Kenneth R. Feinberg's recently formed law
firm seeks to provide dispute resolution services as well as "basic" legal services to
clients and is an outgrowth of Mr. Feinberg's fame stemming from his service as a
special master in Agent Orange and asbestos litigation. For some time, private
dispute resolution organizations have been rendering ADR for profit. See
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 30, at 284-310.
"2 See JOSHUA ROSENBERG ET AL., REPORT ON THE EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
PROGRAM FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFOR-
NIA (1992).
" See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Proce-
dural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993) for a review of the literature on
managerial judging.
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native compensation or adjudication schemes. This can occur
through Congressional imposition of a statutory claims pro-
cessing scheme. Two prominent examples are black lung bene-
fits54 and vaccine liability legislation.55 Another prominent
illustration of de facto alternative handling of litigation occurs
through bankruptcy reorganization, in which the court's power
to withhold claims and consolidate matters, combined with
scarcity of resources, permits imposition of a sui generis ad-
ministrative law mechanism for handling claims. In the Johns-
Manville bankruptcy, the court established such a mechanism
for some asbestos claims, and in the A.H. Robbins bankruptcy,
the court established an ongoing alternative negotiation/adju-
dication scheme for Dalkon Shield claimants." Many have
urged that Congress institute similar mechanisms on a global
scale as a means of resolving mass tort litigation. 7
C. Current Reform Efforts
1. Civil Rules Amendment
As Rick Marcus notes in this Symposium, one can make a
case that the mere existence of a Civil Rules Advisory Commit-
"' See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1988) (providing
federal funds to those totally disabled by pneumoconiosis and to their eligible
survivors). For an analysis of the program, see Allen R. Prunty & Mark E.
Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91
W. VA. L. REV. 665 (1989).
" See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to
300aa-34 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Although the program allows families to pursue
a lawsuit, it establishes obstacles to discourage litigation and contain incentives to
participate in the plan. For a description of administrative claims processing pro-
cedures, see Burke Shartel, DPT Victim's Presence at Hearing Assists Vaccine Inju-
ry Case, INSIDE LITIG., May 1990, at 1, 3. For an analysis of the Act, see Mary B.
Neraas, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the
Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149 (1988).
" See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost
(or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (describing Trust Fund claims pro-
cessing). The claims mechanism has been criticized as creating too many road-
blocks to full court adjudication of claims. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE
LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
"' See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 542 (1984); Richard A.
Schmaltz, On the Financing of Compensation Systems, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 807,
812-18 (1985) (proposing no-fault compensation system for mass torts).
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tee would prompt excessive amendment to the Rules.5" Yet the
Advisory Committee existed for nearly twenty years in relative
silence, 9 taking only two major substantive actions: the 1966
amendment to Rule 23 on class actions and the 1970 amend-
ments to the discovery Rules, primarily Rules 26 and 34.6o In
the 1980s, however, the pace of Advisory Committee activity
seemed to quicken, not only through actual changes in the
Rules but also through an almost constant consideration of
possible changes. To many who follow the Advisory Committee,
it appears as though there is always at least one draft of a
substantial Rule change informally being circulated for discus-
sion. For example, the recently implemented changes to Rule
11 and the discovery rules (discussed below), are the product of
approximately four years of activity including committee dis-
cussion, solicitation of comments and the drafts and redrafts of
Reporter's and Committee proposals. The Advisory Committee
may soon issue for public comment an amended Draft Rule 23
that was first embodied in a discussion draft in 1989 and, if
successful, would not become a new Rule 23 until at least
December 1, 1996. In a sense, the process has become perpetu-
al: the Advisory Committee completes work on one possible
Rules change only to pick up on another.
Moreover, these activities have not been mere spinning of
metaphorical wheels. In 1980, amendments to Rule 26 empow-
ered the court to direct that attorneys attend a discovery con-
ference designed to narrow discovery issues and lead to agree-
ment on a discovery plan and timetable.61 In 1983, Amended
Rule 11 took effect, requiring that an attorney signing papers
submitted to the court make a reasonable inquiry that the
contents of the submission were well-grounded in fact, war-
'3 See Marcus, supra note 53, at 765-66.
' The Civil Rules Advisory Committee was permanently established in 1958
when legislation required a Standing Committee on Rules of the Judicial Confer-
ence in 1962. See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 466-68 (1993).
"' See Marcus, supra note 53, at 807-10 for a description of these changes,
both of which generally liberalized access to courts and information, to the benefit
of claimants.
" See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), promulgated by the Supreme Court at 446 U.S.
996, 1004 (1980). Justice Powell dissented from the proposed amendments, arguing
that they were only ineffective tinkering that did too little to attack his perceived
real problems of discovery abuse and excessive discovery. 446 U.S. at 999.
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ranted by existing law or supported by a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.62
Simply by filing the paper, the attorney certifies that this
standard has been met. As virtually every lawyer now knows,
a finding of a Rule 11 violation subjects the offender to manda-
tory sanctions, including a fine or possible payment of the
opposition's counsel fees incurred in defending the paper in
question.63 Rule 11 was so controversial that the Advisory
Committee in 1990 issued a Call for Comments on the Rule
from the bar, held a public hearing on amending Rule 11, and
revised the Rule, which, in turn was revised further by the
Judicial Conference and promulgated by the Court, and took
effect on December 1, 1993. This version of Rule 11, discussed
below, seeks to reduce substantially the perceived excessive
use and unfair effects of the 1983 version of Rule 11. In addi-
tion to strengthening Rule 11 in 1983, the Advisory Committee
in 1983 and 1984 considered proposals to revise Rule 68 to
modify the traditional American Rule that each side bear its
own counsel fees and to shift more fees liability to losing liti-
gants. 4 Strong opposition from the bar prompted the Commit-
tee to withdraw these proposals from further consideration,
although a variant of this approach was recently circulated for
informal comment by the Advisory Committee.
In 1991, Rule 15 was amended to overturn the Court's
1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune,65 which held that a
complaint amendment correcting a misnamed defendant did
not relate back to the date of the original complaint and, thus,
was barred by a short state statute of limitations for defama-
tion actions. In this same package of amendments, the venera-
ble Rule 50 phrases "directed verdict" and "judgment n.o.v."
were changed to "judgment as a matter of law," and Rule 45
was amended to provide that litigants may subpoena docu-
ments from a nonparty without the necessity of conducting an
oral deposition.66
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
This was subsequently changed in the 1993 amendments to Rule 11.
14 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Preliminary Drafts of Proposed Amendments, 102 F.R.D. 407,
432-37 (1984) and 98 F.R.D. 337, 361-67 (1983).
6 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
111 S. Ct. 813 (1991); see COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
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Although the spate of Advisory Committee activity and
rate of amendment during the 1980s may have suggested that
civil litigation was in flux, the 1993 Amendments, particularly
those to Rule 11" and Rules 26-37,6s confirmed that the
rulemaking process had emerged from any period of calm it
might have once enjoyed. The turbulence reaches even the
Justices of the Supreme Court. On April 22, 1993, the Court
transmitted the proposed Rules Amendments to Congress over
three dissents and a most unusual separate statement by Jus-
tice White. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist's normally blas4
transmittal letter is pregnant with material for discussion. In
adopting the amendments, he wrote: "While the Court is satis-
fied that the required procedures have been observed, this
DURE, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE
(Apr. 1989) (Daniel R. Coquillette Rptr.) [hereinafter LOCAL RULES PROJECT]. Dur-
ing the 1980s, the federal judiciary also witnessed a proliferation of local rules. A
1988 study found more than 5000 such rules, many of which were at least argu-
ably inconsistent with the Federal Rules and, thus, in violation of FED. R. CIV. P.
83, which permits local rules so long as they are "not inconsistent" with the na-
tional rules.
" The Amended Rule 11 transmitted to Congress by the Court relaxes the cur-
rent rule by making sanctions for violation discretionary rather than mandatory,
altering sanctions language to discourage fee-shifting and providing a 21-day "safe
harbor" during which a challenged lawyer or party can withdraw an assertion
without penalty before a court addresses the alleged frivolousness of the assertion.
In addition, new Rule 11 alters the operative language concerning the factual and
legal quality of the claim and ushers in with the new Rule 11 an Advisory Com-
mittee interpretative Note that generally cautions against the perceived excesses of
application under the 1983 Amendment. Reprinted In 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 657.
" A central feature of these amendments, which involve discovery, is found in
Rule 26. The disclosure mechanism of new Rule 26(a)(1) requires that each side
provide to the opposition-without request-the names of persons and copies of
documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity." In addition, oppo-
nents must disclose insurance information (already made discoverable under former
Rule 26(b)(2)) and an explanation of the method of computation of any damages
claimed, including the provision of evidentiary matter bearing on the nature and
extent of damages. Expert witness reports must be disclosed as well. Other chang-
es in the discovery package of recent Amendments establish presumptive limits of
25 interrogatories per party and 10 depositions per side absent leave of court. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 682-84 (proposed
amendment). By requiring that a claim be pleaded with particularity to trigger
disclosure, the intent of the Advisory Committee was that courts applying the new
rule would use the standard of particularity enunciated in cases interpreting cur-
rent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that claims of fraud be
pleaded with particularity. See Proposed Amended Rules 30(a), 33(a). Id. at 722-24.
The parties can avoid seeking court approval through written stipulation or infor-
mal agreement to permit more discovery.
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transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself
would have proposed these amendments in the form submit-
ted. 6
9
The transmittal letter suggests a highly deferential stan-
dard of review for proposed amendments received from the
Judicial Conference. Justice White elaborated in his separate
statement, a concurrence that sent conflicting signals. He be-
gan by summarizing the Rules revision process and the Court's
historical activity in the area, including the frequent dissents
of Justices Black and Douglas, contending that many Rules
effected substantive changes in violation of the Enabling Act or
the Constitution, a perspective Justice White characterized as
a clear minority view in the Court.7" He conceded, however,
that Justices Black and Douglas may have been correct in
criticizing the Enabling Act for giving the Court a role in pro-
mulgating Rules that it would later construe, or even consider
for their constitutionality.7" But in ascertaining its own role,
Justice White continued, the Court had concluded that "Con-
gress could not have intended [the Court] to provide another
layer of review equivalent to that of the standing committee
and the Judicial Conference. 72
Addressing the standard of review followed by the Court in
this instance, however, Justice White described two different,
contradictory standards. He first described a standard akin to
the rational relationship test used in constitutional law equal
protection jurisprudence,73 stating that the Court "should not
perform a de novo review and should defer to the Judicial
Conference and its committees as long as they have some ra-
" Letter of April 22, 1993, from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Hon.
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, reprinted in 113 S. Ct.
(Preface) 475, 477 (1993).
70 Id. at 576 n.2 (citing Black-Douglas dissents).
7' Id. at 577-78.
72 Id. at 578. Justice White reasoned that a more searching review would be
unduly time consuming, distracting the Court from its principal tasks, and unwise
to the extent that it substituted the judgment of the more isolated Justices for
that of practicing attorneys and judges dealing with civil rules on a daily basis.
Id.
3 See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrIUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991) (de-
scribing rational relationship, strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests in
equal protection cases); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§
16-1 to 16-3 (2d ed. 1988).
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tional basis for their proposed amendments."74 One sentence
later, however, Justice White suggested that the Court's scruti-
ny was not at all directed to the merits of the proposed Rules
changes but focused only on whether the rulemaking process
was tainted with corruption, stating that "the Court's role...
is to transmit the Judicial Conference's recommendations with-
out change and without careful study as long as there is no
suggestion that the committee system has not operated with
integrity."7" Finding no such corruption, Justice White sided
with the Court majority in transmitting the proposed Rules to
Congress.76
In light of the language of the Chief Justice's transmittal
letter, the most likely conclusion is that the Court majority
applied a "quick check for corruption" standard of review that
focused only on fairness of process rather than a "rational
relationship" standard of review directed toward the actual
merits of the proposed rules changes. Nonetheless, the imbed-
ded contradiction of the White concurrence gives the legal
community a right to wonder exactly what the Court does
think to be its role in the rulemaking process.
By contrast, in a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and
Souter in opposition to the discovery amendments and by Jus-
tice Thomas as to Rule 11, Justice Scalia quite clearly viewed
7' 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 578-79.
7, Id. at 579.
71 Justice White also provides an interesting glimpse into the Court's relatively
ad hoc approach to this policymaking function when he states that the "proposed
changes do not please everyone, as letters I have received indicate. But I assume
that such opposing views have been before the committees and have been rejected
on the merits. That is enough for me." Id.
Clearly, Justice White meant what he said about not giving the proposed
changes careful scrutiny: there was available to the Court a large public record of
written comments to the Advisory Committee as well as records of two public
hearings. Justice White need not have speculated about the nature of criticisms
heard by the Advisory Committee because he could have read the record.
Perhaps more troubling, however, is Justice White's admission that he re-
ceived and read what appear to be described as extra record, ex parte submissions
on the matter to which proponents of the Rules were accorded no opportunity to
respond. Obviously, rulemaking differs from adjudication. Thus, adjudication con-
cepts of limits on contact with the Court and fidelity to the notion of a defined
record do not apply strictly to rulemaking. But the process of enacting civil rules
is similarly important, perhaps more so in that it affects persons well beyond the
instant adversaries. Consequently, it is disturbing to think that a Justice might be
influenced by letters that cannot be answered by those having a different opinion
regarding a Rules change.
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the Court's role as one of assessing the merits of proposed
Rules changes, probably under an intermediate standard of
review. Justices Scalia and Thomas saw Proposed Amended
Rule 11 as unwisely softening the bite of the current rule at a
time when frivolous litigation assertions continue to comprise a
systemic problem meriting more rather than less deterrence.77
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Souter deemed the proposed
amendments to discovery Rules 26, 30, 31, 33 and 37 "radical"
and "potentially disastrous." In particular, they disliked the
additional layer of discovery practice provided by required
"disclosure" under new Rule 26. They also saw the disclosure
mechanism as undermining the traditional adversary method
of civil litigation to the extent that it required counsel to do
work on behalf of their opponents.78 Additionally, the dissent-
ers saw the discovery changes as "premature" in light of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA or "Biden Bill"), which
requires that each federal district court craft a Delay and Ex-
pense Reduction Plan, thus endorsing a period of experimenta-
tion with discovery that could be thwarted by nationwide
changes in the Rules.79 Although Justice Scalia did his best to
paint the changes in Rules 11 and 26 as irrational, even the
harsh critics of the practicing bar, by and large, have not been
that strident in their views.
Like Justice White's concurrence, Justice Scalia's dissent
contains imbedded inconsistency. When criticizing the proposed
new Rule 11, the dissent makes light of the bar's strong sup-
port of the proposed softening of the Rule and decade-long
criticism of the 1983 Amendment, suggesting that attorneys
can be expected to oppose any rule which limits their license to
assert frivolous positions for client gain and personal profit.'
Two pages later, however, Justice Scalia professes to be greatly
influenced by the bar's strong opposition to the discovery
77 Id. at 582.
78 Id.
" Id. at 585; see infra note 93. In a provision added relatively late in the
process, however, the discovery rules transmitted to Congress provided that the
most controversial aspect of the changes-the disclosure mechanism-may be ex-
empted to or altered by local rule, reducing the force of this objection to the rules.
See Ralph Y. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 263 (1992). For a discussion of the Civil Justice Reform Act, see infra notes
93-102 and accompanying text.
" 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 583.
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amendments."1 But presumably, lawyers should be as protec-
tive of any perceived license to conduct excessive discovery or
stonewall as they are of any purported license to make frivo-
lous claims. Yet the dissent provides no clue as to how the
selfish, narrow-minded lawyers supporting a new Rule 11
became the insightful lawyers wise in public policy when op-
posing disclosure. "
After holding hearings before the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration,
the House passed a bill (H.R. 2814) that would have removed
the disclosure provisions of Proposed Amended Rule 26 and
also the changes in Proposed Amended Rule 30 designed to
facilitate audiotape recording of depositions, the latter an ob-
jective of the court stenographers. Despite its ease of passage
in the House, the bill was not voted upon in the Senate due to
the objections of Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who
refused to let the bill be considered by unanimous consent
prior to the holiday recess. 3 Consequently, the new civil rules
took effect December 1, 1993, as promulgated by the Supreme
Court.
This episode demonstrates convincingly the importance of
presumptions and process in rulemaking. Various entities
opposed to disclosure worked hard to defeat it and appear to
have enjoyed congressional support that was broad but not
"1 To be fair to Justice Scalia, the dissent correctly notes that in addition to
the bar, judges, litigants, academics and public interest groups were opposed to
the new disclosure system and other discovery changes. Id. at 586; see also Griffin
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-the Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1 (1992) (criticizing disclosure); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is it Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991)
(same).
82 The unusual saga of these proposed rules changes continued in Congress.
Opponents of the changes, particularly the discovery changes, vowed opposition
and lobbied in apparent earnest. See Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules: Un-
usual Coalition Tries Last-Ditch Effort to Halt Civil Discovery Reform, NATL L.J.,
May 24, 1993, at 1, 33 (describing coalition of product liability defense lawyers,
manufacturers, civil rights groups, and plaintiffs trial lawyers opposed to changes,
particularly disclosure mechanism); Richard B. Schmitt, Lawyers Unite Against
Plan to Speed Suits, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, at B1.
" See Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6,
1993, at 3. Apparently, Senator Metzenbaum was prompted to object by members
of the plaintiffs trial bar, who thought it unfair to delete disclosure while still
establishing presumptive limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions
and the duration of depositions.
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deep. Congresspersons apparently were happy to vote against
disclosure but did not care enough to make it a top priority
during Fall 1993. The anti-disclosure bill thus was vulnerable
to being thwarted by a single senator when the Senate at-
tempted to decide matters via a "unanimous consent" calendar
in the waning hours of the session. Because the Rules En-
abling Act sets the Court's promulgated rules as the "default"
option (and these result from the Advisory and Standing Com-
mittees), the discovery rules were amended even though it
appears that most of the bar and Congress opposed the amend-
ments.
Even as the Rule 11-Disclosure controversy proceeded
toward heated but uncertain denouement, the Advisory Com-
mittee has been hard at work on two proposals with similar
potential for controversy. One is a major revision of Rule 23
governing class actions." The new Rule would abolish the
Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) categories of class actions by
making current categorization criteria part of a slightly re-
vamped and expanded list of considerations for the court to use
in exercising its increased discretion regarding class certifica-
tion of a case. Only "willing" parties could be named as class
representatives, thus effectively eliminating defendant class
actions. In addition, judges would have greater discretion re-
garding the form and use of notice to the class. The other pro-
posal is a possible amended Rule 68 which would import a bit
of the English Rule into American litigation. It would permit
fee shifting against a party to the extent that its result at trial
is less favorable than a spurned offer of judgment but with fee
shifting liability capped by the size of the judgment and (oddly
in my view) no fees liability for a party that loses completely at
trial. 5 Both proposals have been circulated for informal com-
ment and the proposed amended Rule 23 has been "on the
wire" in some form since 1989. Should the Judicial Conference
and the Court eventually bring the proposed new Rules 23 and
68 to Congress, the current controversy over Proposed Amend-
ed Rules 11 and 26 would look less like an isolated episode and
4 Telephone Interview with Professor Edward Cooper, Reporter of the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (May 6, 1993).
" The proposed change in Rule 68 is something of a trial balloon or discussion
draft based on a suggestion made by Judge William Schwarzer in a recent article.
See Schwarzer, supra note 10.
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more like part of an ongoing trend.
2. The Civil Justice Reform Act and Other Congressional
Activity
Congress has not been a completely silent partner of the
judiciary in the formulation of litigation policy. In fact, in the
area of substantive law Congress has been quite active, by
reversing or modifying Court decisions-particularly regarding
civil rights statutes-thought to be insufficiently sensitive to
statutory rights.86 Congress similarly enacted comprehensive
copyright legislation in response to perceived problems of copy-
right infringement unremedied through litigation. 7 But in the
area of procedural law, Congress has ordinarily been less ac-
tive, usually deferring to the judicially led rulemaking process
or responding to judicially initiated calls for statutory reform.
For example, in 1990, following in part the recommendation of
the Federal Courts Study Committee," Congress enacted a
new provision of the Judicial Code permitting a form of "sup-
plementary jurisdiction" akin to what was previously known as
"pendent parties" jurisdiction. 9
Even before the current ferment, however, there were
notable exceptions to my posited world of a judicially centered
mechanism of court reform. In 1956, Congress rejected an
Advisory Committee proposal and discharged the Committee
(ironically only to revive it in 1958). In the 1970s, Congress
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (reversing or modifying nine recent
Supreme Court decisions); Jeffrey IV. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Inertial Bur-
dens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 657-61
(1991) (listing examples of congressional activity to strengthen Title VII, Title IX
and the Age Discrimination Act).
" See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988); Susan Shoenfeld,
The Applicability of Eleventh Amendment Immunity Under the Copyright Acts of
1909 and 1976, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 163 (1986).
" Established by the Federal Courts Study Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4644 (1990), the Federal Courts Study Committee was a 15-member
committee appointed by the Chief Justice charged with examining a perceived con-
temporary "crisis" in the Federal Courts and making a report of suggestions to
Congress for improving the situation. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE (Apr. 2, 1990).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990), overruling in part Finley v. United States, 490
U.S. 545 (1989) (holding pendent party jurisdiction unavailable).
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substantially changed much of the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence transmitted to it.9" It later intervened to revise habe-
as corpus legislation and, in 1980, directly revised Rule 37 to
permit discovery sanctions against the United States Govern-
ment.9 Also, it occasionally intervened on procedural matters
for idiosyncratic reasons."
In 1990, however, with passage of the CJRA,93 Congress
thrust itself into the field of litigation policy and procedure in
a manner regarded as unprecedented94 by many and as uncon-
stitutional by at least one prominent commentator.95 The
CJRA. mandated that each federal court adopt a Delay and
Expense Reduction Plan, utilizing advisory groups comprised of
local lawyers, law professors, litigants or others. Certain "pilot"
and "early implementation" districts acting by December 31,
1991, could receive special funding to assist them in delay and
expense reduction, and all courts were required to adopt plans
by December 1993.6
Although most observers (including me) do not regard the
Biden Bill as an unconstitutional infringement upon judicial
policymaking autonomy, it remains a more significant intru-
sion on the judicial domain than generally seen in the past.97
" See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975).
" See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
5, 31-36 (1991); Walker, supra note 59, at 460-65.
' For example, it appears that Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Ha.) successfully
amended a technical revision of Rule 35 to provide that psychologists be placed in
the same status as psychiatrists for purposes of the Rule's system governing ad-
verse medical examinations. Senator Inouye's daughter-in-law, it appears, is a psy-
chologist. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking: Fac-
tional Politics is Jeopardizing the Federal Rulemaking Process, 75 JUDICATURE 161
(1991).
93 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The CJRA is also known as the
"Biden Bill" after Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Joseph Biden (Democrat-Dela-
ware), its principal sponsor.
'" See Marcus, supra note 53, at 800 ("For loosing unforeseeable forces, the
Civil Justice Reform Act may have no peer; surely it has been greeted in apoca-
lyptic terms."); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal
Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
" See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 424-38 (1992).
" For a more complete description of the CJRA, see Marcus, supra note 53, at
800-05; Mullenix, supra note 95, at 376-80, 385-96; Tobias, supra note 94, at 1395-
1400.
" See Marcus, supra note 53, at 802-03; Mullenix, supra note 95, at 407-38;
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In addition, the CJRA weighs in on behalf of one side of a
litigation debate, managerial judging (discussed at greater
length below), in that the Act works "to promulgate a national,
statutory policy in support of judicial case management more
extensive than what the current federal rules require.""8 Per-
haps more tellingly, the legislation was accompanied by and
contributed to a period of particularly strained rhetoric and
relations between Congress and the Judiciary. Senator Biden's
former chief aide took to the pages of a law review to mock the
traditional deference to judges in such matters and the "near
mystical reverence of the rule making authority exercised by
the Judicial Conference."99 Others in Congress, even those
generally regarded as friendly to the judiciary, have made
similar remarks.' At a recent Circuit Judicial Conference
attended by Senator Biden and televised on C-Span, the ten-
sion between the Judiciary Chair and many of the judges was
palpable and verging on the nasty.
10 1
The friction between the two branches should not seem too
surprising. The CJRA has made a substantial incursion into
judicial turf, created additional work for the bench without
guarantees of added benefits and put in graphic form a con-
gressional assertion that federal judges border on incompeten-
cy in their judicial administration. Judges are symmetric in
their disdain for legislators. As one judge said to Professor
Robel, "[b]eing told you're inefficient by Congress is like being
told you're ugly by a toad."0 2 Regardless of the accuracy of
Tobias, supra note 94, at 1402-13. One example, which tends to support Professor
Mullenix's point of alteration of the Enabling Act by the CJRA and constitutional
defectiveness, is the CJRA Plan for the Eastern District of Texas, which provides
that the Plan supersedes any inconsistent local rules or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Tobias, supra note 94, at 1417.
8 Mullenix, supra note 95, at 392. The Act specifically mandates that Delay
and Expense reduction plans consider use of mandatory ADR and case manage-
ment, including greater controls on the discovery process.
" Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United." The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 177 (1992), quoted in Marcus, supra note 53, at
802.
," See infra note 181 (describing the Comments of former Judicial Administra-
tion Subcommittee Chair Robert Kastenmaier (D-Wis.)).
... Professor Joel M. Gora, Remarks at The Brooklyn Law School Civil Proce-
dure Symposium (May 7, 1993).
" See Lauren L Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 883 n.2 (1993).
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either criticism, the relatively recent increase in judicial-con-
gressional tensions seem undeniable.
3. Other Forces and Movements
To be sure, not all of the recent activity has been in the
arena of legislative-judicial relations and civil rules amend-
ments. The Judicial Conference has continued to place faith in
the Enabling Act rulemaking model by reconstituting the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, which had
been disbanded after the drafting of what became the current
Evidence Rules. The reconstituted Advisory Committee quickly
turned to work on a possible revision of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 concerning the admissibility of previous sexual con-
duct, in part to permit the judiciary to comment on an issue
likely to be addressed by Congress as part of Senator Biden's
proposed women's rights legislation.103 In addition, other ele-
ments of the legal profession have entered the procedural are-
na in a more direct way. For example, at its 1993 Annual
Meeting, the American Law Institute approved a final version
of its Complex Litigation Project which suggests a procedural
blueprint for management of multi-party, multi-jurisdiction
actions.114 Included in the project are controversial provisions
for transfer and consolidation of cases between state and feder-
al courts as well as a proposed federal code for choice of law in
complex cases.0 '
"o See The Violence Against Women Act, S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The bill was substantially incorporated into the Senate version of the 1993 "crime
bill." As this Article was finalized, congressional staff expected House-Senate con-
ference committee consideration of the bill in 1994.
104 The Project defines a complex action as one with multiple parties affecting
multiple jurisdictions rather than addressing substantive legal complexity. As Pro-
fessor Resnik has noted, see Civil Litigation in the Twenty-first Century: A Panel
Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1200, 1223 (1993), this is a potentially misleading
notion of complexity, suggesting that large or repetitious cases are somehow more
important than the thousands of one-party, one-state cases, many of them quite
complex, in which litigants ask our judicial system for the same degree of commit-
ment accorded other litigants. In addition to meaning "big" or "difficult," complexi-
ty can be defined on a number of bases. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:
Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1, 3.
'0' See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT §§ 5.01-.05,
6.01-.05, Append. A, B, C (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 5, 1993); Linda S. Mullenix,
Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1623 (1992)
(criticizing proposed statute). At the 1993 Annual Meeting, dissenters mounted a
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Another important upheaval on the court reform landscape
was the August 1991 publication of the "Quayle Report" and
its aftermath. The Report, officially titled Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform in America and authored by the President's
Council on Competitiveness,"' which was chaired by former
Vice-President Dan Quayle, quickly became associated with
Quayle and his repeated attacks on the legal profession, most
prominently made at the 1991 ABA Annual Meeting"0 7 and in
nationally televised debate with his 1992 opponent, then-Sena-
tor Albert Gore, Jr."'5 The Report briefly (and, according to the
consensus of scholarly opinion, inadequately and erroneously)
outlined its thesis that America was in the midst of a litigation
crisis requiring dramatic action.0 9 It then made fifty recom-
mendations for change, approximately a third of which merely
summarized the status quo,"' while another third were
largely non-controversial.1 ' However, some of the Quayle Re-
port suggestions were decidedly controversial. For example, it
urged that America adopt the English Rule requiring losing
serious but clearly unsuccessful challenge to the proposed Project choice of law
criteria, proposing a more discretionary approach.
-O See PRESIDENTS COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AN AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE REFOI IN AMERICA (1991).
"o See Randall Samborn & Marianne Lavelle, Subsidiaries, Dan Quayle Domi-
nate, NATL. L.J., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3.
iCS See Robin Toner, Quayle and Gore Exchange Sharp Attacks in Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at Al.
... See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System:
The Council on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244
(1992) (summarizing and criticizing Report); Milo Geyelin, Quayle's Data in Pro-
posed Reform of Legal System Called Misleading, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at B7
(summarizing criticisms of Professor Marc Galanter and others). Although the
Quayle Report has its defenders in Republican politics and the private bar, see,
e.g., Gregory B. Butler & Brian D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response
to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992), as a document the Report and its most
drastic recommendations have enjoyed little or no support among the aggregate
organized bar or the legal academy.
." See, e.g., PRESIDENTS COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 22 (Recommendation No.
11) (providing that punitive damages be granted only where claimant shows
wrongful behavior by "clear and convincing evidence"); Id. at 20 (Recommendation
No. 8) (requiring that summary judgment be granted if evidence available in pre-
trial record suggests a reasonable fact finder could not hold for claimant after tri-
al).
Il See, e.g., id. at 15, 22, 23 (Recommendation No. 13) (proposing that judges
manage cases to some degree); Id. (Recommendation No. 1) (stating that parties
consider ADR in lieu of litigation); Id. (Recommendation No. 26) (directing that
judges bifurcate liability and punitive damages phases of trial).
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litigants to reimburse the winner's counsel fees.112 It also sug-
gested that any award of punitive damages be limited to the
amount of compensatory damages."'
Although Quayle is now a private citizen and the Council
on Competitiveness was disbanded in one of the first official
acts of the Clinton-Gore Administration,"' the Report was as
popular in many quarters of society as it was unpopular with
the bar and legal academics. Former President Bush entered
an Executive Order, not revoked by the Clinton Administra-
tion, implementing some aspects of the Quayle Report (primar-
ily non-controversial ones) for Executive Branch departments
and agencies." 5 In addition, several legislators, most promi-
nently Senator Charles Grassley (Rep.-Iowa), who was also a
member of the Federal Courts Study Committee, have intro-
duced legislation to implement more of the Quayle Report,
including the controversial provisions on fee-shifting and puni-
tive damages. Although the election of Bill Clinton drained
much of the fuel from the Quayle-led movement, the conserva-
tive effort remains energetic and potentially triumphant de-
pending on electoral outcomes in the 1990s. In any event, in
addition to the Legislative Branch's involvement in procedure
detailed above, the Quayle Report and related events have
introduced a good deal of Executive Branch action into the
procedural arena of litigation policy.
II. ATTITUDES TOWARD ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE AND
LITIGATION REFORM: HAVE PARADIGMS SHIFTED?
A. Reformers vs. Preservationists
Many lawyers view much of the recent and proposed
change in civil litigation as regression rather than prog-
ress." 6 Just as fervently, many in the profession argue that
.1. See id. at 24 (Recommendation No. 16).
"' See id. at 22 (Recommendation No. 11).
114 See Martin Tolchin, Settling In: Rewriting the Rules; Last-Minute Bush Pro-
posals Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at 10.
m" See Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
116 Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 31 (1988)
[hereinafter Burbank, Chancellor's Boot]; Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend
Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425 (1986) [hereinafter
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only dramatic changes can correct perceived injustices and
inefficiencies of the system."7 I will characterize the former
group as "preservationists""8 and the latter group as "reform-
Burbank, Abandon Ship]; George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61
MIss. L.J. 5 (1991); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A
Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1988); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Su-
preme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litiga-
tion and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988).
"' See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Proce-
dure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Set-
tling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986);
Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85).
Of course, characterization of a viewpoint is as much an art as it is a sci-
ence. Although I regard Professor Schuck as essentially praising the handling of
the Agent Orange case, which departed substantially from the traditional bipolar
litigation model (see, e.g., the criticism of the Court's treatment of plaintiffs who
opted out of the class in Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus:
Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986)), Judge
Weinstein, who presided over the matter, views Professor Schuck as a critic, at
least in part, of activist judging. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 483 n.54 (1993) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986)).
Critics of the litigation status quo often focus on both procedure and substan-
tive law. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991) (criticizing perceived uninformed and overly emotional juror
assessment of tort plaintiffs' causation claims); Peter W. Huber, Junk Science in
the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723 (1992) [hereinafter Huber, Junk Science];
Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second-Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COL-M. L. REV. 277 (1985) [hereinafter Huber, Second
Best] (criticizing trends in substantive tort law permitting greater recovery against
manufacturers and merchants based on theories of strict liability).
' Perhaps the most prominent preservationists are Professors Resnik and Fiss.
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Resnik, supra note 22. Judith Resnik, Pre-
cluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL.
L. REV. 837 (1984); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982). Both have written eloquently and frequently in support of the adjudicatory
mode of adversarially administered litigation presided over by independent and
active judges, and have on occasion specifically criticized proposed alternative fo-
rums or revisions of traditional litigation.
Some commentators are not avowed preservationists, perhaps because they are
not civil litigation specialists, but their analysis and ultimate conclusions suggest
membership in the preservationist camp. For example, Professor Michael Saks has
been an eloquent critic of those who rush to judgment about litigation and its
faults. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ers,"19 hoping that both camps view the terms as rhetorically
neutral. Obviously, the issues are more than bipolar and the
opinions of lawyers more variegated than my caricature of
"reformers" vs. "preservationists" might imply. Nonetheless,
members of the bench, the academy and the practicing bar, as
of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992);
Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, 10 TRIAL 11 (1974). Saks's
assessment leads him to dispute those who call for drastic and immediate "tort
reform" and to skewer the Supreme Court for almost flippantly deciding that a
six-person jury is no different than a 12-person jury, results that in the aggregate
aid the preservationist cause. The same can be said of venerable jury defenders
Professors Kalven and Zeisel. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY (1971); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV.
1055 (1964); Hans Zeisel, . . .And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the
Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971).
... IdentiP'ing clear leaders of the reformist movement proves more difficult, in
part because the reformist champions have not as regularly taken their case to
the pages of law reviews, perhaps because reformers have had more powerful
pulpits available. For example, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was a con-
sistent proponent of streamlined trials and alternative dispute resolution. See War-
ren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). Current Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia have argued repeatedly
for limiting federal court jurisdiction. See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme
Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the High Court or Transforming its Role?,
24 AKRON L. REV. 393 (1990); Joseph R. Typbor, An Appeal for Court Overhaul,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1987, at 4.
Several prominent jurists have carried the reformist flag into both the law
reform effort and legal periodicals. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in
Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 394 (1986); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Jon 0.
Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J.
1643, 1652 (1985) (judicial system cannot afford to "retain any procedure that
could conceivably increase the likelihood of a fair result" due to inherent delays
accruing from additional procedure, which makes other litigants "unfairly" wait for
adjudication of their claims); Robert Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of
Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 267-77 (1985); Robert F. Peckham, The
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing
to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Alvin B. Rubin, The Managed Calen-
dar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive
Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 135 (1978); William
W Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE
400 (1978); Winter, supra note 79, at 263.
However, the bench is not uniformly in the reformist camp, at least not on
all issues. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 30, at 366. For an illustration of the occa-
sional sharpness of disagreements between judges, see the exchange between
Judge Eisele and Judge Broderick: G. Thomas Eisele, From the Bench: No to Man-
datory Court-Annexed ADR, LITIG., Fall 1991, at 3; Raymond J. Broderick, From
the Bench: Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, LITIG., Summer 1992, at 3.
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well as interested politicians and policymakers, have tended to
fall into one of the two categories, and this rough division
provides a fairly accurate picture of the philosophical battle
currently being waged over civil litigation.
Despite their differences, these broadly defined groups
seem to agree that the current era is one of near-crisis in civil
litigation, although advocates of change see it as one of oppor-
tunity as well. Reformers want substantial change in the liti-
gation system, reduced litigation volume, a net shift in dis-
putes from litigation to ADR, reduced disputing costs and dam-
age awards and faster determination of disputes.
Preservationists, while not strictly opposed to these objectives
(for who can oppose lower costs and faster resolution in the
abstract?), fear that the reformist agenda will either create
more problems than it solves or achieve its objectives only at
the cost of reducing the accuracy and justice of dispute resolu-
tion.1 20
I am not attempting to characterize with subtlety the
positions of the profession regarding particular reform propos-
als. Rather, I wish to make the point that the profession tends
to divide broadly into those that are encouraged by the seem-
ing explosion of multi-sourced interest in changing litigation
and those who view the multiplicity of reform proposals with
some suspicion and merely as evidence of fragmentation rather
than progress.' To the former group, the variety of activity
directed toward changing litigation can be viewed benignly as
a "new paradigm"'22 in which the system responds to per-
ceived need for change through a variety of sources outside the
traditional hierarchy of rulemaking and policy proposals by the
judiciary. To the latter group, current developments seem to
reflect a "crumbling construct" as the edifice of basic agree-
ment about the litigation system breaks down under the re-
lentless chipping away by so many critical sculptors.
Another apt typology for assessing the profession's current
i I confess to being more of a preservationist than a reformer, a bias that I
hope does not skew my description of the reformist agenda and activities.
12 This perspective is succinctly captured by the title of Professor Stephen
Subrin's paper for this Symposium: Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It
Disintegrate, supra note 24.
"2 See infra notes 164-98 and accompanying text (concerning the concept of
dominant paradigms of an intellectual discipline).
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attitudes toward reform was provided by Professor Edward
Brunet, who has spoken and written of an efficiency camp, a
justice camp and a discretion camp." The efficiency group,
like the reformers generally, argues that dispute resolution has
become perilously slow and expensive. It urges as a solution
changes in substantive and procedural rules and party-attor-
ney incentive structures to achieve greater efficiency, which it
defines largely as the faster processing of more cases with no
increase in overall expenditures on the court system.124 While
the efficiency group, like other camps, exhibits a range of view-
points, it is largely comfortable with the Quayle Report and
the Biden Bill. By contrast, the justice camp opposes much of
the Quayle Report as well as the tone of "speed and cost uber
alles" that animated much of the advocacy for the Biden Bill.
Similar to, if not congruent with, the preservationist camp,
Brunet's justice group urges caution in any reform efforts lest
the traditional rights of litigants to a full airing of their claims,
including broad discovery and jury consideration, be lost or
diminished too greatly.'25 Finally, Brunet's suggested discre-
tion camp is something of a coalition of liberals and moderates
attracted to efficiency and members of the justice camp willing
to make some changes in the "open courts" adjudication model.
The uniting thread of discretion holds for them the promise of
more efficient flexibility by judges without per se limitations on
the open courts adjudicatory ideal.'26
Ultimately, Brunet predicted, the discretion camp would
prevail, with the justice team finishing a distant third in the
race to control modern litigation policy.'27 He may have been
correct. But the intervening impact of the CJRA, just passed
when he wrote, and other developments, particularly the con-
tinued tension in congressional-judicial relations, suggest that
although retaining its allure as a method of compromising or
deferring policy questions, discretion is held in less esteem
" See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Compet-
ing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991) [hereinafter Brunet,
Triumph]; Edward Brunet, Remarks at Association of American Law Schools Civil
Procedure Section Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3-6, 1991).
124 See Brunet, Triumph, supra note 123, at 277-81.
122 Id. at 281-85.
'2' Id. at 285-96.
127 Id. at 306-08.
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than before, at least when exercised by judges. Of course, most
of the efficiency-driven reform suggestions of local CJRA Advi-
sory Groups and others depend heavily on case management
and judicial discretion to implement proposed efficiency re-
forms. Whatever one's favored typology, the single near indis-
putable conclusion is that the legal profession and legal
policymakers are less united in their vision of the "good" litiga-
tion system than they were thirty years ago.
B. Attitudes About Adjudicatory Procedure And Attitudes
Toward the Litigation Reform Process
The possibility that the norms of litigation policymaking
are being splintered or changed is of course related to the view
(accurate in my judgment) that policymakers and the legal
profession not only have limited access to adjudication for a
variety of reasons, 2 ' but have lost their "faith" in the capacity
or competence of the traditional adjudicatory model of dispute
resolution. Professor Judith Resnik's prominent article'29 ana-
lyzed this development thoroughly some seven years ago and
ensuing events have largely continued the trend. I could not
improve upon her assessment but I will try both to update it in
part and examine this tendency from a slightly different per-
spective, that of the purported nature of scientific revolutions.
In addition, I want to focus on another aspect of the changing
litigation Zeitgeist: the method by which adjudicatory proce-
dure and other aspects of litigation are altered-the "law re-
form" mechanism so to speak. Thus, while Professor Resnik's
article focused on changing attitudes toward traditional adjudi-
cation, I am also attempting to focus on attitudes toward the
process of litigation reform itself.
The two areas are related but distinct. Adjudicatory proce-
dure is the means by which particular litigation is adminis-
tered. Litigation reform is the means by which aspects of the
litigation process, including adjudicatory procedure, are al-
tered, marginalized, reduced in importance, bypassed, elimi-
. See Resnik, supra note 22. see also Risinger, supra note 116, at 35 (noting
'emerging consensus that federal civil procedure is in the midst of a counterrevo-
lution" but observing that nature and impact of revision movement remains a
matter of debate); Tobias, supra note 116, at 287-96 (same).
" See Resnik, supra note 22.
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nated or changed. I am not only positing, as did Resnik, that
the prevailing attitude toward adjudicatory procedure has
changed toward a more restrictive view, but also that a previ-
ous consensus supporting relatively centralized, nonpartisan,
orderly, deliberate and structured litigation reform has eroded
or fragmented. As discussed further below, the "revolution," if
that is the proper term, is more complete regarding adjudicato-
ry procedure. The formerly prevailing "open access" model is
increasingly viewed as a luxury society can no longer af-
ford. 3° The success of my posited change in the political
system's views toward litigation reform is less certain. Recent
years have seen significant steps away from the "judicially
centralized-deliberative" model but the status quo appears yet
to be something less than a -evolution or new order. Whether
"new thinking" in litigation reform represents a new consensus
or merely the rejection or erosion of the old remains in debate.
Some preservationists see disintegration while others view
recent reform efforts as a new paradigm of litigation thinking,
a paradigm they dislike nonetheless.
Political consequences often accompany changes in intel-
lectual attitudes and, in my view, modern civil litigation de-
bates are no exception. For example, the previous consensus on
adjudicatory procedure was more friendly to less powerful
socio-political interests than is current sentiment."' It is con-
1. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 117, at 321 ("Nourishing the fiction that justice
is a pearl beyond price has its own price," arguing that managerial judging tech-
niques are an evolutionary response of the judicial system to defects of the "open
access" model of adjudicatory procedure).
' This view is widely held. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 116, at 35 (new
ethos in litigation is viewed by some as "cynical movement to restore to defen-
dants, particularly powerful, establishment 'repeat player' defendants, traditional
procedural advantages they lost by virtue of the Federal Rules' emphasis on full
disclosure and decision on the merits ...[w]hatever the conscious motivation, ...
burdens flowing from recent changes in the system have fallen more heavily upon
plaintiffs than defendants"); Weinstein, supra note 116, at 470 n.6 ('[ilt can be
argued that the growth of a powerful plaintiffs' bar together with post-New Deal
legislation in the mid-twentieth century constituted a major swing of a pendulum
toward consumers' rights after a swing toward producers in the mid-nineteenth
century"); accord MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 253-66 (1977) [hereinafter
HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I]; see also STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 120 (1980)
(widespread right to jury trial in most civil cases and widespread use of contin-
gent fees by "entrepreneur-lawyers" significantly expanded plaintiffs' recovery in
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siderably less clear whether the status quo of litigation reform
is more or less hospitable to society's have-nots than was the
previous construct. For reasons developed later in this Article,
I conclude that, on balance, the new order (or disorder) in liti-
gation reform, like the new order in adjudicatory procedure,
weighs more in favor of the socioeconomically advantaged than
did its predecessor.
C. Paradigms and Procedure: The Nature of Scientific
Revolutions and Their Applicability to Legal Change
"Paradigm" has been one of the buzzwords of intellectual
discourse during the past thirty years, the result of Thomas
Kuhn's influential book,'32 first published in 1962. Kuhn per-
suasively argued that in even the supposedly objective "hard"
sciences of mathematics, chemistry and physics, the controlling
conventional wisdom resulted in large part from the collective
consensus of the profession's leadership rather than from any
tort).
Many of the recent and proposed changes in litigation have had or would
have the net effect of providing less information (recent changes in Rules 26-37),
fewer jury trials (the ADR movement, including mass use of arbitration clauses in
contracts), more judicial supervision of juries or alteration of jury verdicts (expand-
ed use of judgment as a matter of law), less use of the class action device against
defendant classes or where only injunctive relief is sought against institutions
(changes in Rule 23) and greater risk to litigants who challenge existing law or
press claims viewed as dubious by the power structure (Rule 11). These develop-
ments are discussed in more detail at infra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
As to the importance of attorney fee arrangements in the scheme of things,
some developments have introduced more scrutiny and control of fees, see Vincent
R. Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class Actions,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 539 (1988); Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the
Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litigation, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 41 (1991), while
at the same time attorneys have been permitted greater freedom to advertise and
compete, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), as law practice
has become more commercial, marked by more mammoth firms. See MARC
GALANTER & THOMAS PALEY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BIG LAV FIM (1991). However, despite the emergence of "superstar" plaintiffs
lawyers (e.g., Gerry Spence, Philip Corboy, Stanley Chesley, Melvin Belli) and
their well-heeled firms (or fiefdoms), most of the growth in law firm infrastructure
has occurred in firms that primarily represent substantial corporations and
wealthy individuals, providing more of this economy of scale to litigations tradi-
tional defendants. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out.Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
112 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
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pure immutability of particular findings and conclusions. In
framing this inquiry for law, I use the term "new paradigm" to
describe a potential shift in the controlling axioms governing
the dispute resolution activity in the United States. Talk of a
new paradigm or "paradigm shift" (the displacement of the
prevailing paradigm with a new paradigm) in any field is in-
tended by its defenders to evoke the notion of a fresh approach,
one unmoored from the constraints of a flawed preceding sys-
tem. The term has become so much a part of the lexicon of the
pretentious that academics regularly make excessive use of the
term, such as referring to their own scholarship as "paradigm-
shifting" or looking down on the efforts of others as insuffi-
ciently revolutionary.13
This pop-culturalization of Kuhn, in which this Article is,
perhaps, a witting participant, not only says a good deal about
the academic politics of law, but also illuminates how law and
litigation both resemble and differ from the sciences (both
physical and social). As one commentator observed in a differ-
ent context, in legal theory "a little fact goes a long way. From
the recognition that law is transmitted through words springs
the school of 'law and literature.' From the fact that legal dis-
putes involve the allocation of costs comes 'law and
economics.""34 In similar fashion, the legal profession (practi-
tioners and judges as well as academics) has a more hair-trig-
gered response to new data than do our counterparts in other
fields. The types of scientific revolutions Kuhn surveyed usual-
ly were built over decades or generations, even if the actual
shift in the prevailing paradigm occurred within a matter of a
few years.'35 Despite Arthur Vanderbilt's aphorism that "judi-
cial reform is no sport for the short-winded," 36 law reform or
133 I realize that I make this statement based on largely anecdotal evidence.
Most documentation of the subject is probably located in confidential promotion
and tenure files but there are exceptions. For example, Professor Farber describes
receiving a letter of recommendation that described a job applicant as someone
who "would do 'extremely intelligent conventional legal scholarship' but was 'un-
likely to be a paradigm-shaker.'" Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70
MINN. L. REV. 917, 929 n.54 (1986).
"14 See David Cole, Against Literalism, 40 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1988) (reviewing
JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW
(1985)).
... See KUHN, supra note 132, at 52-91.
"' Quoted in William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
[Vol. 59: 659
TRENDS IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
jurisprudential movements can arise and gather critical mass
quite rapidly.137
Some of the difference in the "response time" of science
and law is both understandable and justified. The science dis-
cussed by Kuhn primarily concerns itself with decoding the
laws of nature. Law seeks to shape and control society at least
as much as to reflect or explain it. Consequently, lawyers have
more freedom to "invent" their worlds, although much of the
impact of Kuhn's book resulted because he made a convincing
case that scientists do a good deal more inventing than is com-
monly supposed. In addition, law is a political institution as
well as a learned discipline. As such, law, like any political
institution, is expected to be responsive to public concern about
perceived problems,13 while science is given more insulation
from the current social environment. 3 '
Whatever lawyers may say about the conservatism of their
business,14 they are fickle compared to scientists. A scientist
Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 11. Arthur Vanderbilt was Chief Justice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court and an active participant in efforts to reform judi-
cial procedures.
" For example, restrictions on the addition of "pendent parties" (who could
otherwise not properly be in federal court) to a lawsuit anchored in federal juris-
diction seemed well-entrenched despite academic criticism. See Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 595 (1989) (rejecting pendent parties claim under very compelling
circumstances); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (rejecting pendent parties
argument but holding open possibility of future application). Then, with great
speed and little fanfare, Congress in 1990 enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, codifying the
permissibility of pendent parties jurisdiction in federal question cases under the
rubric of "supplemental jurisdiction."
As another example, legal movements such as Critical Legal Studies, Law and
Economics and Feminist Jurisprudence began as challenges, even strident objec-
tions, to the prevailing conventional wisdom. Yet they obtained substantial (even if
not always dominant) acceptance within only a few years. By contrast, scientists
proposing alternatives to prevailing scientific theory were severely ostracized (even
academics must admit that burning at the stake is worse than being denied ten-
ure or promotion) and did not enjoy significant support among other professionals
until the paradigm shift was nearly complete. See KUHN, supra note 132, at 71-91.
'" But, once again, the line between science and law is not as bright as com-
monly assumed. For example, Kuhn notes that social conditions, particularly pres-
sures for calendar reform, gave important support to the successful "Copernican
Revolution" in astronomy. See id. at 153.
"' Again, however, the statement must be qualified. When certain scientific
activity intersects with current social issues, scientists may be quickly drawn into
the political fray, as has occurred in varying degrees regarding issues of the begin-
ning of life, genetic engineering, the painfulness of various forms of killing, and
the safety of certain chemicals or drugs.
10 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 123-24
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typically shows greatest fear of a "Type I error" (the erroneous
acceptance of a purported theory, fact or relationship) and is
more willing to accept a "Type II error" (erroneous rejection of
a purported theory, fact or relationship)."' This is so because
other scientists, as well as society, do not rely on erroneous
rejection as they might rely upon an erroneously accepted theo-
ry; scientists therefore generally demand strong "proof' of a
fact, rule or theory before accepting it. They reason that the
costs of wrongful acceptance outweigh the costs of wrongful
rejection, which are likely to be cured in the future by newer,
better information or theoretical refinements. The consequenc-
es of the respective types of error are also arguably different in
law, or at least in civil litigation. For example, the Type I error
of an erroneous liability verdict against a manufacturer (partic-
ularly one with good insurance coverage) does not forever send
legal knowledge down the wrong fork in the road and may be
spread over an entire profitable industry. But the Type II error
of an erroneous defense verdict generates greater remorse by
leaving a badly injured claimant wrongly uncompensated.' Of
course in criminal law, we have made a different value judg-
ment-that convicting a single innocent defendant is worse
than acquitting scores of the guilty-and we therefore require
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (which minimizes
Type I error) rather than the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard (which minimizes Type II error).'
(1982) (arguing that law generally has-and should have-a "retentionist bias" for
the status quo).
141 Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 410-12 (1985) (noting scientific
tendency to lower risk of Type I error by requiring greater confidence in experi-
mental results before accepting inferences from the experiment).
142 Obviously, Type I errors in civil litigation, if bad enough or frequent enough,
may have consequences more akin to the scientific community's feared acceptance
of schlock theories: withdrawal of a socially useful product from the market; in-
ability of manufacturers to obtain any affordable insurance; and, bankruptcy of a
useful firm. Notwithstanding this, my point remains: in most individual civil cases,
a Type I error must be very egregious and of great magnitude even to begin to
rival the consequences of Type I error in science.
" The legal profession is hardly uniform on this point, however. For example,
judges have often required a claim to be probabilistically probative in order to per-
mit recovery. See Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Agent
Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim of John
Lilley); see also In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1233, 1230,
1260 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Prominent scholars have criticized this view. See Nesson,
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The lawyer's conservatism, although strong, yields more
readily than the scientist's to external demands and political
considerations not strictly related to the "truth" or accuracy of
a proposition.144 Kuhn compares political and scientific revolu-
tions, and suggests they are more alike then commonly sup-
posed. But because the discipline of law is not entirely a sci-
ence, Kuhn's overall thesis about scientific revolutions cannot
be applied to legal change.'45 Nonetheless, Kuhn's analysis can
provide an instructive analogy for assessing the current state
of the profession's attitudes toward civil litigation. Kuhn de-
scribed the period of a paradigm's dominance in a field as an
era of "normal science"-the time between revolutions in the
discipline. He posited several characteristics of the normal
science of a controlling paradigm:
1) It attracts an "enduring group of adherents away from
competing modes" of thought in the area;
2) It is sufficiently "open-ended to leave problems to solve;"
and
3) Students of the discipline study the dominant paradigm
in order to become members of the scientific communi-
ty. 1
46
In addition, Kuhn posited that the prevailing paradigm theory
must be perceived by the community as "better than its com-
supra note 117 (criticizing Agent Orange decision); Charles Nesson, The Evidence
or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accountability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1357 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (trial outcomes involve social
values in addition to and more important than strict accuracy); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 877 (1988) (criticizing Palmer, 815 F.2d at 84.).
1,4 In fairness to my chosen field, I again emphasize that these differences are
matters of degree. Scientists of course respond at some point to social forces and
may be chronically "politicized" in some ways because of the importance of obtain-
ing grants, gaining fame, preserving status or making money. See, e.g., Ron
Wislow, Conflicting Amoxicillin Studies Set Up Bitter Dispute, WALL ST. J., Dec.
24, 1991, at B2.
... See KUHN, supra note 132, at 160-91, discussing the nature of a scientific
community, particularly natural science communities and the impact of that struc-
ture on the discipline's potential for "progress." Kuhn posits that the seemingly
more linear advances of the natural sciences stem in significant part from their
relative isolation from real world pressures; e.g., social scientists (and presumably
legal scholars) feel a need to study important or controversial phenomena while
hard scientists study what they find interesting or the logical "next step" in a
problematic area.
"I Id. at 10.
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petitors."147 Further, in times of normal science, practitioners
of the discipline gain stature in the profession through success
in solving the acute problems in the interstices of the prevail-
ing paradigm.14
According to Kuhn, the essence of professional activity
during a period of paradigm hegemony is the application of the
controlling paradigm to new problems and facts. In particular,
Kuhn saw normal science as engaging in three distinct sorts of
factual investigations:
1) The determination of significant facts-important
data for better understanding of the paradigm and its
application. Significant fact research attempts to increase
the scope and accuracy of factual knowledge considered
well-revealed by the existing paradigm;
2) The matching of facts with theory-testing the
paradigm against the world (or the world against the para-
digm). Matching research gathers information to deter-
mine the extent to which facts are consistent with theory;
and
3) Articulation of theory-the interpolating or extrapo-
lating of the prevailing paradigm to encompass more of the
discipline's world. Articulation research seeks to refine the
dominant paradigm by resolving ambiguities or using it to
solve additional problems in the field.'
Traditional legal scholarship prior to the mid-1970s fit the
Kuhn model in many respects: it assessed case law and doc-
trine, identifying more precisely the degree to which legal
outcomes support or diverged from theory. It also attempted to
square particular subfields or lines of case law with the pre-
vailing theory. And, like Kuhn's natural normal science, it
eventually may have undermined the prevailing paradigm by
suggesting it failed to solve problems, diverged from reality, or
created undesirable side effects (both social as well as intellec-
tual in law).
Law is more receptive to paradigm shifts in that its differ-
ent mission, mixed social and intellectual role and different
approaches to error costs make law a tinderbox for new ideas,
147 Id. at 17.
148 Id. at 23.
119 Id. at 27, 34.
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which spread rapidly and make significant inroads into at least
some influential quarters where the environment is supportive.
The acknowledged absence of objective, rock-solid "truth" in
law makes it more tolerant of other voices. New schools of
thought need not eradicate their predecessors to succeed. A
substantial amount of co-existence over a long period is not
only possible but normal. 5 ' At the same time, this chronic
fragmentation' of the legal profession makes it harder for a
new paradigm to obtain dominance. If nothing else, it is harder
to determine whether a paradigm shift has occurred and when
it took place.'52 More important, the paradigm shifts in law
generally will be less complete than those of the sciences. For
example, in this Article, I posit that the profession has shifted
to the verge of displacing the "open access" paradigm of adjudi-
catory procedure with a restricted view. Even if this is true
and the restrictive paradigm continues to climb, it will never
have the complete success of a Copernican Revolution or the
shift from Newtonian physics to Einstein's relative physics.
Within narrower areas of law, however, it seems possible
... Scientific paradigms can compete for long periods, see id. at 136-59, but I
think it wrong to consider these battles, no matter how gentile, as co-existence.
For example, a physicist in good standing during the early Nineteenth Century
could not believe that light was both made of waves and made of particles. A
Twentieth Century Iawyer can endorse both feminist and CLS views or may apply
economic analysis and formal legal doctrine to a civil rights dispute. As the dis-
cussion below suggests, much of the current debate in litigation and other areas of
law derives from long-standing differences between formalism and realism, both of
which have continued to have legitimate status in the mainstream legal communi-
ty.
t,' As one author has noted, the mainstream of law is so wide that both Robert
Bork and Ronald Dworkin are considered to be within it. See Richard A. Posner,
The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV.
761, 766 (1987). Although there are of course professional differences in the more
scientific fields, it is hard to imagine a similar range, as though the medical pro-
fession had prestigious camps of practitioners who advocated faith healing irrecon-
cilable with the views of other doctors.
"' See KUHN, supra note 132, at 150-60. He posits that paradigm shifts occur
both from generational changes (younger scholars more receptive to the new para-
digm ascend while stalwarts of the old paradigm die out), and from convincing
opinion leaders of the community to switch allegiances.
The role of power and opinion leadership is probably more formidable in law
because the indeterminacy of the discipline makes it more difficult to refute com-
pletely the opinions of the profession's leadership. See Subrin, supra note 24, at
1156-58 (positing that 1976 Pound Conference marked beginning of sea change in
civil procedure).
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to speak accurately of revolutions in the world view of the
lawyer-specialists who dominate the respective area. For exam-
ple, Brainerd Currie's writing on the conflict of laws153 dramati-
cally shifted the intellectual establishment's focus away from
physical contacts formalism, particularly lex loci delicti, and
placed government interest analysis at the center of modern
conflicts analysis (at least by scholars if not all courts). Pas-
sage of the Civil War era constitutional amendments can be
viewed not only as a major redrafting of the Constitution, but
also as a complete shift in thinking about federalism and indi-
vidual rights, or at least they became so in the hands of the
post-New Deal Supreme Court. The advent of strict liability or
the fall of the citadel of privity' can be seen as mini or micro
paradigm shifts in tort law.
In much the same way, changes in litigation practice can
be deemed paradigm shifts by those inclined to see such shifts.
However, in my attempted analogy to Kuhn, I suggest that
lawyers be careful not to dilute overly his concept. Before de-
claring a revolution or counter-revolution, we should "hold out"
for evidence of a major change more like the Copernican Revo-
lution and less like a change in the doctrine of official immuni-
ty for judges. Of course, in attempting to apply Kuhn's thesis
to litigation, strict comparability is impossible. Certainly, my
posited new orders in adjudication procedure and, perhaps, in
litigation policymaking do not appear to meet the dictionary
definition of a paradigm as "an outstandingly clear or typical
example or archetype."155 It may, come closer, however, to
Kuhn's notion of a paradigm as a central bundle of axioms
establishing the operation of a field of inquiry. Although many
observers view current eclectic efforts to revise civil litigation
as indicating only confusion and not the emergence of a new
central organizing principle.
Kuhn's thesis is often cited as an example of our inspira-
' See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
154 See, e.g., HARRY W. JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD 132 (1980); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (5th ed. 1984).
Compare Thomas and Wife v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852) with MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (court moves away from imposing privity as
a basis for liability and instead determines liability based on a theory of negli-
gence).
"5 See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 823 (1981).
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tion for critical or post-modern thought,' including modern
legal pragmatism.5 7 Too often, in my view, Kuhn is cited for
the proposition that science or knowledge is whatever a critical
mass (no pun intended) thinks at the moment. 5 ' Although
Kuhn's book is influential precisely because it rejected the view
that knowledge was divinely decreed, his picture of scientific
and social change strikes me as considerably constrained, albe-
it socially constructed. Kuhn identified himself as traditional
in large part by stating that "[olbservation and experience can
and must drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific
belief." However, "[an apparently arbitrary element, com-
pounded of personal and historical accident, is always a forma-
tive ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific
See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 254, 275, 307 (1992) (describing Kuhn as postmodern in approach). Quite to
the contrary of this view, my colleague Gary Minda views Kuhn as essentially
modern rather than postmodern in his thought because, despite his recognition of
the importance of social context to the emergence of "truth," Kuhn paints episte-
mology as an essentially linear path of progression to more accurate or sophisticat-
ed paradigms that enjoy widespread support among professionals and society at
large. In contrast, postmodern thought generally sees less cohesion in this regard.
See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1993)
[hereinafter Minda, Jurisprudence]; Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and
Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U. COL.
L. REV. 599 (1991).
..7 See, e.g., Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Im-
plications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2539 n.132 (1992)
(describing Kuhn's book as "monumentally important work" and suggesting it was
a "strong influence" on neopragmatist thinking of Professor Stanley Fish, who in
essence concludes that meaning assigned to text (literary, statutory, judicial, etc.)
is not immutably provided by language itself but by the meaning attributed to
language by the relevant community of reader-critics). See generally STANLEY E.
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMIUNITIES (1980) [here-
inafter FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?]. For variants and criticisms of the
Fish viewpoint, see Peter Brooks, Bouillabaisse, 99 YALE L.J. 1147 (1990) (review-
ing STANLEY E. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY); Owen M. Fiss, Conven-
tionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985).
' The tendency both to oversimplify Kuhn (in ways other than I am oversim-
plifying him) and identify him with a raging, standardless relativism is akin to
the tendency of some conservative commentators to caricature current liberal ini-
tiatives in order to debunk the straw man they have erected. See, e.g., ROGER
KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: HOW POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCA-
TION (1990); DINESH D'SOUzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND
SEX ON CAMPUS (1991); CHARLES J. SYKES, PROF SCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE
DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988).
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community at a given time."159 Once hegemonic, the prevail-
ing paradigm sets the parameters of inquiry in a particular
discipline, in part because professional education is "both rig-
orous and rigid."6 ° Under this regime, what Kuhn called nor-
mal science goes forward.
Although it has long been unfashionable to label law a
science, as did Langdell and other practitioners of "mechanical
jurisprudence," the similarities between the legal and scientif-
ic16' professions and the potential applicability of Kuhn's the-
sis to law reform bears examination. Law, like virtually any
other professional or social activity, goes through times of
"normalcy" and times of ferment or eruption. Law is organized
as a profession, with fixed educational requirements which, at
the risk of being pompous, we might even call rigorous. To
become a lawyer, one must receive three years of professional
inculcation and successfully pass a bar examination that pro-
vides some assurance that the new lawyer's thinking falls
within the mainstream of professional thought. In addition,
many states now have mandatory continuing legal education
"CLE" requirements, which force lawyers to become further
exposed to mainstream legal thought and practice. The very
activity of lawyering requires the lawyer to obtain the approval
of others in the profession. This tendency is most pronounced
in litigation, where the advocate seeks favorable rulings from a
judge.
But the scientific revolutions discussed by Kuhn, like most
political revolutions, tend to be lead by a comparative elite. For
natural sciences, Kuhn estimated that this smaller scientific
community of opinion leaders in a given specialty would often
be but "perhaps one hundred members, occasionally signifi-
cantly fewer."162 Because law is generally more open and its
community norms and hierarchy less structured,'63 the compa-
... KUHN, supra note 132, at 4.
" Id. at 5.
, Kuhn, trained as a physicist, focused on the so-called "hard" sciences of
astronomy, chemistry and physics. Thus, his assessment had even greater weight
than if he had merely "debunked" the conventional mythology of the "soft" sciences
of economics, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political science, which have
historically been viewed as less rigorous, more subjective and more vulnerable to
"non-scientific" influences.
162 KUHN, supra note 132, at 178.
" Kuhn defines the opinion-making scientific community as one united by read-
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rable "paradigm keeping" community is ordinarily much larger
than that posited by Kuhn in the natural sciences-but the
differences are uncomfortably slim, at least if one is a populist.
Consider Federal Rules revision: although thousands may
theoretically participate, at least at the periphery, the major
shapers of change and participants in extended dialogue are
few in number, probably less than the 100 natural scientists
from Kuhn's field.
D. The Seeming Paradigm Shift in Adjudicatory Procedure
and the Possible Revolution in Litigation Reform
1. Historical Background
The early American paradigm of adjudicatory procedure
stressed common law development and imposed rigid pleading
requirements designed to narrow issues prior to decision by
the fact finder. The prevailing litigation reform paradigm is
harder to discern but appears to have been one of comprehen-
sive legislative dominance. The well-known Judiciary Act of
1789 was comprehensive and evidences an early legislative
attempt to impose order and control on the newly created fed-
eral judicial power. It appears that state legislatures also were
active in lawmaking that affected litigation, so much so that
ing the same journals, membership in the same elite-learned societies, communica-
tion with one another, and employment of the same experimental techniques. See
id. at 177-78. Law is both different and similar. Lawyers share a basic methodolo-
gy of case-driven knowledge but scholars differ widely in research approaches and
even in fundamental views. The communication among opinion leaders is largely
closed to others but surfaces indirectly through panel discussions, symposia and
the like. Although some lawyers' societies are more restrictive than others (ALI;
American College of Trial Lawyers as compared to the ABA), legal organizations
appear to assert less control over legal activity than do scientific or medical societ-
ies over their activities. Regarding key journals, of course, law differs quite re-
markably from other fields because there are so many such journals (the salvation
of junior faculty), and they are student-edited, which is a mixed blessing. On one
hand, the student editors arguably lack the expertise to assess the true merit of
submissions and may be unduly influenced by name recognition and other prestige
factors unrelated to merit. On the other hand, the prevailing paradigm of legal
thought is less closely guarded in the journals by anonymous faculty referees com-
mitted to maintaining the old paradigm. Whatever the overall merits of legal liter-
ature, leading law reviews are widely but not universally read and an article in
one of the 300 or so non-elite periodicals may be influential. In the sciences, a few
journals command the field.
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the Framers included constitutional provisions barring bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws and confiscation of property with-
out just compensation as a check on the activist state legisla-
tures.' Indeed, when the federal judiciary upheld a creditor's
claim against a state165 a mere half-dozen years into the Re-
public Congress and the states responded with breakneck
speed to enact the eleventh amendment.'66
In the first half of the Nineteenth Century, there appears
to have been a paradigm adjustment if not a full-scale para-
digm shift toward greater judicial control of litigation policy
and relatively little legislative interference.'67 The Civil War,
of course, changed many things, including the activity of Con-
gress. Although the most famous congressional activity on this
front involved altering the Supreme Court's composition in
retaliation to or anticipation of judicial rulings'68 and the en-
actment of the Civil Rights Acts,'69 Congress generally became
more active in the last half of the century, passing a number of
'" See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985);
HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 131; William M. Treanor, Note, The Ori-
gins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
15 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that citizens have
a right to sue a state in federal court and that the state of Georgia must honor
contractual obligations incurred to lender during Revolutionary War).
11 See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEV-
ENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987). Of course, Congress currently can
be found frequently overruling or modifying Supreme Court decisions, especially
those with a pronounced impact on litigation. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 serves
as a dramatic recent example as do other statutes more specifically focused on
court procedure, which are discussed in Part II, infra. My point in terms of rough-
ly characterizing the changing sentiment about litigation reform is that both the
current and early American eras appear to be times of unusually high legislative
activity.
1 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 164, at 265-92; HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I,
supra note 131. However, this also appears to be a time in which the adjudicatory
procedure paradigm of strict pleading requirements continued to hold sway and,
perhaps, even strengthened as courts became increasingly formal and increasingly
important to the emerging merchant community and property claims accelerated
with the nation's westward movement.
' See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 3.2-.3 (1989); CHARLES
A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing
Congress' alteration of Supreme Court size and jurisdiction as means of attempting
to affect Court decisions).
169 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88 (1988) (largely providing private rights of action as
a means of implementing or strengthening policies underlying the thirteenth, four-
teenth, and fifteenth amendments).
[Vol. 59:659
TRENDS IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
substantive and regulatory laws with at least indirect effect on
the judicial system.7 ' More particular to civil litigation, Con-
gress in 1875 established the federal district courts which
conduct federal litigation' and established a structure of ap-
pellate courts for reviewing district court decisions.'72
At the same time, western states were being added to the
nation, providing newly empaneled state legislatures with the
opportunity to enact comprehensive provisions governing
courts and litigation. Throughout the country, the legislatures
were increasingly making forays into civil litigation legislation,
principally through the enactment of codes of procedure or
codification of the law. In 1848, the noted New York attorney
(and brother of Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field) David
Dudley Field was successful in having New York enact his
Field Code of civil procedure, which abolished the state's sepa-
rate court of chancery and "paved the way for the merger of
law and equity." The Field Code sought
to abolish the distinction among the forms of action [by] creat[ing]
the civil action in which the parties were to plead the fact constitut-
ing the accuse of action or defense. [It] was intended to make avail-
able all the appropriate remedies in [one] action [and] sought to
liberalize the provisions for joinder of causes and parties.173
However, after these spurts of legislative activity to enact
reforming codes of procedure or establish new courts or juris-
diction, Congress and the state legislatures appear to have
lacked sustained interest in litigation reform. 4
17' See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Anti-Immunity Act, ch. 3920, 34
Stat. 798 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 48 (1988)); Income Tax Act of 1894, ch.
349, 28 Stat. 509, which established the first federal personal income tax and was
struck down by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895), prompting eventual passage of the XVI Amendment to ensure the
legality of a subsequently enacted income tax.
17 See WRIGHT, supra note 168, § I.
172 Id.
... See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 18 (4th ed.
1992); see also CHARLES CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21-31
(2d ed. 1947); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING (1897); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311
(1988).
174 Regarding adjudicatory procedure, however, the era may have contained two
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Thus, despite the increasing hegemony of the legislature in
national policymaking for both litigation and substantive law, I
hesitate to label the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Cen-
turies as part of a particular controlling paradigm of litigation
reform. Rather, it seems as though two roughly defined reform
constructs-comprehensive enactments by the legislature ver-
sus incremental implementation through the judiciary-vied
unconsciously for supremacy, with both schools of thought
achieving incomplete or sporadic success. Yet neither appears
to have established its pre-eminence sufficiently to be deemed
"paradigmatic," as least as Kuhn uses the term. In large part,
this may be the result of the absence of self-conscious thinking
on the subject. Advocates of either reform methodology proba-
bly were unlikely to realize when they had triumphed or even
that they carried the standard for a particular litigation para-
digm (or what someone writing 100 years later would describe
as a paradigm).
2. Modern Litigation Reform: The Enabling Act and
Professional Dominance
By the early twentieth century, the legal profession and
political elites were quite consciously focused on the matter of
how litigation reform should proceed.' The American Bar
paradigm shifts. In reaction to the first half-century's limits on adjudication (a
paradigm of restrictive adjudicatory procedure), the Field Code and its progeny
sought to simplify civil litigation and to open the courts, evidencing at least an
attempted shift to a paradigm of open adjudication. By the late Nineteenth Cen-
tury, however, it appears that both bench and bar, through narrow construction of
the civil procedure codes, provided advantage to social forces with greater legal
sophistication and created a shift back toward the more restrictive adjudicatory
paradigm, a development paralleled in the contemporaneous substantive law. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 164, at 323-58; HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note
131. For example, the Supreme Court of the era provided the status of
"personhood" to corporations (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S.
394 (1898)), established the Lochner doctrine drastically limiting government regu-
lation of business (Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)), held that manufac-
turing was not "interstate commerce" admitting of federal regulation (United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)), and delayed imposition of a federal
personal income tax (Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)).
"' Burbank, supra note 4, at 1035-50 (describing litigation reform views and
efforts prior to passage of Enabling Act). As Professor Burbank's article notes, the
Enabling Act has some of its genesis (to mix paternity as well as fracturing a
metaphor) in reformist activity of the preceding century. I do not ignore these
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Association and strong local bar groups like the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York became increasingly organized
and active. For example, the ABA promulgated its Canons of
Ethics in 1908176 and its commercial law section was instru-
mental in achieving passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in
1926.177
Most important, however, was the bar's support of the
judiciary in promoting the Enabling Act.' During the early
Twentieth Century, political decisionmakers and the legal
profession debated whether litigation reform should be run by
the courts or the legislature.7 ' Having more faith in the com-
petence of courts, many judges and lawyers argued that the
judiciary (or at least organizations of the legal profession)
should take the lead. Evidence authority and legal giant Dean
John Henry Wigmore went so far as to argue that, based on
separation of powers concerns, legislating rules of procedure
was unconstitutional, not merely imprudent.' Other authori-
ties, however, particularly those in politics, regarded this as
anti-democratic heresy and questioned whether legislatures
should defer even slightly to the claims of expertise and au-
thority put forth by lawyers and judges.' The debate proceed-
events in framing my interpretation but view the "critical mass" of debate over
litigation reform as occurring in the early Twentieth Century and, thus, constitut-
ing a shift away from the preceding status quo.
' See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 1992 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 246.
r See Stempel, supra note 29, at 277.
' See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1043-65.
... See, e.g., id. at 1045-97.
... See John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). Wigmore, long-time dean of North-
western Law School, is of course best known for his multi-volume treatise on evi-
dence, which was first published in 1904. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AiiERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940).
On Dean Wigmore's philosophy, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Tra-
dition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLIJi. L. REV. 38 (1985) (discussing Wigmore's views
on natural selection and law and how his writings were influential).
... See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1074-83. Modern debates over civil litigation
reform often mirror the "legislature versus judiciary" arguments of the early Twen-
tieth Century. Compare Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, A Judi-
cious Legislator's Lexicon to the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMITY 54, 56 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) ("from the
birth of our nation the issue of court reform has been a public policy question, not
one reserved to judges and lawyers") with Mullenix, supra note 95, at 424-36
(arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 intrudes so greatly upon autonomy
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ed in earnest virtually until the first Franklin Roosevelt Ad-
ministration, at which time fortuitous political developments
placed key proponents of the Enabling Act in positions of pow-
er from where they could finalize enactment of the proposed
legislation, which had been gaining support as a compromise
between the competing legislative and judicial camps."8 2
The Enabling Act was both an ingenious resolution of the
litigation reform controversy as well as a major paradigm shift.
Although litigation policy entails more than procedural rules,
the rules remain at the heart of a lawsuit and essentially set
the parameters within which litigation is practiced. The Act
gave the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, the legal profes-
sion'83 substantial license to set the agenda and shape these
important aspects of litigation. Under the Act, Advisory Com-
mittees for respective sets of Rules operate under the auspices
of the Judicial Conference of United States." Committee Mem-
bers are appointed by the Chief Justice and serve three-year
terms.' The Advisory Committees consider new rules or
of judiciary as to be unconstitutional). See also infra notes 257-77 and accompany-
ing text (discussing modern debate over litigation reform).
1 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1094-98.
18 As discussed in note 190 infra, the Chief Justice exerts primary control over
the selection of Advisory Committee members charged with designing new Civil
Rules. In the modern era, the majority of the Advisory Committee has been com-
prised of judges, with a judge as chair. A typical Advisory Committee also includes
law professors and practitioners, usually from larger, more prestigious firms or the
U.S. Justice Department. The Reporter, charged with drafting proposals sought by
the Committee, is usually a law professor.
The original Advisory Committee appointed by Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes in 1935, however, was comprised of "fourteen lawyers and law teachers."
Its chair was former Attorney General William D. Mitchell, with Yale Law Dean
Charles E. Clark serving as Reporter. See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 173, § 1.7
at 21. Even then, however, I think it fair to describe the process as a judicially
centered paradigm of litigation reform since the Supreme Court held final power
to report proposals to Congress. The shift from a lawyer-centered Advisory Com-
mittee to one dominated by judges, however, figures in the ensuing drift away
from the judicial reform paradigm. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
18 Currently, the Judicial Conference of the United States maintains advisory
committees dealing with civil rules, criminal rules, appellate rules, bankruptcy and
evidence.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter, a recent
member of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and current Chair of the recently
reconstituted Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, has suggested that terms of
membership should be increased to four years to take realistic account for the
time required to oversee a proposed rule change from gestation through discussion,
public comment, reference to the Supreme Court and ultimately congressional re-
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amendments and draft recommended changes,186 which are
then subject to a period of public comment."8 7 After reconsid-
ering the proposed new rules, the Advisory Committee then
forwards them to the Judicial Conference. 88 The Conference
may reject a Committee proposal or may forward it to the
Supreme Court in total or in revised form. The Court ordinari-
ly receives a proposed change from the Judicial Conference
during the fall of a Term. The Court considers the proposal
and accepts, rejects or modifies the proposed change. If the
Court acts by May 1 of the ensuing year and reports a Rule
change to Congress, the legislature has seven months to act by
modifying or rejecting the proposal. If Congress fails to act by
sponse. See infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text (discussing the process for
adopting rules under the Enabling Act).
' The process by which a proposed new or amended rule reaches an Advisory
Committee agenda is relatively unstructured. Frequently, the Committee responds
to Supreme Court decisions that either explicitly invite re-examination of the Rules
or have been subject to substantial criticism. For example, after the Court's deci-
sion in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), which took a restrictive view of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) and directed dismissal of a case on statute
of limitations grounds due to plaintiffs misnaming of a defendant, the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee quickly began work on revisions to reverse the Schiavone
decision, resulting in a revised rule by December 1991. See Joseph P. Bauer,
Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-Ate Illustration of Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720 (1988); Harold
S. Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons for Civil
Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987).
In other instances, the Advisory Committee responded to suggestions. For
example, as of Spring 1993, the Civil Rules Committee was considering a revised
Rule 68 based upon the suggestions of Federal Judicial Center Director Judge
William Schwarzer. See Schwarzer, supra note 10.
" The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988), took several steps designed to improve public participation in the
rulemaking process. For example, the meetings of the Advisory Committees are
expressly open to the public and a period of public comment on a proposed new
rule (which is to be widely disseminated), including a public hearing to receive
testimony, is required. However, the meetings are not well-publicized and are
infrequently attended by outsiders, and there is no provision for further public
input after the revision of a rule that has already been the subject of comment.
Although the process is still not optimally open, the 1988 changes incorporate
some of the changes suggested by leading commentators. See Jack E. Friedenthal,
The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 673 (1975); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time of Re-
examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975).
'" The Judicial Conference of the United States is established by law as an
official policy-setting body of the federal courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988), and is
comprised of the Chief Judge or designated representative of each Circuit Court of
Appeals and a district court judge from each Circuit.
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December 1, the proposed rule change takes effect.189
Thus, the paradigm of litigation reform for the Rules in
the middle third of the Twentieth Century was one of compro-
mise weighted toward judicial authority. Although Congress
retained ultimate authority over the Rules, the controlling oar
was held by the judiciary because, ordinarily, it set priorities,
acquired information, shaped proposals and directed the focus
of rulemaking, which in normal times is the main means of
altering litigation policy.19 By contrast, during this period
Congress generally was inclined to defer to the judiciary's
views in the matter, despite operating under a committee sys-
tem of specialization designed to assist members in acquiring
expertise and focusing on discreet areas of public business.
This is particularly true so long as Congress (or the relevant
congresspersons influential in judicial policy) are not besieged
by interest group pressures at odds with the judiciary's objec-
tive, and so long as Congress respects the judiciary enough to
defer to it and the Enabling Act process. For the most part, it
appears that this set of circumstances prevailed during the
1934-1974 period, enabling civil rules revision to be revised
largely by the bench.' 1
Rules creation and amendment are not, of course, the sum
of the universe of litigation reform policy, and it appears that
the judiciary also enjoyed extraordinary influence over non-
rules matters. Changes in procedural law or civil litigation
policy were often initiated by or came at the behest of the
bench or organized bar groups.'92 For example, federal judges
See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1954).
190 An implicit assumption underlying the Enabling Act is that Advisory Com-
mittee membership represents a cross-section of the federal bench and legal profes-
sion. However, many observers question this benign assumption. The Committee
composition could easily reflect the perspective of the Chief Justice and his allies
rather than the bench as a whole. Indeed, it has been suggested that the conser-
vative cast of proposed and enacted new rules during the past decade (as contrast-
ed with the more liberal tone of amendments during the 1960s and 1970s) reflects
the efforts of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist more than the changing shape
of the federal bench or changing viewpoints in the legal profession. For example,
Chief Justice Burger so desired the Committee to promulgate an expanded version
of Rule 68 permitting fee shifting (proposed and most hotly debated during the
1983-85 period) that he personally lobbied the Committee at one of its meetings.
191 See Walker, supra note 59, at 464-69.
" Although it vacillated on the issue for decades, the ultimate support of the
American Bar Association for the Enabling Act was of great importance to its
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frequently took the lead in lobbying for legislation to expand
the size of the bench or reshape court jurisdiction. Perhaps the
most famous example is the so-called "judges' bill," which pro-
vided the Supreme Court with substantially increased discre-
tion and control of its docket through a reduction in appellate
jurisdiction and greater reliance on certiorari for selection of
cases for review.'93
Although the attitudes toward reform of bench and bar
were largely congruent or co-created,'94 there have been nota-
ble exceptions. For example, as noted earlier, the commercial
law section of the ABA was a vigorous proponent of the Feder-
al Arbitration Act, legislation that ran counter to some judicial
preferences in that it was designed to overcome adverse com-
mon law and require courts to enforce arbitration
agreements. 9 ' For the most part, however, conflicts of this
sort were avoided. Usually, judges and prosecutors wanted
essentially the same things from Congress as did judges and
top-flight commercial lawyers or lawyers seeking greater abili-
ty to sue nonresidents. Indeed, the rise of more formal interac-
tion between different parts of the profession may have in-
creased the relative amount of co-created bench-bar policy. For
example, the American Law Institute ("ALI"), 'g created in
passage. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1043-95.
191 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3504
(1992).
... In my lexicon, bench and bar opinions on a matter are "congruent" when
they match but were arrived at independently or developed in parallel. Bench-bar
views are "co-created" where there has occurred intertwined dialogue and activity
resulting in a legal profession "position" on a matter of policy.
' See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering The Employment Contract Exclusion in
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Stat-
utory Vision, 1991 J. DIsP. RESOL., 259, 259-63; Stempel, supra note 29, at 263-78
(discussing traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration and legislative history of
Arbitration Act). Today, however, most every federal judge would regard the bar's
support of the Arbitration Act as a favor to the bench in that it serves to elimi-
nate some cases from the federal docket.
" ALI is an organization of judges, practicing lawyers, law professors and
others in the profession (e.g., government policymakers, corporate counsel) elected
to the organization, which is limited to a maximum size currently set at 3000. As
such, it is something of an elite but diverse and integrated organization. Unlike
the ABA and similar local organizations, which are dominated by practitioners in
private firms and the Judicial Conference (which is, of course, dominated by judg-
es), influence within ALI seems more diffuse but if anything appears slightly
weighted in favor of the academy. The current Executive Director and his prede-
cessor (who enjoyed a 25-year tenure) were prestigious law professors and this
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1923,'9' did substantial and influential work during the 1923-
1974 period.198 During this same time, the ABA grew rapidly
in wealth, organization and influence. Although practitioner-
dominated, the ABA normally seeks and responds to judicial
opinion, thus strengthening the paradigm of judicial authority.
3. The "Open Courts" Paradigm of Adjudicatory
Procedure And Its Hegemony: 1938-1980
The first major project under the "new paradigm" Enabling
Act resulted in a new paradigm of adjudicatory procedure. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, provided for
an open model of adjudicatory procedure stressing simplicity,
liberal pleading, broad discovery, and a preference for sub-
stance over form; the primary mission was the just resolution
of disputes.'99 Commentators generally have praised the
Rules,20° which have been essentially adopted by half the
states."'
I find the establishment and demise of the "open" 1938
Rules paradigm of adjudicatory process easier to identify and
explain than the history and possible demise of the litigation
position is the managerial core of ALL. The Reporters for ALI's Restatements of
the Law, some of its most important work, are usually law professors. However,
professors can not set ALI policy by sheer force of numbers.
'9 See HERBERT F. GOODRICH & PAUL A. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE 1923-1961, at 7 (1961).
19 This is not to suggest that ALI has reduced its output or that recent pro-
jects have had impact. I argue only that ALI "arrived" and continued to hold a
strong position as a major shaper of substantive law and litigation policy during
this time period.
"s According to leading commentators, the "principal features" of the Rules are:
* the union ("or merger") of law and equity, with retention of jury trial in ac-
tions formerly "at law";
* simplicity and liberal amendment in pleading and motion practice;
" liberal provisions for joinder of claims and parties, with devices of counter-
claim, cross-claim, third-party claim, and intervention to permit additional
claims and parties to be joined;
* comprehensive discovery procedures, permitting examination of witnesses
and compulsory production of evidence in the possession of an opposing party;
* simple provisions for appeal.
See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 173, § 1.8, at 22.
" See, e.g., id. § 1.8, at 21-22 (although "not perfect" the "experience with [the
Rules] has on the whole been most satisfactory); WRIGHT, supra note 168, § 62;
WRIGHT, supra note 193, § 1008.
21 See WRIGHT, supra note 168, § 62.
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reform paradigm that also took firm hold in the 1930s." 2 Per-
haps my view (whether accurate or in error) stems from the
fact that leading scholars have chronicled both the emergence
of the "Charles Clark era" and the more recent developments
that have undermined the open courts paradigm so well. °3
Because I tend to agree with those who have observed and
criticized these developments, I probably am also quicker to
see a definite shift in views. 20 4  In a nutshell, I see the open
courts paradigm dominating the litigation landscape from 1938
(perhaps a bit later because of some lag between promulgation
of the Rules and their acceptance and actual application on the
front lines of litigation) until 1980 or so. 2 5 Perhaps, the party
... One might argue persuasively, however, the open access regime of adjudica-
tory process did not truly become dominant until sometime after 1938, when rear
guard actions resisting the new order were finally quashed. When Charles Clark,
Committee Reporter and principal author of the Rules, became a Second Circuit
Judge, he labored for some time against narrow or grudging construction of his
project through continued scholarly writings and judicial opinions reversing lower
court decisions that crabbed the reach of the Rules. See, e.g., Dioguardi v.
Durning, 151 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 698 (1946). However, one
could view the triumph of the new paradigm as incomplete until the Supreme
Court's endorsement of broad "notice pleading" in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957). But taking this view-that the new order has not triumphed until the last
pocket of resistance is wiped out-is too grudging. By this standard, Charles
Darwin's theory of evolution has perhaps fallen short of paradigm status because
some fundamentalist religions, with considerable political power in some locales,
reject the theory.
... See, e.g., Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Abraham Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term,
Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982);
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading in Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 433 (1986); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some
Chilling Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1313 (1986); Resnik, supra note 22; Risinger, supra note 116; David M. Rob-
erts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390
(1980); Tobias, supra note 116.
211 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting
Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices,
60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 257, 257-68 (1991) (criticizing application of Rule 11 and
some of the forces giving rise to 1983 amendment of the Rule); Stempel, supra
note 116, at 159-93 (criticizing Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy
for, among other things, failure to adhere to open adjudicatory procedure para-
digm).
One can make a colorable case that the open courts era actually ended
sometime during the 1970s with increasing Republican appointees to the federal
bench (from the 1968-76 Nixon and Ford Administrations), the emergence of a
higher profile ADR movement, criticism of excess litigation (see, e.g., Robert H.
Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 233 (1974))
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was most clearly over by 1983 when amended Rule 11 took ef-
fect.20
6
During the open courts "era," the Rules were not only
liberal but were read liberally by most federal judges and their
state counterparts." 7 When the Rules were amended, it was
only for technical reasons or to liberalize them further. For
example, the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 broadened the utility
of the class action while the 1970 amendments to the discovery
rules allowed broader discovery less subject to court restriction
or dependent upon court permission. Congress generally ig-
nored or responded favorably to the open courts paradigm. For
example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act made counsel fees available
for successful job discrimination claimants,2"' as did the 1976
and the Supreme Court's decisions limiting the use of class action lawsuits (see
Arthur A. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 678-79 (1979)). Also impor-
tant was the mid-1970s congressional response to the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, which also bears upon the shift in litigation reform consensus and is
discussed supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. In this Symposium, Professor
Subrin finds the 1976 Pound Conference to be the watershed point of demarcation.
See Subrin, supra note 24, at 1156-58. I realize that I have previously suggested
that the mid-1970s may have marked the paradigm shift (see Stempel, supra note
204, at 262 n.24) and that I am either inconsistent or maturing, depending on
one's view.
On balance, however, I view the 1970s as the beginnings of successful attacks
upon the prevailing paradigm rather than the displacement of the paradigm
through accepted new theories or practices. For example, no rule or statute from
the 1970s enshrined the "restrictive adjudicatory procedure" paradigm. The Nixon
and Ford judicial appointments, although more conservative than those of Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson, were hardly radical reversals of field. By the 1980s,
however, there were minor restrictions on discovery, the immensely important new
Rule 11, serious proposals to revise Rule 68 to create a variant of the English
Rule on fee-shifting, judicially imposed restrictions on claimants' fee-shifting pursu-
ant to statutes such as the Attorney's Fees Civil Rights Act of 1976, a more ag-
gressive approach to taking cases from the jury via summary judgment, significant
proposed restrictions on discovery and a majority of federal judges appointed by
Presidents Reagan and Bush, whose selection criteria included an effort to build a
bench opposed in large part to the old paradigm.
20 See Stempel, supra note 204, at 262-67; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1925, 1932-33 (1989); Nelken, supra note 203, at 1315-20. Georgene M.
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988); Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630,
631 (1987) (responses to perceived litigation explosion, "including the amendment
of rule 11, reflect a widely held view that increased use of the courts is a nega-
tive development").
201 Resnik, supra note 22, at 498-526; Risinger, supra note 116, at 35-43.
200 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act for non-employment
civil rights claimants.0 9 Moreover, the size of the bench ex-
panded, as did the judge's staff and budget support. The Jus-
tice Department experienced similar growth and was support-
ed in access-related activities like voting rights and desegrega-
tion litigation by both the Congress and the Judicial
Branch.21 Furthermore, there appeared to be an ideological
consensus in support of the open adjudicatory model that was
widely shared among influential decisionmakers"'
4. The Open Courts Model Under Attack
Like Kuhn's scientific paradigms (e.g., the earth-centered
solar system, linear Newtonian physics), the open courts sys-
tem came to face external events that it could not completely
explain or neutralize: increasing caseload; perceived longer
delays between case filing and termination; jury verdicts in-
creasingly regarded by many as erratic and often extravagant;
excessively strategic discovery and motion practice;"2 and dra-
matically increased lawyer's fees and expenses." 3 There was
also a continued need for access to the courts, despite the pre-
' 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
210 See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY
JUSTICE (1977).
211 See Resnik, supra note 22, at 498-526.
212 Bryant Garth views the hyper-aggressive litigation tactics of the 1970s as
setting the stage for anti-lawyer initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s. See Garth,
supra note 1, at 932.
213 Although normally one does not think of the practice of law as technology-
driven like the hard sciences, medicine, engineering, or manufacturing, there exists
at least a partial analogy. In medicine, for example, one view holds that increas-
ing technological expertise permits doctors to save lives that previously could not
have been saved, prompting greatly increased expenditures incurred in expanding
the life-saving frontier. Law is perhaps less dramatically but perhaps equally vul-
nerable to a sort of Parkinson's Law: legal services expand to the limits of deliv-
ery systems so long as the client can pay and does not actively resist. Computer-
ized legal research is expensive ($200 per hour or so), but once available must be
used (on top of the attorney's hourly rate) lest something be missed; once they are
available, only state-of-the-art word processing, printing, communications, mailing
and delivery services will do. Even conventional law library materials multiply in
variety and expense as specialty services grow to keep counsel informed about
variQus sectors of litigation. Supersonic transport exists so perhaps a key partner
can fly to Europe for one meeting and return to New York for another in the
same day. These developments undoubtedly add up and are nontrivial, but they
are not the primary spurs to increased litigation costs.
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vious half-century of open adjudicatory procedures; that is,
instead of reducing social pressure like a slightly opened steam
valve,214 the open adjudication model seemed only to invite
more disputes. In short, many looking at the state of litigation
(or more properly, the perceived state of litigation as empirical
data was often scanty or subject to conflicting interpretation)
viewed it as reflecting deterioration because of-or at least in
spite of-the open adjudication paradigm. Many were favorably
inclined toward the notion that a restricted adjudicatory proce-
dure would reduce some of the problems of delay, cost, incon-
sistency and litigation growth-or at least it could not hurt.
Of course, upon closer examination, the analogy to Kuhn's
scientific revolutions begins to break down. Unlike the physical
or social sciences in the academy, the judicial system cannot be
studied in isolation. Nonetheless, the legal and political actors,
as usual, had less caution than physical scientists. When faced
with shortcomings attributed to the open adjudication para-
digm, they were quicker to consider a shift of paradigms rather
than to engage in rigorous testing of the new, allegedly more
efficient, restrictive procedural paradigm.21
More than in the sciences,"' moreover, the paradigm shift
in procedure was affected in large part by the sociology and
politics of the American judicial system. Despite its origin in
elite efforts to pacify the masses, the open procedural para-
digm became hugely unpopular with the business community,
which saw itself victimized by bogus or marginal claims that
consumed legal resources and actually could succeed at the
hands of lay jurors, who elites thought inflated the value of
legitimate claims." 7 Almost from the outset of the 1938 Rules,
'2 It appears that one factor animating the original Civil Rules Advisory Com-
mittee was fear of popular dissatisfaction with the legal system and a desire to
encourage support among the general public by providing the public with reduced
barriers to participation in the litigation system. Transcripts of Advisory Commit-
tee meetings even contain references to the Bolsheviks and the possibility of polit-
ical upheaval in America should the public feel alienated or oppressed by the legal
system. See Subrin, supra note 22, at 973-75.
215 To be fair, I should note that support earlier in the century for the open
procedural model was not based on rigorous hypothesis testing, either, but gained
hegemony as a result of more political argumentation.
21" For ease of reference, I use "sciences" as a term including scholarly disci-
plines such as philosophy and the social sciences, which initially may not be
thought of as sciences for some readers.
217 See, e.g., Huber, Junk Science, supra note 117; Huber, Second-Best, supra
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business groups worked against the paradigm by arguing for
narrow application of the Rules. Gradually, efforts focused
more on obtaining broad-based changes in policy, an effort that
gained intellectual currency from the rise of the Law and Eco-
nomics movement and its theories of litigant and business
behavior.21  The force of this sustained criticism, support-
ed by corporate budgets, cannot be underestimated.219 The
catalyst for the counter-revolution, however, was the Republi-
can ascendancy and dominance of presidential politics during
the 1968-1992 period. When Republicans held the White
House, particularly during the Reagan and Bush years, the re-
strictive procedural paradigm and the reformers supporting it
had a vital ally. Presidents appoint Supreme Court Justices,
Circuit and District Judges, and key Justice Department offi-
cials (including the ninety-four United States Attorneys across
the country), all important in shaping the governing paradigms
of adjudicatory procedure and litigation reform. For example,
the appointments of Chief Justices Burger in 1969 and
note 117.
I"s Law and Economics thinking focuses on aggregate social wealth and whether
a set of affairs is efficient according to the "Kaldor-Hicks" criteria (where a trans-
action is assessed according to the net gains or losses produced in aggregate
wealth). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16, 25 (4th ed.
1992); Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452-59 (1974) (reviewing Posner's first edition
and noting major impact of Law and Economics in legal circles is heightened at-
tention to the overall costs of a rule, decision or system).
Much Law and Economics writing has also focused on the means by which
various actors calculate and respond to incentive structures. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987). Thus, even though data on the judicial system show that
punitive damages awards are comparatively rare, as are medical malpractice
plaintiffs' verdicts, and that the average jury award seems modest in relation to
claims, the business community and its allies have argued with some force that
potential defendants are nonetheless deterred from socially useful activity and
forced to spend excessive amounts on legal defense and prevention because of the
unpredictability of the legal status quo.
219 Although I find the shift in partisan power from Democratic to Republican
to have had much to do with the shift in thinking about litigation procedure, the
psychological gains of the counter-revolution were evident across the political spec-
trum. For example, the Carter Administration championed deregulation and em-
barked upon a method of judicial selection much more favorable to the "out-party"
than was previously the case. The entire legal tone of the Carter years was differ-
ent than that of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For example, no one
would confuse Carter's Attorney General Griffin Bell with 1960s Attorneys General
Ramsey Clark or Robert Kennedy.
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Rehnquist in 1986 meant that conservative jurists frequently
critical of the open procedural paradigm could spend more than
two decades placing kindred spirits in positions of influence.
Despite the growing pressure upon and dissatisfaction with the
open courts model, it might well have survived if instead Jus-
tice Brennan had become Chief Justice in 1969, to be replaced
by, for example, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham of the Third
Circuit or Judge Abner Mikva of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.
In addition, the executive and judicial power structure has
influence (both directly and through ripple effect) over the
activities of legal analysts in both governmental and non-gov-
ernmental policy organizations such as the Federal Judicial
Center, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
the National Center for the Study of State Courts and even
non-governmental entities such as the American Judicature
Society, the ALI, the ABA, the Rand Corporation and the
Brookings Institution. For example, as noted previously, the
Bush Administration's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by
former Vice-President Quayle, strongly took up the reformer's
cudgel on behalf of the restrictive paradigm."'
5. The Open Courts Model in Retreat: Impoverishing the
Judiciary
I do not mean to overstate the argument that politics
shapes law or suggest that law is "pure politics."22' Many
judges with impeccable "liberal" credentials have accepted at
least some tenets of the emerging restrictive paradigm. For
example, Judge Jack B. Weinstein has in his decisions and his
writings made a case for aggregate processing of mass tort
claims with accompanying restrictions on or modifications of
the individual open adjudicatory model. 2 District of Columbia
220 See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
221 See generally Minda, Jurisprudence, supra note 156, at 39-44 (discussing
critical legal studies and describing apt slogan for the movement as "law is poli-
tics" as contrasted with Law and Economics slogan that "law is efficient" or should
be made so); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971 (1990).
"' See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d. Cir.)
(reversing aspects of district court's consolidation orders reported at 129 B.R. 710
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1992); In re Agent Orange
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Circuit Judge Patricia Wald has defended the post-Chevron
ideal of great judicial deference to administrative agencies,2"
an approach seen by many as part of the Reagan-Bush-Quayle
conservative agenda. 4 Her colleague Abner Mikva has encour-
aged lawyers to seek legal and litigation change from legisla-
tures rather than courts,2 5 a perspective that reflects the shift
in thinking in both adjudicatory procedure and litigation re-
form. Judges Robert Merhige, the late Robert Peckham and the
late Alvin Rubin are not commonly (or credibly) characterized
as conservatives as they were appointed by Democrats, but
they have been prominent proponents of managerial judging,
which, regardless of its virtues or vices, runs counter to the
open courts paradigm.2 6
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving district court's brokering
of settlement and affirming In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)); Weinstein, supra note 117, at 485 (sometimes individual
litigation prerogatives must yield to overall needs of public policy or to achieve
fairness for group as a whole).
Several prominent commentators share this view. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck,
The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 541 (1992); Vairo, supra note 56. Others have observed the
trend without comment or seen it as a potentially damaging development. See,
e.g., Resnik, supra note 91 (noting trend but reserving judgment); Nesson, supra
note 117 (criticizing Judge Weinstein's grant of summary judgment against an opt-
out plaintiff who did not participate in class settlement of Agent Orange matter).
" See Patricia Wald, The New Administrative Law-With the Same Old Judges
in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647.
14 See Sanford Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757 (1991); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 452 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (doctrine of greater deference to administra-
tive agency determinations set forth in National Resources Defense Council v.
Chevron Oil Co., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), combined with other legal developments of
1980s represents substantial shift of power from Congress and judiciary to exec-
utive); accord William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick:
Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regu-
latory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992). However, others have found the
Chevron decision in practice not to have brought about the feared increase in
Republican agency power. See E. Donald Elliot & Peter H. Schuck, To The Chev-
ron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
984 (finding that judicial reversals of agency determinations actually increased
after Chevron).
2. Hon. Abner Mikva, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, Remarks at Association
of American Law Schools Workshop on Law and Social Science (April 12, 1990).
211 See, e.g., HUBERT L. WILL ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETTLE-
MENT PROCESS (1983); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of
Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery, Planning and Alternative Dis-
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In addition to the shift in intellectual perspective and the
more overtly ideological or partisan political changes, the shift
in the procedural paradigm has been abetted by strong, virtu-
ally nonpartisan "background" political factors sewn through-
out the political culture. Perhaps most prominent among these
is the executive-legislative unwillingness to fund the federal
courts at the level required if they are to manage their case-
load well according to imperatives of the open adjudication
paradigm. Indeed, as the Symposium reported in this issue of
the Brooklyn Law Review took place, federal courts were on
the verge of ceasing jury trials because they had run out of
money to pay civil jurors." This type of episode, relatively
common in recent years, speaks volumes about the state of
American litigation."' Although some have accused the federal
judiciary of "crying wolf' and employing grandstand tactics to
lobby for increased funding, 29 most informed opinion has con-
cluded that the federal bench's budgetary problems are quite
real."'
When looking for the "something else" more expendable
than civil jury trials, federal judges and administrators must
feel perplexed. By law, criminal matters must be heard within
seventy days of the time charges are brought, but no sooner
pute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985).
See Stephen Labaton, Federal Judges Blame Money Woes for Slowdown, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1993, at B16 (Judicial Conference indicates that civil jury trials
may be suspended for lack of funds starting May 12, 1993). Judge Weinstein stat-
ed that he expects to continue to hold civil trials by providing vouchers to jurors
on the assumption that Congress will eventually appropriate funds as it has done
in the past. Id. ("I will tell the jurors they'll have to wait to get paid . . . I don't
imagine that it will be a big problem.").
22 Although the current matter involves federal courts, similar events have
been a feature of relations between state courts and their executive and legislative
funding masters, particularly since the late 1980s when recession combined with a
shift from federal to state funding of state activities exacerbated the situation. For
example, former New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wachtler sued the
state, contending that the level of funding provided to state courts was so inade-
quate as to be unconstitutional. The litigation was eventually dismissed as part of
a political compromise.
229 See Labaton, supra note 227.
" See, e.g., ABA Special Committee on Funding the Justice System, The Jus-
tice System Funding Crisis: What We Can Do About It, JUDGES' J,. Winter 1993,
at 6; Brent Stinski, Why Lady Justice is Wearing Rags: Budgets Cutbacks Hit the
Courts, JUDGES' J., Winter 1993, at 12; see Labaton, supra note 227 (FJC Director
Judge Schwarzer states that federal courts have "worked very hard to reduce the
costs" of operation).
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than thirty days absent a defendant's consent.2 31 Since jury
trials are mandatory unless the defendant waives this
right,232 excess juror fees are unlikely to be found. The most
courts can do is encourage either more plea bargains, thereby
risking further criticism that there is too much plea bargaining
in the system, or bench trials, a largely forlorn hope as most
rational criminal defendants correctly conclude they have bet-
ter odds with a jury. One federal judge recently suggested in
jest that perhaps the bench should force the issue by giving
civil trials parity with criminal matters, even if this results in
dismissal of indictments for failing to meet Speedy Trial Act
deadlines, a result sure to catch the attention of the Justice
Department and Congress. 3 Bankruptcy filings are also on
the rise, as are discovery disputes, making it hard to trim
resources from the non-Article III portion of the courts. Judi-
cial staffs are not large and are not especially well-paid. Salary
or benefit freezes may save some money but are likely to en-
courage personnel defections and attendant costs from turn-
over and training of new, and possibly, less-qualified employ-
ees. 13 Much federal court equipment is at least a generation
behind the technology of the private sector, which not only
adds to efficiency problems but also counsels that the judiciary
receive upgraded equipment sooner rather than later. Perhaps
each federal judge's chambers does not need the extensive
library of case reporters one usually finds, but in my experi-
ence there are clear efficiency gains as law clerks and judges
are enabled to make better, faster decisions. Furthermore, al-
though many federal courthouses sit on prime real estate and
perhaps have more size than necessary, selling off judicial
buildings or subletting the courthouse basement are not realis-
"1 See The Speedy Trial Act, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56, 3161-74; 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1988)).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Hon. Thomas Griesa, Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York,
Remarks before the Committee on Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (April 19, 1993).
"' Most law clerks, of course, serve only one or two-year stints as federal judi-
cial employees. Therefore significant turnover is built into the system. But law
clerk services are essentially a steal for the government which, due to the prestige
of clerking, obtains the services (often well over the standard 40-hours per week)
of an inexperienced but capable and ambitious new lawyer for a salary well below
what he or she could earn from other employers.
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tic options.
In short, courts probably need substantially more money
and other logistical support than they have received in recent
years. However, no one seems very interested in giving it to
them, at least not without strings attached.235 The current
annual budget for the federal courts is approximately $2.5
billion, a sizeable amount even for jaded policy analysts.236 It
constitutes far less than one percent of the total federal bud-
get, however, leaving the other ninety-nine percent to the other
two branches. In return for its $2.5 billion, the nation receives
both criminal and civil dispute resolution of approximately
150,000 matters per year,237 federal rules revision, study of the
courts, and judicial efforts at law reform.3 The importance of
adjudication to the national economy and society is obvious
and not subject to displacement-at least not complete dis-
placement-by ADR. 239 At the risk of using too homely an
analogy, good courts can be compared to good roads, bridges,
airports, rail lines, waste treatment, schools and other impor-
tant public goods. Although recorded as expenditures, when
well-administered they function as capital investment from
which society reaps more than it has contributed through tax-
es.
Yet at the same time that talk of infrastructure and "re-
building America" abounds, the body politic shows little inter-
"5 See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text, discussing funds available
under Civil Justice Reform Act for districts implementing "Delay and Expense
Reduction Plans."
"6 "Nearly $2 billion of the budget is for the salaries and expenses of staff and
judges. The budget also includes $68.8 million to pay for jurors and $215.1 million
for lawyers' services." Labaton, supra note 227, at 1316.
' This includes resolution of popular prosecutions such as those of drug deal-
ers. Many of these cases are quite complex and require substantial judicial time
and resources. The prosecutor's salaries and other expenses of the Justice Depart-
ment are not included in the judicial budget figures.
21 See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF
CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 8-15 (1990).
" See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385,
1398 (1992) (although room for improvement obviously exists, "[c]ourts are not
obsolete-they serve in areas and ways that no other entity can"). An important
part of that service is setting of substantive legal parameters within which ADR,
settlement and other important activity (e.g., decisions not to sue, to contract, to
refrain, to sell, to pay taxes, etc.) takes place. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 951 (1979).
[Vol. 59: 659
TRENDS IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
est in giving courts the resources for optimal performance-at
least not optimal performance under the open courts adjudica-
tory procedural paradigm. This of course presents a classic
"chicken-or-egg" debate: did inadequate funding play a major
role in the shift from the open paradigm to the restrictive
model or did the shift toward the restrictive paradigm erode
political support for adequately funding the increasingly
disfavored open courts adjudication paradigm? As in so many
chicken-or-egg debates, the cosmically correct answer is proba-
bly "both." On balance, however, it seems that the resources
problem is cause far more than it is effect. Because of it, the
open paradigm never has had a sufficient "fighting chance" to
fend off the assault of the restrictive model. Additional legisla-
tive activity such as the creation of new federal jurisdiction
24 °
suggests that inadequate judicial resources have more to do
with misplaced frugality and political clout (e.g., there are
more voting medicare recipients than voting judicial employ-
ees) than a considered decision to feed the new paradigm and
starve the old.
Whatever the reasons for the contradictory underfunding
of the courts during a time of growth in federal litigation, the
effects are obvious: more delay, additional costs to litigants and
... See, Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLA-
TORS, supra note 181, at 7:
In the waning days of the 1986 legislative session, Congress tacked on to
a childhood vaccine protection law a provision that could greatly increase
the judicial work load, but did not provide federal courts with the neces-
sary additional resources. Judges were charged with determining whether
claimants are eligible for compensation due to illness or death resulting
from vaccination. [citing 100 Stat. 3743, 3755-3784] One official of the
court system estimated that the judiciary would have to hire and train
300 to 400 special masters to handle these cases. Courts would still have
to decide the flood of expected appeals, running perhaps in the thou-
sands. In spite of the obvious impact on the courts, Congress did not
consult with the judiciary when it considered the legislation. A year of
considerable uncertainty passed before the district courts secured relief
from the legislature.
See also id. at 8 (describing Speedy Trial Act, Bankruptcy Administration and
Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 and Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 as enacted
"without sustained communication with the very branch charged with implement-
ing those changes" (footnote omitted)).
Since Katzmann wrote, the Congress and the President have launched a "war
on drugs" requiring adjudication of increased prosecution and considered similar
expansion of federal jurisdiction for gun-related offenses or gender-related offenses.
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a pronounced demoralization of the judiciary."' This last effect
is particularly insidious in relation to the relative dominance of
the competing paradigms of adjudicatory procedure. If judges
feel drastically overworked, behind and "swamped," but see no
realistic prospect of relief through additional resources, they
are likely to be drawn closer to the restrictive procedural para-
digm. Whether intended or not, Congress may have starved the
bench into support for the restrictive approach.242
Regardless of funding, of course, a number of judges will
favor the restrictive paradigm when faced with the large case-
load. Many judges believe that the federal bench should not
exceed a certain size or should have a more narrowly defined
adjudicatory mission regardless of the availability of resources.
This was the express view of the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee, which recommended eliminating of some forms of fed-
eral jurisdiction, including diversity.243 A respected federaljudge recently wrote that the maximum effective size of the
federal bench was 1000 in light of his concept of its mis-
sion.2" However, a conscious limitation on the size of the feder-
al bench does not require simultaneous underfunding of the in-
tended elite judiciary. To the contrary, one would expect that
to function adequately, a constrained federal bench would be
accorded top-of-the line facilities, equipment, staff and other
support." Nonetheless, judicial salaries and benefits are a
241 See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Case-
load, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3 (finding based on survey research that federal judges
are disheartened by growing caseload pressures and feel unfairly overworked).
242 Of course, if my thesis is correct, many judges needed no prompting to pre-
fer the restrictive model.
243 See REPORT O1F THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38-53 (1990).
2" See Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-the Limit for an Effective Federal Judi-
ciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993) (arguing that more than this number of judges
would reduce federal courts to mere government bureaucracy with less quality
control of political appointments, less collegiality and cohesiveness of particular
courts, and less consistency in federal law, rather than elite and specialized corps
of jurists).
2" If overall efficiency is sought, the government may wish to provide federaljudges and their law clerks (under either the small size or large size models)home use of computers, computerized legal research, fax machines and the like. Ido not hold my breath waiting for these items to become standard issue for theThird Branch. Federal judges, who in the wake of the mail-bomb assassination ofJudge Robert Vance (11th Cir.), broached the possibility of greater security, werelargely rebuffed. For example, when some judges asked about remote control car
starters (in case explosives were planted in the car), executive and congressional
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substantial portion of the judiciary's budget. The "small bench"
model thus will likely gain many adherents based on purported
cost savings rather than an intellectual commitment to limited
federal jurisdiction.
During the 1970s and 1980s, economics, politics, and soci-
ology combined with Kuhn-like considerations of dissatisfaction
with aspects of the open courts model to bring litigation almost
joltingly into a more restrictive mode of adjudicatory proce-
dure. Unlike the scientific revolutions Kuhn discussed, howev-
er, the paradigm shift in adjudicatory procedure is an incom-
plete one. The continuing battle between preservationists and
reformers attests to the incompleteness of the procedure revo-
lution.246 Many lawyers would even dispute my contention that
a shift has in fact occurred.
6. Continued Tenacity of a Wounded Adjudicatory Model
Although many lawyers, even preservationists, concede
that the open courts paradigm has lost support-indeed, that
is why they have taken up the preservationist cause-one can
argue that the basic infrastructure of the open era remains
intact: the federal civil rules look roughly the same as original-
ly written; there appears to be no shortage of litigants and
lawyers willing to press their causes;... many judges continueto preach and practice the open courts paradigm;24
response seemed to indicate that the $300-per-car cost was too expensive and the
issue has faded, at least until the next judge is murdered.
2"' See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
247 This is not to minimize the effect of the procedural paradigm shift on the
legal profession. I know a number of lawyers who have greatly reduced or elimi-
nated their practices in certain areas such as employment discrimination or civil
rights litigation due to bad experiences as targets of aggressive (and in the in-
stances of which I am aware, misplaced) application of Rule 11. I am not at all
certain that prospective litigants in these sorts of cases have the same opportunity
to obtain legal representation for their claims as existed 10 years ago.
... See Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive
Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827 (1993). Although, in my view, the average
Reagan or Bush judicial appointee leans decidedly toward the restrictive paradigm,
many of the post-1980 appointees have shouldered their task with neutrality and
been unwilling to push the emergence of the restrictive paradigm beyond what le-
gitimate policymakers have decreed. For example, the Supreme Court's 1986 sum-
mary judgment trilogy, see Stempel, supra note 116, made summary judgment
more available. While many district judges pushed the trilogy beyond its limits to
grant summary judgment, circuit courts for the most part, have done an admirable
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policymakers have been willing to revise or recalibrate when it
appears that they have moved too far toward the restrictive
paradigm;24 9 standard filing fees are low;25 and losing litigants
are not as a matter of course required to reimburse the oppos-
ing party's costs.25' These observations are correct in them-
selves. Nonetheless, when one backs away to take in the mosa-
job of quality control in correcting these errors. I reach this conclusion on the
primitive empirical basis of having at least skimmed most circuit decisions on
summary judgment since the trilogy was announced. At the same time, however, I
also believe that a number of summary judgment injustices have gone unredressed
in a manner that would not have occurred before 1986: the procedural revolution
in this area may be less radical than I feared but nonetheless is palpable. But see
Joe S. Cecil, Summary Judgment Practice in Three District Courts, FJC DIREC-
TIONS, Nov. 1991, at 1 (suggesting that major upsurge in summary judgment
grants began in early 1980s and was only mildly stimulated by Court's 1986 trilo-
gy).
29 For example, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee responded favorably to the
legal profession's complaints about Rule 11 and referred a Proposed Amended Rule
11 to the Supreme Court, which promulgated the change. See supra notes 19, 64
and accompanying text. If successful, the new, "new" Rule 11 would be the culmi-
nation of a three-year process of systematic rethinking of Rule 11 which involved
solicitation of public comment, a hearing, and numerous trial drafts. The
Committee's successful revision of Rule 15(c) in response to the Schiavone decision,
see supra note 186 & infra note 278, can be viewed in the same light.
250 The current fee for filing a federal court action is $200, a reasonable amount
for access to substantial judicial machinery. See A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Col-
liers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 227 (1985) (esti-
mating that use of federal courts costs government approximately $600 per hour).
In addition, very poor litigants may be relieved of these obligations by obtaining
in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1959). Of course, poor and middle-
class litigants have difficulty affording litigation commensurate with the merits of
their claims. However, it is almost universally agreed that this results from the
high costs of representation rather than government fees.
" In addition, certain litigants benefit from the virtually one-way fee shifting
accorded to successful claimant under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) & § 1988),
with victorious defendants able to obtain fees only when the unsuccessful claim
was "frivolous." See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). However, aggressive use of Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and the court's inherent sanctioning power, see e.g., Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), has blunted this advantage for these plaintiffs. See
John Papachristos, Comment, Inherent Power Found, Rule 11 Lost: Taking a
Shortcut to Impose Sanctions in Chambers v. NASCO, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1225
(1993). In addition, Rule 68 has been construed to eliminate the advantage when
the claimant has refused a settlement worth more than the judgment obtained.
See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). Defendants also may condition settle-
ment offers on the waiver of statutory counsel fees. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S.
717 (1986). In addition, Rule 68 has been the recurring subject of proposed revi-
sion that would bring federal courts closer to the "English Rule" of fee-shifting.
See Burbank, Abandon Ship, supra note 116; Schwarzer, supra note 10.
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ic of the various successful, mixed and thwarted attacks on the
old Charles Clark model of procedure, the picture looks quite
different than it did in the 1960sY2 Absent demonstrative
gains by the preservationists through changes in rules, stat-
utes or policy, the emerging restrictive paradigm seems des-
tined to consolidate its hegemony in the near future.
Yet as measured by one criterion deemed important by
Kuhn, the open access adjudicatory procedure paradigm re-
mains quite vibrant. Kuhn describes scientific textbooks as the
chroniclers of scientific revolutions: when the new paradigm
displaces the old one in the texts used to train succeeding
generations, the revolution is complete." 3 By this standard,
one well might argue not only that the procedural battle is
unresolved but also that the open courts model continues to
enjoy great dominance. Most current Civil Procedure casebooks
and treatises are still organized around the Federal Rules and
the adjudicatory model.254 To be sure, all reflect the modern
trends at least in part. For example, all have added sections on
ADR that were essentially absent in earlier editions. Yet the
new ADR sections are usually comparatively short or placed
near the end of the book. 5 Similarly, despite the many
changes in the technicalities of pretrial practice, particularly
.2 See Subrin, supra note 24, at 1158.
2 See KUHN, supra note 132, at 163-91.
For examples of this in the leading course casebooks, see COUNDE ET AL.,
supra note 30; RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (6th ed.
1990); RICHARD MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (1989);
MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1990); STE-
PHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1992). But see ROBERT M. COV-
ER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988).
Treatises are particularly structured around the Federal Rules and tend to be
quite steadfast in promoting the Clarkian ideal. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985); JAAMES W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (various dates
according to volume; supplemented annually); CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (same). One arguable exception is JAMES JR.
ET AL., supra note 173, which is organized more along historical, topical, and
structural lines. But this treatise, like the others, tends to be supportive of the
open access model.
... See, e.g., COUND ET AL., supra note 30, ch. 15, at 1230-86; DAVID CRUMfP ET
AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 15, at 1077-1135 (2d ed. 1992);
FIELD, supra note 254, at 350-53; A. LEO LEVIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE 542-59 (2d ed. 1992); DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 1255-80 (6th ed. 1989); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 254, at 96-108;
ROSENBERG, supra note 254, ch. 18., at 1111-36; YEAZELL ET AL., supra note 254,
at 668-84.
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for conferencing and discovery, the major textbooks generally
give little space to these issues and present discovery issues as
though the counter-revolution had never occurred.256 These
presentations may be criticized as inaccurate, of course, but
they do have virtue for the preservationists in that they tend
to place a figurative finger in the dike of the old paradigm as it
faces the rising tide of the restrictive model. Unfortunately,
because legal textbooks do not carry the pre-emptive weight of
those in the sciences, this probably will not be sufficient to
stem the reformist tide.
E. The Embattled Litigation Reform Paradigm
A similar but different pattern emerges when examining
the previously dominant law reform paradigm and fissures
within it. Although less settled than in the past, by Kuhnesque
standards, litigation reform has not seen a sufficient upheaval
to qualify as a revolution. As yet, in fact, no opposing paradigm
has been sufficiently articulated and promoted to serve as a
replacement. Although a new structure may emerge or the
previous consensus may reassert itself, litigation reform may
also devolve into a fragmented regime of controlled chaos rath-
er than the emergence of a new paradigm.
As noted above, I have posited that during the 1934-1980
period, the system governing the manner in which litigation
policy was made, as differentiated from the way in which cases
are actually adjudicated, was generally one that was
judge/legal profession-centered at the top, with a preference for
deliberation, uniformity, and neutrality. Recent developments,
however, particularly the CJRA have aroused concern that a
new policymaking paradigm is in place. The CJRA has been
211 See, e.g., COUND ET AL., supra note 30, at 801 (devoting one paragraph to
1980 amendments to Rule 26(f) providing for discovery conference and 1983
amendments to Rule 16 encouraging district courts to schedule early pretrial con-
ferences); COVER ET AL., supra note 254, at 938-41 (discussing "A New Emphases
on Sanctions"); CRUtMP ET AL., supra note 255, at 661-63 (considering various pro-
posals, including local rules, to limit the scope and cost of discovery).
See, e.g., JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS
761-854 (6th ed. 1993); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE
IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 549-92 (6th ed. 1990); DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 901-69 (6th ed. 1989) (giving some hint
of the political battle surrounding discovery, id. at 967-69).
[Vol. 59: 659
TRENDS IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
harshly criticized as "balkanizing" civil procedure." 7 It also
has been characterized as a "counter-reformation" in litigation
policymaking that not only drastically and unwisely alters the
traditional roles of courts and Congress, but violates separa-
tion of powers norms as well.258 Although I agree for the most
part with criticisms of the CJRA259 and other trends which
erode the litigation reform model, such as proliferating local
rules and standing orders,26 it is far too early to announce a
new paradigm of reform policy. The existing but shaky para-
digm retains many attractions and can be shored up to contin-
ue, even if it must preside over a different model of adjudicato-
ry procedure. I attempt a blueprint for an amended litigation
reform model in Part III.
Although the judge/lawyer-centered characterization weak-
ens when one confronts other litigation changes, many of
which are congressionally generated, the emerging picture is
one of the judge/lawyer-centered, uniform, deliberative model
of change, heavily accenting the dominance of the bench. Yet
since 1970, fissures abound in this model. Uniformity has been
undermined by more and more detailed local rules26' and
standing orders, scholarly criticism of trans-substantivity. 2
and increasing geographic and political differentiation of the
bench.6 3 Indeed, the contribution of the legal profession has
... See Tobias, supra note 94; supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
"" See Mullenix, supra note 95.
... As much as I find the CJRA unwise and wasteful, and as much as I am
appalled by the manner in which it passed as something of an "end run" around
the judiciary, I think that even thoughtful commentators like Professors Tobias
and Mullenix have not emphasized sufficiently the potential silver lining that
exists if the required district-by-district experimentation of the CJRA were properly
harnessed through observation. We might be able to learn a good deal from this
massive field experiment. Unfortunately, erratic implementation of local Delay and
Expense Reduction Plans, insufficient monitoring and the possibility that other
reform forces, such as the recent Amendments to Rules 26-37, will overwhelm the
potential incr6mental learning offered by the CJRA.
"' See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the Adversary System: The
Enduring Problems of Distrust, Misunderstanding, and Narrow Perspective, 27 VAL.
U. L. REV. 313 (1993).
"'31 In 1988, there were more than 5000 local rules, many of them arguably
inconsistent with the Federal Rules, and, thus in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83. See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 66.
2"2 See, e.g., Robert Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Read-
ing of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
": Geographic variance has always characterized the federal bench. See Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). This occurs both
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generally diminished as judges have exerted greater control
over both rulemaking and policymaking.
But whether the bench may rule with greater force, it
presides over a diminishing 'kingdom as Congress has inter-
vened more frequently to change policies affecting litiga-
tion,2" most prominently with the CJRA. For the most part,
the CJRA is unwise, ill-thought, shoot-from-the-hip congressio-
nal meddling in judicial administration by those who know
little about it. However, the CJRA does not micro-manage
litigation in a way that so overwhelms the bench as to consti-
tute a separation of powers violation-but it is uncomfortably
close. For example, in addition to directing a significant aspect
of the internal operations of the courts, the CJRA offers addi-
tional funding to "pilot" districts and "early implementation
districts," provided that these districts take certain action
implementing the CJRA by certain deadlines.265 At a time
when the bench is literally starved for funds,266 congressional
use of funding as a "carrot" for the courts in a manner similar
to the national legislature's nudging of state and local govern-
ments is uncomfortably disquieting. Although states have the
constitutional rights of federalism, historically these rights
have not been given the same force267 as have separation of
because lawyers in Alabama often have a different world view than those in New
York and because U.S. Senators historically had great influence in judicial selec-
tion; not surprisingly, the judicial nominees sponsored by liberal Democratic Sena-
tors differ from those promoted by conservative Republicans. Until 1981, however,
lowered ideological concern over judicial appointments muted these tendencies.
Personal friendships and nonpartisan standing in the local bar were then more
important to judicial selection. See generally HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES:
THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1970). Since the Reagan inauguration, however, the
effects of ideology, partisanship and geography have been more pronounced because
of the Reagan-Bush efforts to police the politics of appointees rather closely. De-
spite Administration efforts, however, some local bars and Senators resisted
politization more successfully than did others, thus widening the range between
new judges. See generally Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges
Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993).
24 See Stempel, supra note 86, at 655-58 (reviewing earlier congressional re-
versals of restrictive Supreme Court decisions on Title VII, ADEA, and Title IX).
265 See Pub. L. 101-650, § 106, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
26 See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Author., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which took a
stronger view of the Ninth Amendment's codification of federalism principles).
During the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, however, there has existed a good deal
of more subtle but strong regard for federalism in that the Court has frequently
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powers principles.26 Consequently, national dominance over
the states is something to which we are all accustomed, at
least since Brown v. Board of Education.269 The ramrodding
of the courts by a co-equal federal branch, on the other hand,
comes as a jolt more reminiscent of the Civil War era. The
CJRA may not be unconstitutional, but it does underscore the
degree to which the courts have become Rodney Dangerfield in
the eyes of Congress.
Yet, notwithstanding its flaws, the CJRA has a significant
virtue: it has ordered the courts to engage in policymaking that
includes persons other than judges. The Advisory Groups that
have met to plan, draft and oversee the Delay and Expense
Reduction Plans have usually included local practitioners and
scholars and have acted in the first instance without the
bench."' Although local courts have not been obliged to fol-
low every suggestion and have retained final control over the
process, the CJRA must be regarded as at least a substantial
expansion of the official channels of judicial communication.
Nonetheless, only a mistaken optimist would characterize the
CJRA as a dramatic democratization of judicial policymaking.
A frequent complaint voiced by practitioners serving on Adviso-
ry Groups is the unreceptiveness of the bench to their ideas.
On balance, it appears that neither the CJRA nor its Advisory
Group mechanism represents a workable long-term model for
enlarging participation in litigation policymaking.271
permitted federalism concerns to shape its view of the scope and meaning of feder-
al statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
2" See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one-house veto provision intrudes
too greatly on executive prerogatives); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential seizure of steel mills during wartime unconstitu-
tional when inconsistent with congressional legislation governing emergency han-
dling of labor disputes). But see Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (special
prosecutor appointed by Congress to investigate executive officials does not violate
separation of powers); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (executive
branch permitted to abrogate certain judicial claims as part of Iran hostage settle-
ment).
2C 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
270 See Robel, supra note 102, at 881-85.
271 Even the best attempts at expansion can come to naught. For example, the
Northern District of California Advisory Group included a representative of Nolo
Press, which publishes books designed to assist laypersons in avoiding lawyers.
However, the Nolo representative quickly became frustrated with the lawyer-domi-
nated Advisory Group and ceased coming to meetings. See Wayne D. Brazil, Re-
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The CJRA is not a sure sign of a paradigm shift in litiga-
tion reform. As noted above, the dominant judge-centered mod-
el is under strain and the CJRA amply illustrates the size of
some fissures in the edifice of the old paradigm. Without more,
however, it is too early to call the old model dead or a new
model ascendent. Of course, my confidence in vital signs of the
old paradigm stems largely from the failure of its implicit crit-
ics to articulate exactly what is supposed to constitute the new
paradigm. This results, in part, because the forces changing
the litigation reform landscape have been far more interested
in, and successful in obtaining, specific changes rather than
seeking to sketch a new order in litigation reform. If they272
did, however, they could enunciate two and, perhaps, three
characterizations of alternatives to the open courts model.
One effort at congealing the rash of recent litigation policy
change into a model for the future would suggest that local
autonomy, experimentation and eclectic litigation policymaking
now come from a variety of sources. In essence, we273 would
be asked to replace the old order of litigation policymaking
with the capitalist's version of "let a hundred flowers
bloom."274 I find this too diffuse to qualify as a paradigm, at
least by the Kuhn standard. Although in some circumstances
decentralization can count as a paradigm (e.g., decentralized
government or decentralized management), decentralization in
such contexts is at least consistent. In the decentralized gov-
ernment paradigm, for example, the local burghers always
have complete control over their bridge tolls, closing hours for
merchants, police practices and the like. Recent litigation de-
velopments lack the same steadiness. Courts are allowed to
marks at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 7,
1993).
272 By "they," I mean the groups that have attempted to alter litigation pro-
cedure through direct pleas to Congress or specific judges rather than through
attempts to follow the Enabling Act model or to build judicial and legal profession
support for legislation.
... By "we," I mean the legal profession and society at large, assuming for the
sake of argument that "we" are relatively united in adhering to or recently having
adhered to the "old paradigm."
27 Chairman Mao Zedong, in Remarks of Judge Cabranes, District Judge of the
United States District Court of the District of Connecticut, Proceedings of the Fif-
ty-First Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit on Criminal Proce-
dure and Rules Governing Section 2255 (May 21, 1990) (voicing "cautious opti-
mism" regarding ADR and Biden Bill).
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run quite far afield by local rule only to be required by the
federal government to adopt Delay and Expense Reduction
Plans that often alter or countermand local rules.275 Courts
are ordered to develop Delay and Expense Reduction Plans
only to have them possibly mooted by new Amendments to the
Civil Rules, unless they act to opt out by local rule.
A second, more coherent effort to classify recent events as
a reform revolution would argue that Congress has now sup-
planted the judiciary and that the Rules Enabling Act's model
(perhaps the Act itself) faces numbered days. The reaction of
Congress to newly promulgated Rules changes concerning the
controversial Rule 11, discovery and disclosure amendments
indicate that this type of paradigm is possible but not yet able
to displace the old model. Congress was heavily involved in
almost revising or stopping the proposed amendments, suggest-
ing that the old paradigm is wounded and on the run, and that
a possible long-term shift to Congress may be in progress."6
But, ultimately, the controversial rules changes went into
effect. Congress threatened but did not alter the Court's pro-
mulgations. This suggests that the old paradigm retains con-
siderable vitality under "normal" circumstances, even in peri-
ods of controversy.
My own impression is that a return to normalcy in litiga-
tion policy is likely. The judicial branch and the legal profes-
sion at large will regain some of the ground lost during the
past decade for a number of reasons. Most prominently, Con-
gress is busy. As the enactment of the rules amendments
shows, the crowded congressional agenda empowers the judi-
ciary in some circumstances. Congress probably lacks the in-
terest in dominating litigation policymaking on a consistent
basis over the long term. So long as things appear to be func-
tioning normally, Congress will be attracted only to isolated
efforts to correct perceived particular problems. Congress, of
course, occasionally responds to interest group pressures with
particular alacrity and absence of deliberation. Should interest
" See Tobias, supra note 94, at 1399-1413 (noting that in 1988 Congress urged
courts to reduce local variance but in 1990 encouraged it with CJRA).
.7 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991) (criticizing efforts of
elements of the bar to go "over the heads" of Court and Advisory Committee to
affect rulemaking policy).
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groups backing litigation reform gather sufficient sustained
force to continue to pressure Congress, chronic congressional
litigation reform remains a possibility. However, this grim
scenario is unlikely because interest groups usually reach a
state of "almost equipoise" in which they are unable to win
sufficiently preclusive legislative victories on a consistent ba-
sis. Although some groups, generally those aligned with the
more powerful socioeconomic interests, may habitually hold the
upper hand, they cannot regularly convert that advantage to
tangible changes in policy. Occasionally, there will be setbacks
as well. Congress historically has tired of devoting too much
time to attempted resolution of such quagmires and delegated
much of the policymaking task. With the bench and legal pro-
fession so open to assuming the litigation policy role, over the
long haul Congress will tend to delegate and defer here just as
some observers contend they do when delegating certain vexing
issues to administrative agencies. 7
If, however, the executive branch were to align itself with
a particular coalition for litigation change, this could well pro-
vide the impetus for dominance that would permit regular
congressional action. If, for example, President Bush had been
re-elected, the Quayle Council on Competitiveness assault on
some aspects of litigation policy such as punitive damages, the
American Rule and non-economic damages may well have
allowed a dominant executive and congressional coalition to
impose either permanent new policies or a permanent new
policymaking mechanism on civil litigation. However, the
Clinton election, the new Justice Department and the abolition
of the Competitiveness Council have punctured this possibility
until at least 1997. Depending on future developments in Re-
publican politics, it is too early to predict whether subsequent
GOP candidates will have the conservative litigation procedure
and policy agenda held by the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions. If they do and are victorious, a new litigation reform
policymaking structure becomes far more likely. If not, the
traditional centrism of the executive branch in these matters
will make the old paradigm harder to dislodge.
2"7 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP K. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 45-65 (1988) (Congress "ducks" certain issues
by referring them to agency for decision).
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A third possible way to articulate recent developments as
a new paradigm of litigation reform would posit that we have
moved from a court-centered system of litigation and litigation
reform to one of privatized dispute resolution with a market-
based means of "DR" reform; nothing is "alternative" anymore.
Thus, although the Enabling Act model of Rules revision might
well continue to hold sway, it would become increasingly irrele-
vant except in criminal matters. The judicial system would be
but another option for disputants rather than the preeminent
option from which other options are derived. Although this
model may well be the most accurate in predicting what has or
may be happening, like the "hundred flowers" characterization,
it seems a little short of paradigmatic since it does not estab-
lish a particular system or process for revising the means by
which dispute resolution is practiced. This characterization,
however, does square with what appears to be the shifting
paradigm of adjudicatory procedure as we move from the "open
access adjudication and decision" model of the 1938 Federal
Rules to the current regime of "bureaucratic structured case
resolution" emphasizing ADR, managerial judging, negotiation,
settlement and non-trial disposition generally. However ad-
vanced this shift in adjudicatory procedure, the situation in
litigation policymaking itself remains fluid, with the trend,
such as it is, tilting toward retaining the old paradigm of liti-
gation reform, however worse for wear, while moving toward a
more restrictive model of adjudicatory procedure within that
system.
III. RETHINKING THE LITIGATION REFORM MECHANISM
A. The Perspective of Paradigm Shifts
In my view, Kuhn's thesis about scientific revolutions
should be useful for more than mere intellectual enjoyment
worrying about the degree to which law differs from or resem-
bles science. If, for example, one endorses the path of progress
seen in the natural sciences, one presumably would endorse
legal (and litigation) policymaking mechanisms that replicate
those of the sciences. Conversely, if one finds the hard sciences
too closed to dissent and innovation, slow to change and insuf-
ficiently considerate of human values, one would presumably
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want a law reform mechanism less rigid than that of the scien-
tific academy. I favor something of a middle path not drastical-
ly different from the paradigm of litigation reform that has
dominated most of the Twentieth Century. Law is inherently a
substantially political and social enterprise. Consequently, it
can never be successful if too widely separated from political
and social concerns. Legal coherence, rigor, and consistency
will never equal that of the natural sciences. Litigation
policymaking should never have the same rigid funneling of
opinion and proof that characterizes natural science. The vari-
ety of viewpoints in law is both refreshing and vital to its mis-
sion, right down to the perceived oversupply of student-edited
journals. Nonetheless, social needs and political reality should
not become an excuse for resisting constructive borrowing from
the organization of other disciplines.
Thus, Kuhn's observations provide lessons that law might
profitably borrow from the sciences. To begin with, despite its
imperfect analogy to law, the Kuhn model of scientific revolu-
tions can provide us with some indication of the degree to
which the legal profession and the body politic are operating
"business as usual," degenerating into chaos or making a dra-
matic transition to a new order. Despite the possible subjectivi-
ty of my possibly strained adaptation of Kuhn, I think self-
conscious assessment of the state of legal change can provide a
valuable tool for gauging our progress or lack of it. For exam-
ple, the episodes of contraction in the open model of adjudicato-
ry procedure are no secret to lawyers. Neither is the overall
trend toward adding additional procedural requirements. How-
ever, most lawyers, even those in policymaking roles, probably
do not frequently stop to ask whether the cumulative weight of
these changes has wrought a shift in the governing paradigm.
It is a question worth asking. To a far greater degree than
the natural sciences, law is socially constructed and its para-
digm shifts can be controlled: there are no immutable facts like
the speed of light or the position of the stars that require a
paradigm shift. For example, the legal profession may have
supported some constriction of the open adjudication model but
be unwilling to support a complete shift to the more restrictive
bureaucratic structured case resolution. By attempting to
gauge such imminent shifts, perhaps we can better find the
point in litigation reform that satisfies the profession and soci-
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ety as a whole, avoiding the mistakes occasionally generated
by excessive reform, overly abrupt reform or attempting to
administer aspects of the system designed for a paradigm that
no longer holds sway.
Perhaps more important to structuring future litigation
reform efforts, however, is Kuhn's theory of the impact of the
scientific community on change and paradigm shifts. In it are
some distinct lessons for law. Recall that Kuhn described the
meaningful scientific community of change as small, (usually
no more than 100 persons), uniform in training (through the
"sacred text" style of textbooks), cohesive (except when divided
during times of inter-paradigm battles), communicative
(through correspondence, select journals) and very conservative
in its attitude toward change. Although, I would never want
litigation reform power to be as concentrated as that in the
sciences, some traits of the natural sciences infrastructure
described by Kuhn are perhaps worth importing in modified
form into legal policymaking.
The litigation reform community is alternately much
broader and as narrow as its natural sciences counterpart. All
of the nation's three-quarters of a million lawyers belong, but
perhaps as few as twenty-five persons are really important to
some changes of Rules or statutes. On other occasions, several
thousand lawyers and politicians may be credibly regarded as
important to a litigation policy debate. In addition, litigation
reform discussions lack the cohesion of scientific debates. The
wide variety of potentially interested parties pursuing pre-
ferred agendas virtually guarantees that many elements of the
litigation reform community will be on different pages from
one another regarding the reform agenda. Since law cannot
and probably should not emulate the tight cohesiveness of
Kuhn's core scientific community, it could profit from institu-
tionalizing coordinated analysis and dialogue among the di-
verse elements of the national legal community.
B. A Possible Compromise for the Future
In particular, the litigation reform mechanism should
attempt to capture the concept of a structured community of
dialogue and reflective, sustained examination of the subject
matter. Specifically, Congress should enact legislation along
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the lines of an expanded Rules Enabling Act model and pro-
vide that changes in litigation procedure and other litigation
reform initiatives be scrutinized by a broadly defined legal
profession. Similarly, congressional procedures for
policymaking or bypassing the rulemaking process should
change to force more contemplative behavior by all involved.
1. Invigorating the Enabling Act
The Enabling Act, which was opened more to the public in
1988, should be opened further and amended in other ways.
Currently, Rules amendments tend to emerge almost by an
erratic osmosis: a particular case or doctrine arouses profes-
sional clamor for change;"7 8 certain quarters of the profession
come to see an area of law as unsatisfactory;279 an influential
person thinks a particular Rules change will improve the sys-
28 Two recent amendments are particularly embarrassing examples of perceived
"acute" problems with procedural rules. In Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21
(1986), the Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White, dissenting, took what many regarded as a hyper-literal inter-
pretation of Rule 15(c)'s provisions for determining the "relation back" of a claim
when a defendant was misnamed, dismissing a libel suit that missed a one year
statute of limitations by days. Professional and scholarly opinion quickly aligned
with Justice Stevens' position on the matter, resulting in an amended Rule 15(c)
which took effect in 1991. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 186, at 720; see also Karen
N. Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993) (arguing persuasively that Court engages
in too much crabbed, Schiavone-like interpretation of the Federal Rules and that
more apt interpretative approach would focus on intent and purpose underlying
Rules and appreciate Court's role as co-creator of Rules as well as interpreter of
them). The saga of Rule 15 is embarrassing to both the Court, which applied a
nitpickingly literal textual view to the Rule, and to the rulemaking process, which
thought it had "fixed" this problem of Rule 15(c) serving as a trap for the unwary
in its 1966 amendments to the Rules. Instead, the resulting Rule 15(c) in effect
from 1966 to 1991 was all too susceptible to such construction.
The adoption and subsequent modification of Rule 11 also reveals a shoot-
from-the-hip rulemaking process in which insiders quietly but quickly decided to
"do something" about a perceived problem with frivolous litigation and then saw
their handiwork made perhaps even worse by the Court's opinions construing the
Rule in decisions that did not provide much meaningful guidance for lower courts
and litigators. In reaction to widespread dissatisfaction, Rule 11 was amended
substantially 10 years after its enactment but the resulting current Rule 11 still
leaves much of the legal community unhappy.
279 The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 did not result from Court interpretation
but nonetheless proved highly unpopular with the bar, which lobbied hard for
change throughout the 1980s, culminating in the Amended Rule 11 which took
effect on December 1, 1993. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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tem;280 or the criticism or suggestions of scholarly writings
take hold among the Advisory Committee.8 Well before law
mirrors the rigidity of the natural sciences, we can and should
demand a bit more proof of a need for change before the
rulemaking process clicks into gear.
New legislation should require that, as a prerequisite for
amending the rules, the Advisory Committee draft and circu-
late for comment a Memorandum of Notice of Possible Amend-
ment which examines the Rule and area at issue and makes
the case for a serious consideration of a possible amendment.
The Act should provide for a wide required circulation of this
Memorandum, any Discussion Drafts of possible amendments
and, finally, any officially Proposed Amended Rules. This new
"early" public comment period would be in addition to the
existing period of public comment available once the Advisory
Committee has embraced a proposed amendment. After com-
ments on the Memorandum are evaluated, the Advisory Com-
mittee should be required to hold public hearings if it desires
to go forward with a planned amendment. The Committee also
would have the option and government financial support for
holding such hearings at the outset to aid it in determining
whether to continue with the Memorandum and to assist it in
the writing of the Memorandum and any subsequent draft
Proposed Amended Rules.
Currently, there is no requirement of a Memorandum
making the case for change, although the Reporter's Note often
2. The 1992 consideration of revising Rule 56 (disapproved by the Judicial
Conference late in the process) and circulation of a possible draft Rule 68 due to
the interest of Judge William Schwarzer provide recent illustration. Chief Justice
Burger's activity relating to service of process and Rule 68 fee-shifting during the
early 1980s are also examples. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
... Ironically, the unpopular 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was spurred by sharp
criticism of its toothless precedessor. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading
and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1976) (finding old Rule 11 used in only 23
reported cases in nearly 40 years); see also COUND ET AL., supra note 30, at 545
(attributing 1983 change to rare use of pre-1983 version of Rule 11). Obviously,
the general dissatisfaction with perceived excessive litigation of the late 1970s and
1980s, see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text, made Professor Risinger's
criticisms more salient. A historical example is the 1966 amendment to class ac-
tion Rule 23, spurred in part by scholarly criticism of the former class action
structure and terminology. See COUND ET AL., supra note 30, at 656-58; Harry
Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941).
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assumes, this role. Moreover, there is no requirement that
"unofficial" drafts be circulated for comment to anyone outside
the official rulemaking process except to the extent that the
Judicial Conference or the Advisory Committee so desire.
Hearings and widespread notification that something is in the
offing occur only after the Advisory Committee has already
coalesced around a Proposed Amended Rule. I find this trou-
blesome. Those outside the rulemaking process are not invited
to brainstorm with the rulemakers but only to react to their
product, often after an official proposal already supported by
the Advisory Committee has gathered momentum. A certain
"leave it to us" tone surrounds today's rulemaking process
notwithstanding all of the superficial openness Congress man-
dated in 1988. For example, when former Civil Rules Advisory
Committee Reporter Paul Carrington proposed increased pro-
fessional participation in the rulemaking process, he suggested
the formation of a group to lobby Congress on behalf of pro-
posed Rules, a group that as a "primary function" would "orga-
nize and orchestrate efforts to protect the rules in Congress
and to provide a constituency for the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority under the Rules Enabling Act."28 2 In
effect, Professor Carrington proposed a legal "cheerleading
corps" for the Advisory Committee. Conspicuously absent from
his proposed "reform," though, is any suggestion that the legal
profession and society at large should be more involved in
formulating the products he wants "sold" to Congress.
Instead of asking lawyers to make the stark choice of be-
ing either a rubber stamp or a howling mob in opposition to
change, the litigation reform process should begin treating
them as a source of information, ideas and assessment
throughout the process. This model of litigation reform would
retain the judge-centered deliberative mode of the Enabling
Act while incorporating some aspects of the legislative process
at its most open. For example, Congress often holds hearings
on an issue before debating and drafting legislation on the
matter. So, too, should the Advisory Committee. Regrettably,
both the modern Congress and the modern Committees now
too often draft first and ask questions later. In the case of
Congress, however, this may occur in large part because the
282 See Carrington, supra note 92, at 166.
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electorate seems to demand it.
Although it may seem more efficient to focus discussion on
a draft and move forward with a proposal rather than merely
talking about it, this method extracts a price. Within the inner
sanctum of Congress or the rulemaking process, only a compar-
ative few have access to the drafters and sponsors of new laws
and rules. Although these insiders often are public spirited,
they are nonetheless insiders: their ability to set the agenda
and frame the debate holds troubling potential to anyone who
finds the public choice literature even slightly persuasive.283
Obviously, of course, the Advisory Committee will not explore
an issue-under my proposed model or any other-unless in-
clined to see the matter as potentially ripe for change. None-
theless, the process would be improved by attempting to keep
Rules reform as close to "zero-based" alteration as possible.
At all junctures, there should be required opportunity for
participation by the legal profession at large. In addition to
notifying the practicing bar, the law school community should
be notified as well, probably through correspondence with the
Deans of ABA-accredited schools. Also part of the legal profes-
sion are the Justice Department and government lawyers.
Furthermore, the Executive Branch qua Executive Branch
should be consulted, probably through the Office of White
House Counsel. Hearings, the Memorandum and informal
drafts should be as widely publicized as possible. Any hearings
should be announced well in advance in the major case report-
ers and legal periodicals as well as general circulation newspa-
pers in the city in which a hearing is held. A Memorandum of
Possible Amendment should be published widely, more widely
than the drafts for public comment that are now circulated.
Any "informal" drafts should be provided to the major bar and
law reform organizations such as the ABA, ALI and the bar
associations of each state and major cities such as New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles and so on.
In addition, meaningful consultation with the profession
requires a more restrained pace of evaluation. The period of
comment on either a Memorandum or an informally circulated
" See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (summarizing and analyzing public
choice theories of undue interest group influence on legislation and public policy).
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Rule draft should be at least six months. Actual Proposed
Amended Rules could also be circulated much as they are to-
day. Despite the air of urgency that often grips those lobbying
for change, few aspects of litigation structure are likely to be
so defective as to require immediate systematic change; I chal-
lenge readers to name one. Acting in an atmosphere of crisis
will almost certainly diminish the resulting product. Instead,
the emphasis should be preservation of the status quo and
more thorough analysis; change would be appropriate only
after an almost unquestionably persuasive case has been made
and the proposed change is widely supported, well-drafted and,
perhaps, even tested so that, unlike Rule 11, it is likely to
wear well under daily pressure. Congress should provide suffi-
cient funds to support field study, case study and other empiri-
cal research on problematic areas and possible amendments to
the Rules. Although I would stop short of requiring such
studies to be part of each Memorandum of Possible Amend-
ment, any proposal for change backed without such study
should bear a presumption against it.
Much of my suggested change in rulemaking involves
mandating a regularized effort to expand the number of per-
sons who have a realistic opportunity to comment on possible
changes. I realize that much of the legal literature of the past
decade has been awash in analysis of interpretative communi-
ties." However, advocacy of the legal interpretative communi-
ty as a solution to perceived problems of indeterminacy of
meaning and legitimacy when enforcing arguably ambiguous
laws has suffered from a relatively cloudy vision of just who
constitutes the authoritative interpretative community, how it
is constituted and why it deserves authoritative status.285 Per-
2. An interpretative community is the group of readers making reference to a
particular text used by them in carrying out a collective function. For example,
newspaper readers can be viewed as an interpretative community, although the
term connotes a more narrow and specialized group with some sphere of authority
to act upon the consequences of their interpretation. Federal judges responding to
the Constitution are perhaps a classic illustration of an interpretative community.
See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS?, supra note 157; Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
28 See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13-14 (1988); Paul
Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661 (1985) (observing that the act of in-
terpreting legal texts is "inevitably affected by the interpreter's experiences and
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haps by fiat, my proposal avoids these pitfalls through legislat-
ing the parameters-wide parameters-of the community. In
addition, my proposal does not deal with interpretation, at
least not textual interpretation but rather with policymaking.
It seeks to define with some precision the membership and
authority of the litigation policymaking community.
In addition, the Supreme Court must return to a more
active role in which the Justices in fact function to some de-
gree as a substantive screen upon the product of the Judicial
Conference. Although there are substantial costs to this be-
cause of the demands on the Court's time, the costs of ill-
thought rulemaking are also substantial. Despite Justice
White's misgivings about tinkering with trial court rules from
the high perch of the Court, the Justices-should they reas-
sume a role of closely studying the proposed rules-could pro-
vide a valuable layer of additional scrutiny: all are lawyers of
some accomplishment; all are trained to assimilate occasionally
vast records like those already generated by the current public
comment provisions of the Enabling Act; and the members of
Court are selected over a period of many years which is likely
to reduce the chances that the Justices will fall victim to the
occasional groupthink that can grip a study commission or an
action committee. Even where rules are forwarded to Congress,
dissenting Justices can raise and frame important issues for
future consideration.
2. Improving Congressional Litigation Reform Activity
The same expansion I propose for rulemaking should be
brought to the legislative arena. Although Congress is unlikely
to restrict members from ever introducing legislation in ad-
vance of analysis, my ideal litigation reform system would lean
in that direction by requiring that legislation affecting the
courts be referred to the bench and bar, as well as Executive
Branch entities, for comment as a prerequisite for holding
interests," which prompts inquiries into counter-majoritarian aspects of our judicial
system). But see Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reserva-
tions About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987) (decree-
ing authoritative meaning of legal texts is act of power rather than pure literary
interpretation; obscuring this fact can lead to inequitable raw exercises of power
hidden in the more benign sheepskin of community interpretation).
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hearings on the proposed bill. Operationalizing this referral to
the bench would be relatively easy. Comments could be re-
quired from the Judicial Conference and the Federal Judicial
Center. Notification of the legislation should be sent and an
opportunity to comment provided to all federal judges and all
state high courts. Moreover, while mailing to the entire bar is
impractical, mailing to the bar associations who receive notice
of informal drafts of Proposed Amended Rules would not be
difficult. As with Rules revision, Deans of all ABA-accredited
law schools should receive the legislation and notice of oppor-
tunity to comment.
The comments should be docketed in Congress and provid-
ed to all members of the relevant Congressional Committee.
Presumably, Congress will not trigger my suggested pre-hear-
ing comment process unless the bill is important, the member
intent on pressing it or the legislation has a serious possibility
of at least receiving a hearing. If a hearing is held on proposed
legislation affecting courts, the Committee should ensure ade-
quate representation by bench, bar and the academy. Much
current Congressional assembly of witnesses for a legislative
hearing seems to proceed on the basis of assembling big wheels
(the official spokespersons of affected institutions) and squeaky
wheels (representatives of groups known to favor or oppose the
suggested change, often for partisan reasons),' with the occa-
2" Although to some extent, government by squeaky wheels is part and parcel
of a democracy, too much of this sort of responsiveness to the most rabidly inter-
ested parties may make for bad public policy. Interested legal partisans (e.g., de-
fense lawyers, plaintiffs' lawyers, manufacturers, insurers) obviously may be pro-
moting their own self-interested agenda rather than the commonwealth. Behaving
like Washington insiders, they are likely to monitor developments closely on a
regular basis and to have established contacts in Congress and the Executive
agencies. If Congress quickly accommodates these groups' requests to dominate
hearing testimony, this shrinks or eliminates the available openings for more neu-
tral persons or organizations whose very neutrality and detachment makes them
less likely to be the first to call Congress to seek an audience on litigation mat-
ters.
For example, the House in 1993 responded quickly to the Supreme Court's
April 22 transmittal of proposed Federal Rules amendments (see supra notes 67-68
and accompanying text, describing the amendments), scheduling a day of hearings
in mid-June. By the time the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
requested participation in the hearing, the list of witnesses was virtually complete.
It was comprised of proponents of the Rules changes from the judiciary faced by
opponents from interest groups of lawyers (e.g., the defense-oriented Lawyers for
Civil Justice and the liberal civil rights group Public Citizen); only one slot initial-
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sional star or human interest witness testifying as Well." 7
Too often, representatives of the neutral mainstream seem to
be absent. Yet, legislating openness and representation into
fixed criteria for selecting witnesses is problematic. At the very
least, however, Congress should attempt to hear from the legal
profession at large by contacting representatives of bench and
bar through their umbrella organizations rather than allowing
congressional information to be dominated by "special inter-
ests" within the profession.
If legislation is viewed favorably after hearing and report-
ed out of committee, there should be a required "Judicial Im-
pact Statement" compiled by the Federal Judicial Center, the
Judicial Conference or the relevant congressional committee,
provided that the judiciary receives fair opportunity to review
and criticize the statement. This change has long been advo-
cated by prominent jurists and supported by the ABA. It has
been introduced as legislation, but to no avail. 8 The pro-
posed Judicial Impact Statement probably should be renamed
and should not be analogized too closely to the environmental
impact statements required by much environmental legislation.
Environmental statements have acquired a reputation as much
work, often for little payoff, with much attendant delay. With-
out entering into the pro-con fray over environmental state-
ments, I stress that the Judicial Impact Statement envisioned
by the proposed legislation and the bench is a less cumbersome
document that could be satisfied by sufficient reflection and a
minimum of field research. It is not intended to thwart or
unduly delay change but rather to force legislators to consider
seriously the effect of their proposals.
ly was allotted to a bar association representative. The House subcommittee staffs
inclination to view testimony by one bar group (the ABA Litigation Section) as
sufficient, precludes testimony by other bar associations.
' For example, congressional hearings on law reform issues often call as wit-
nesses litigants who have suffered harm under the status quo system which is
likely to change as a result of proposed legislation. For example, when Congress
considered civil rights legislation to overrule the Court's narrow interpretation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), un-
successful plaintiff Brenda Patterson was a witness.
Another common type of witness is the proponent or opponent with fame or
media star status. For example, actor Robert Redford has testified on behalf of
environmental legislation and singers John Mellencamp and Willie Nelson testified
on behalf of bills designed to aid farmers.
2. See, e.g., S. 1569, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 602 (1992).
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Although requiring these statements would of course add
another layer to legislating, the potential policy gain probably
exceeds the modest procedural cost in that such statements
would put Congress on notice of the ramifications of seemingly
benign change and mute the legislative tendency to add bur-
dens to the court system at the same time that it criticizes the
courts for being slow and expensive.
All of these increased efforts to gather professional input
into the generation, drafting and revision of legislation will
undoubtedly require more time. In general, each stage of the
process should allow a minimum of six months for notified
parties to respond. Although critics may view this as excessive,
I think this is the minimally adequate period for commentary
if this system is to work. By definition, some of the lawyers
with the most interesting observations will be some of the
busiest and, therefore, will require a decent interval to frame a
thoughtful response. To the extent that responding to a pro-
posed Rule requires substantial legal research or empirical
investigation, time pressures are increased. Consequently,
broad circulation of materials but short deadlines for response
are no solution as they do not effectively expand the
profession's opportunity for access. In addition, short time
periods add to the atmosphere of false urgency that seems
unnecessarily to surround litigation reform.
3. The Almost Apt Administrative Law Model
After this Symposium had taken place, an important arti-
cle appeared about rulemaking reform in which Professor
Laurens Walker advanced criticisms of the process similar to
my own289 and also advanced a somewhat different and more
specific solution. Professor Walker decries the excessively un-
bridled discretion of the rulemakers and the ad hoc
"incrementalism" of the continuous trickle of rules reform.29
2"9 See Walker, supra note 59, at 459 (Advisory Committee amends rules "chief-
ly on the basis of personal experience, opinion, and intuition").
20 Id. at 461-64, 475-77. Professor Walker describes Colin Diver's characteriza-
tion of the incremental model of rulemaking as having the distinctive features of
(1) piecemeal policymaking "tightly restricted in scope;" (2) a dynamic and remedi-
al process; and (3) decentralization, finding that the current litigation rulemaking
system largely fits this model. Id. at 475-77 (citing Colin S. Diver, Policymaking
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In its place, he would prefer a "comprehensive rationality"
model of rulemaking,29' in which the Supreme Court enters a
rulemaking order similar to Executive Order No. 12,291,292
which sets forth similar criteria for agency rulemaking and for
the monitoring and enforcement of agencies by the Office of
Management and Budget. Professor Walker's proposed Court
order would provide that the Advisory Committee must:
(1) make rules based on adequate information;
(2) refrain from rulemaking unless the "potential benefits
to society outweigh the potential costs;"
(3) "pursue objectives chosen to maximize the net benefits
to society;"
(4) "choose the alternative involving the least cost to soci-
ety;" and
(5) attempt to maximize net social benefit in its rules poli-
cy. 29
3
Although I am attracted to a more aspiringly rational,
forward-looking and less ad hoc rulemaking process, I am both
troubled by the express deification of cost-benefit analysis in
Professor Walker's proposal and the fear that by wrapping
itself in the robes of rationality, the rulemaking process might
well continue to operate as the same nonempirical insiders
game played with more force and more success. The language
of administrative law may sound more rigorous and scientific,
but the events of the past two decades do not suggest that the
administrative law rulemaking system has been functioning
any better than the litigation reform system, 94 which has
Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 399 (1981)). There's that
word "paradigm" again!
"i This classification is also Professor Diver's, by which he means that the
decisionmaker (1) specifies her goal; (2) identifies "all possible methods of reach-
ing" the objective; (3) evaluates the effectiveness of each method; and (4) selects
the alternative that "will make the greatest progress toward the desired outcome."
Walker, supra note 59, at 475-76 (citing Diver, supra note 290, at 396-99, 409-28).
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
Walker, supra note 59, at 464.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP K. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 493-95 (1988) (describing "l'affaire Gorsuch,"
regarding possibly poor EPA performance thwarting objective of legislation and
executive hostility toward cooperation with Congress); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1681-88
(1975) (agency co-optation a problem under any model of decisionmaking due to
interest group influence and other public choice factors).
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been dominated by the comprehensive rationality model,295 at
least in theory.
In particular, cost-benefit analysis always poses the dan-
ger of becoming a mere Kaldor-Hicks efficiency yardstick by
which litigation policy is measured. Recall that under the pre-
vailing economists' definition of efficiency, a transaction is
efficient if those benefitting gain enough to retain some of the
gain and yet have the capacity to compensate those disfavored
by the change.9 6 Unfortunately, the point of much of the le-
gal system is to enhance justice and stability even if that en-
hancement occurs at the expense of efficiency. In addition, the
whole point of much litigation is to assign blame and penalty.
Consequently, it might be a very good rule of civil litigation to
impose small costs (although large in the aggregate) on many
persons in order to grant moderate benefits with accuracy or to
impose moderate penalties upon certain litigants. Although,
strictly speaking, I am probably applying cost-benefit analysis
in labeling this hypothetical rule "good" because I value accu-
racy and desert more than the additional processing costs,
many observers would simply say that I am willing to impose a
cost on the many for the benefit of the comparative few.
In real life, I seldom expect to defend such awkward posi-
tions. For example, permitting discovery in civil litigation rais-
es costs for many but it undoubtedly benefits many as well,
even though a large number of litigants do not benefit at all
from its availability. No matter how the numbers are crunched
today or in the mythical future when we possess better field
research, I expect that no case could be made for abolishing or
sharply curtailing discovery. However, if ninety-nine percent of
the litigants saw no benefit from its availability, I would be on
thin ice as a discovery defender unless the one percent of bene-
ficiaries gained momentously or were far more deserving than
those who shouldered discovery costs without benefit.
In addition, the expressly venerated cost-benefit construct
may lead policymakers to overemphasize the more easily quan-
tified costs and benefits-such as faster resolution or fewer
' See Walker, supra note 59, at 475 (citing Diver, supra note 290, at 396-99,
407-28). According to Diver, the comprehensive rationality or "synoptic paradigm"
now prevails in administrative law.
2 See POSNER, supra note 218, at 13-14.
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expenditures on court personnel-rather than matters equally
important but less amenable to numeric valuation, such as
litigant satisfaction, accurate results, just deserts for the par-
ties or reduced unethical lawyering.297 Unless very rigorously
applied, such self-conscious cost-benefit analysis may simply
become intuitive decisionmaking in which the rulemakers
assign variable but not necessarily accurate weights to the
many competing issues that animate rules reform debate.
Given that lawyers and judges are seen so frequently as empir-
ically inept and drawn toward positions more by experience,
ideology and intuition (a criticism Professor Walker himself
makes),29 I have little cause for optimism that the compre-
hensive rationality model would be rigorously and wisely ap-
plied rather than becoming a scientific-sounding justification of
the preconceived notions of the rulemaking elite.
In addition, Professor Walker adopts the comprehensive
rationality or "synoptic" model of administrative rulemaking
without any apparent consideration of other models of
rulemaking. Specifically, administrative law scholars, although
acknowledging the traditional dominance of the synoptic mod-
el, have also recognized a "pluralist" model and a more recent
"civic republican" model of rulemaking. Under the pluralist
model, rules are made less by resort to seemingly objective
technical cost-benefit analysis and more by political
decisionmaking as various groups with divergent interests
fight to prevail in the rulemaking process. 9 In contrast to
the pluralist model in which groups bring their pre-existing
preferences to the political arena and either succeed, compro-
mise or fail, under the civil republican model, the political
community engages in deliberation in which the citizenry at-
tempts to arrive at a shared conception of the "common good"
2"? To his credit, Professor Walker appreciates this criticism although he rejects
it. See Walker, supra note 59, at 480-81 (citing Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis: An Ethical Critique, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 33 (making criticisms similar to
mine) and James V. Delong, Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Replies to Steven
Kelman, REG., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 39 (supporting cost-benefit analysis concept as
does Professor Walker)).
2. See Walker, supra note 59, at 487-88 nn.249-50 (citing Maurice Rosenberg,
The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies on the Administration of Justice, 51 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 25-27 (1988)).
2" See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
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and to make administrative rules designed to foster that com-
mon good.3"'
The synoptic model of seemingly objective, noncontrover-
sial, technical problem-solving can work well and seems per-
fectly apt so long as there is widespread consensus on the goals
of rulemaking and the relative weighing of various costs and
benefits. Where this exists, the body politic will not only toler-
ate but may insist upon a "scientific" approach to rulemaking
or other public policy issues. Where society is divided on goals,
assumptions or valuation, the synoptic model will be subjective
and distributional in effect. In such cases, society might well
be better off to spurn or modify the synoptic model for a
pluralist approach that tackles divisive political issues head-on
or a civic republican approach that openly attempts to find
common ground among diverse factions.
Because differing values, goals, opinions and idealogy
permeate both the legal profession and society's view of litiga-
tion, adopting a completely synoptic model of civil rulemaking
seems inappropriate. The system must openly acknowledge
this and avoid the potential "blue smoke and mirrors" of adopt-
ing a more cerebral-sounding litigation reform process. By the
same token, however, civil rulemaking should not be trans-
formed into a completely political or partisan enterprise. In-
stead, the reform process should expand and institutionalize
widespread participation and criticism of proposed changes,
work toward nonpartisan attitudes in rulemaking, and insist
on more solid research about and testing of reform proposals
without attaching to them arbitrary numeric values. In es-
sence, I am advocating something of a civic republican
rulemaking process in which opinion is widely sampled to
achieve consensus where possible, make candid political choic-
es where necessary, and implement those decisions in a delib-
erative and rational manner.
" See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1542-58 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 29 (1985). Although not every observer would agree with this classification
of current models of rulemaking, the tripartite division and characterization is
based on scholarly writings in the field even though the authors themselves have
not used this terminology. See Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judi-
cial Review after Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of
Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991) (developing classification).
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By guaranteeing that rulemaking not become too much of
an insider's game and seeking cross-representation of the pro-
fession, the reform process can achieve de facto cost-benefit
analysis and thorough examination of particular proposals.
Consequently, one method that Professor Walker suggests
borrowing from administrative law is particularly promising:
0MB-like record-keeping and disclosure procedures in which
drafts of new rules and correspondence with committee mem-
bers are available to interested parties, with logs maintained
of communications involving the rulemakers.3 °' Likewise,
Professor Walker is right to urge rulemakers to consider all op-
tions-so long as the rulemakers realize that restraint is one
option always worth considering. In addition, the notion of a
long-term, comprehensive agenda and routinized data-gather-
ing implicit in the comprehensive rationality model could well
improve the litigation reform process. However, in light of the
unwillingness of the other two branches to fund the judiciary
adequately, one must seriously fear insufficient funds to imple-
ment and maintain adequately a well-functioning version of
Professor Walker's model within the existing judge-centered
litigation reform paradigm of the Enabling Act."2
Perhaps Professor Walker's administrative law would
improve upon the status quo. But perhaps, as I fear, it would
be an overcorrection. Out of caution alone, however, I view
such an overhaul as premature. Despite the recent changes in
adjudicatory procedure and litigation reform, the rulemaking
process does not appear to require radical surgery. As a first
step, more modest reforms seem worth attempting. I prefer to
work within the existing framework, traditions, lawyer traits
and incremental model0 3 first before making more far-reach-
ing changes.
In addition to holding some normal suspicions of sudden
change, I also argue that preferred solutions are those that
refrain from making modern lawmaking any more complex
"' Walker, supra note 59, at 483; see also Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Over-
sight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact, 25 IND. L. REV. 299,
314-18 (1991) (describing current OMB disclosure practices).
2 See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
3 See Walker, supra note 59, at 476 (citing Diver, supra note 290, at 428-34)
(neither incremental or comprehensive model is inherently superior; proper choice
depends on context of policymaking).
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than it has already become. In his thoughtful article on the
subject, Peter Schuck identified our legal system as complex
according to criteria of density, technicality, differentiation and
indeterminacy.0 4 According to Professor Schuck, "[d]ensity
and technicality are chiefly aspects of the system's rules. Dense
rules are numerous and encompassing .... Technical rules
require special sophistication or expertise on the part of those
who wish to understand and apply them.""5 A system is in-
stitutionally differentiated when there are several different
sources of legitimacy, decision processes and so on.3"6 Indeter-
minacy of course, is uncertainty.0 7 A new administrative law
model of litigation reform would certainly make the reform
process more technical and, thus, more complex, especially if
imposed upon the existing judge-centered model of personnel
and operation. In my view, it would also make the reform
process more dense as new rules or methods for implementing
the new system arise. Because cost-benefit analysis is so mal-
leable, it is not even clear that Professor Walker's proposal
would make rulemaking outcomes and objectives any less un-
certain than they are today. The comprehensive rationality
model would not make ruleinaking or litigation reform less
institutionally differentiated unless Congress was so impressed
with the results that it returned to a mode of virtual deference
to the judge-centered rulemaking apparatus. In short, the
administrative law model seems certain to increase the com-
plexity of litigation reform more greatly, a result generally to
be avoided unless one is quite confident of enjoying posited
potential gains.08
C. Too Important to be Left to the Generals-Entirely
Recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated Clemenceau's
famous dictum that "war is too important to be left to the
generals" and added that
the shape of the federal court system is too important to be left to
See Schuck, supra note 104, at 3.
"' Id. at 3-4.
3' Id. at 4.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 18-25, 39-51.
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the judges. The [Judicial Conference Long-Range Planning] Commit-
tee must develop its vision of the future and shape of the federal
judiciary in part by listening to all those who have an interest in the
work of the federal courts. °
Although the Chief Justice's admonition related strictly to the
Judicial Conference's Long-Range Planning Committee, his
praiseworthy sentiment applies to law reform in general. How-
ever, I would modify slightly Clemenceau's statement: litiga-
tion reform is too important to be left to the judiciary or the
bar-entirely.3 10 In addition, the judiciary must do more than
give mere lip service to a policy of inclusion. The Long-Range
Planning Committee so glowingly invoked by Chief Justice
Rehnquist itself held meetings in 1993 and 1994 that are
among the least publicized in the Western world. Many law-
yers might have something to say to the Committee, if only
they knew about the Committee, its meetings and the proce-
dure for participating.
I stress that the "experts" in civil litigation should be de-
fined to include not only the bench but the bar as well. Among
many in the profession, the conventional wisdom posits that
judges are far more able than members of the bar to manage
the business of litigation reform: by definition they are "in
court" more than other lawyers; they are detached from con-
cerns of client representation; and they lack the economic in-
centive that can warp one's analysis. Although these observa-
tions are partially if not predominantly true, I nonetheless feel
strongly that judges should be only slightly more equal than
other lawyers in their impact on litigation reform. Under the
current system-or nonsystem for those who see chaos rather
than a shift in paradigms-we face the odd incoherence of a
litigation reform apparatus in which a small group of judges is
far more influential than lawyers or even judges at large, but
where the judiciary is simultaneously far less powerful than a
" See Rehnquist, supra note 136, at 4 (quoting Georges Clemenceau, Premier
of France during World War I).
31' This revised version of the Clemenceau creed probably applies to war, or
virtually anything else, in cautioning society never to abdicate supervision com-
pletely to the relevant specialists for fear the specialists' views may diverge too
greatly from the needs or preferences of society. Society should not abdicate to the
specialists but neither should it reject the knowledge of the experts out of a mis-
begotten populism.
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small number of elected or appointed officials. Some realloca-
tion of power and communication is in order to remedy both
aspects of this inconsistency.
At present, the current institutionalized channels by which
the legal profession may seek reform are almost entirely judge-
dominated. In particular, the federal rulemaking apparatus is
operated by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference.
While a few non-judges are members of the Civil Rules Adviso-
ry Committee, the Committee is dominated by judges, both in
absolute numbers and by the reality that the Committee and a
few judicial members have historically dominated the
Committee's agenda and determined its product."1 ' The attor-
ney members of the Committee, on the other hand, have ap-
peared less visible. Furthermore, practitioner-members histori-
cally have worked for the federal government or large law
firms, leaving large segments of the practicing bar relatively
"unrepresented."312
Law professor Committee members may be more influen-
tial, particularly because a law professor is usually the
Committee's Reporter, who thus has the opportunity to shape
outcomes at the margin through having greatest impact on the
actual drafting of a proposed amendment. In addition, the
Reporter has in recent years acted as something of an advance
scout measuring bar sentiment."3 Nonetheless, the Report is
to a substantial extent a conduit, drafting possible amend-
ments in response to Committee requests, and possesses no
311 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
312 To be sure, the practicing bar is not strictly "frozen out" of rules revision. It
may still respond with public comment on proposed amendments. However, indi-
vidual lawyers or bar organizations are not guaranteed the right to appear at pub-
lic hearings and are not automatically granted a chance for "input" prior to the
release for public comment of a draft amendment. By this time, of course, the
Committee may be quite committed to a position (e.g., disclosure) and, thus, be
relatively difficult to dissuade, making the bar's participation less meaningful. See
also supra note 286 and accompanying text.
313 For example, both former Reporter Professor Paul Carrington of Duke and
Professor Edward Cooper of Michigan have routinely circulated "unofficial" discus-
sion drafts of possible proposed amendments to bar associations, other scholars or
individual prominent lawyers in order to obtain reactions. Presumably, the
Reporter's assessment of the reaction as communicated to the Committee is impor-
tant for determining the fate of a possible amended rule. However, the process of
circulation for "informal comment," while not really secretive, appears to be quite
ad hoc and does not appear to represent a systematic attempt to survey early bar
or public reaction to a proposal.
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veto power over the operation.314
Nonetheless, the bench largely controls the Committee's
work product, perhaps more today than ever. A comparison of
the original Advisory Committee membership with that of
recent Committees emphasizes the point. The inaugural Com-
mittee was chaired by former Attorney General William Mitch-
ell and relied heavily on its Reporter, Dean Charles Clark of
Yale, as well as influential Michigan Professor Edson
Sunderland, who historians view as the primary figure in
drafting the discovery rules. Other prominent practitioners on
the Committee included Edgar Tolman, a prominent Chicago
lawyer and special assistant to the Attorney General and edi-
tor of the ABA Journal, George Wharton Pepper, a former U.S.
Senator and prominent Philadelphia lawyer, and ALI Presi-
dent George Wickersham.315 The modern Committees have
been chaired by judges and dominated by judges. Practitioners
have clearly faded away from the inner circle of the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee at the same time that the profession has
been officially entitled to outside participation through the
public comment and hearing process. As anyone familiar with
politics and public policy will attest, insiders are more influen-
tial than outsiders.
The current Advisory Committee structure may have left
procedural rules reform too much in the hands of law's "gener-
als"-the judiciary-at the expense of its lieutenants, sergeants
and front-line soldiers-the practicing bar, other legal actors
(e.g., court personnel, paralegals, law enforcement officers) and
clients. A significant but easily remedied part of the problem is
the excessive power of the Chief Justice in selecting rules com-
mittee members. Although the Chief is scrutinized in many
ways during the confirmation process, this inquiry historically
has ignored the Chiefs views on rulemaking and court proce-
dure. There simply is no basis for believing that the Chief
'" For example, current Reporter Professor Edward Cooper recently circulated a
discussion draft of a possible revised Rule 68 for which the Committee apparently
decided to "test the waters," because the advocate of the proposal was influential
Judge William Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center. Whether the
Reporter endorsed this proposal is unknown and irrelevant-the Reporter was
required to draft and circulate it. The Reporter is, however, free to suggest and
advocate particular amendments.
315 See Resnik, supra note 22, at 498-500 & nn.19 & 24.
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exercises the appointment power in any way consistent with
the views of the bench, bar or society at large. In the hands of
a Chief with a hidden agenda, the appointment power can be
used to subvert a representative rulemaking process. New
legislation should provide for rules committee appointments
through other means,316 including requiring expanded repre-
sentation of practitioners in the Advisory Committee process
and should provide a means of tapping for service lawyers
beyond those employed by the largest elite commercial firms or
the government.
Simultaneously, we have seen quite of bit of participation
and influence by "nonexperts" in litigation through congres-
sional activity. Although most Senators and Representatives
are lawyers, they can hardly be termed litigation experts. Al-
though nonexperts, particularly clients, must have a voice in
litigation reform, in most cases, it should be a diminished voice
as compared to that of the legal profession.317 Still missing
from my purported Nirvana of cautious and participatory liti-
gation reform is a complete answer to the problems of lay par-
ticipation. When either Congress or federal rulemakers speak
of lay participation, they tend to mean participation by the
elite or a massively aggregated laity represented by profession-
al lobbyists. Although there remains nothing inherently wrong
with lobbyist feedback as a surrogate for that of "real people,"
most real folks are not represented by lobbyists except in the
most attenuated way. 8 The mythical average person whose
only contact with litigation is through an insurer-selected de-
fense lawyer or a contingency fee personal injury lawyer may
316 One possibility would have the Chief Justice appoint a fourth of a
committee's membership, with the Judicial Conference, Congress and a rotating
group of major bar associations also each appointing a fourth of each Committee. I
am relatively unconcerned with the exact formula for decentralization so long as
greater decentralization of the appointment power occurs.
317 I also urge a prominent role for legal scholars as well. Although some will
accuse us of being impractical while others will trot out the old myth of academics
being unduly left-wing, in my view the correct assessment is that law professors,
despite lacking a complete appreciation of the nuances of practice, on the whole
are credible sources for litigation reform decisions because of their detachment and
concentrated expertise.
318 For example, my parents have the American Association of Retired Persons
("AARP"); I have the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association ("TIAA); my wife
has the Catholic Church, which misrepresents her on several issues; my kids have
the Children's Defense Fund and Hockey USA.
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have meaningful information for litigation policymakers but it
remains hard to tap. Until a better idea emerges, I am forced
to hope merely that my institutionalized expansion of expert
consultation raises the profile of these issues sufficiently to
increase lay participation.
CONCLUSION
Current developments in litigation reform and adjudicato-
ry procedure have elements of both a new paradigm and a
crumbling construct. The legal profession's relative consensus
which fueled passage of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 and
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 has
fragmented. Litigation reform now involves a more active Con-
gress and special interest groups. The multi-sourced reform
movement will probably not recede to a more integrated model
in the near future. But although multi-pronged efforts at litiga-
tion change are part of the new status quo, they have yet to
emerge as a full-fledged new paradigm. Perhaps, however, this
is merely the legal profession's version of normal science as the
conventional wisdom is tested at the margin through applica-
tion to new situations.
Although the ebb-and-flow of policy activism probably will
allow the judiciary to hold the inside track in litigation reform,
the process as a whole has been both expanded and politicized.
Just as "tax reform" seems to be a recurring feature on the
political landscape,319 litigation reform has become prominent
on the landscape of law as judges, legislators, scholars, think
tanks, business groups and various elements of practicing bar
all seek to show their continued commitment for improving the
world of dispute resolution, at least for their respective constit-
uencies. But like anything else, eclectic variety can prove too
much of a good thing. National policymakers should begin to
seek more rather than less integration of bench, bar, Congress
and the executive in the process of governing America's civil
319 See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1990) (combination of highly motivated interest groups and politicians'
desire to be seen as doing something about tax reform leads to frequent revisiting
of tax policy despite economists' consensus that such frequent shifts in the law are
highly inefficient).
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cases while simultaneously institutionalizing expanded oppor-
tunities for broad-based participation by rank-and-file lawyers
and litigants.
